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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

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**PRC To Sign Chemical Weapons Convention**

*OW1612132992 Beijing XINHUA in English  
1313 GMT 16 Dec 92*

[Excerpt] Beijing, December 16 (XINHUA)—Chinese State Councillor and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen is to

visit Africa next January, as he did annually in the previous years, and will sign the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on behalf of the Chinese Government.

The foreign minister announced this at a new year reception hosted by the Information Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry here today. [passage omitted]

## BULGARIA

## Costs of Disarming Under CFE Treaty Surveyed

AU1112095792 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian  
8 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Georgi Peshev: "Some Arms Producers Protest About the Prosperity of their Business, While Others Destroy Weapons for 40 Months"]

[Excerpts] The engineering plants threaten to strike, while trade union leader Krustu Petkov claims that the civil disobedience of the arms workers in Kazanluk is a warning that our arms plants are about to collapse. This subject will remain topical for a long time to come, but the public should know that the 40-month period of the CFE [Conventional Forces in Europe] Treaty, to which we are signatories, will expire on 17 November 1995. According to the treaty, we have to implement a process of intensive disarmament, which also costs a lot of money.

As regards combat aircraft, we will be deprived of hundreds of planes, which will be destroyed in Graf Ignatievo and Bezmer by one of three methods: by cutting into small pieces, by deformation, or by using them as targets. According to Colonel Engineer Lyubomir Gechev, head of the Disarmament Department of the General Staff, almost half of the aircraft due to be destroyed (Mig-15 and Mig-17) have already been removed from operational service. The Mig-21 is also an outdated aircraft, and by the end of the period provided under the treaty will have almost completed its maximum flying life, so that the loss is not so great as appears at first glance. For an army like ours, 235 aircraft are quite sufficient if we put the emphasis on high performance. (At the moment our defense budget is unlikely to permit the purchase of modern equipment.) Here we should not forget that in the event of a flying accident the aircraft in question is deducted from the list of planes to be destroyed provided that we notify the treaty member states of the incident and provide them with the relevant documentation and evidence within 90 days.

During the initial period, the Vola Military Repair Plant at Vratsa will destroy 60 armored personnel carriers, by cutting them into pieces, blowing them up, or smashing them with a steel ball, after which the body of the carrier has to be burst in at least three places, and the turret—in one place. [passage omitted]

During the 40-month period we have to eliminate 794 tanks from our Army. Of these, 20 have already been destroyed at the Khan Krum Plant in Turgovishte, and a further 40 are awaiting their turn. The T-34 tank is an

outdated modification that is not suitable for reconstruction or modernization.... There are no foreign customers for this model, and therefore one of the recent solutions is to convert it into metal blocks. High-quality metals command a high price both at home and abroad, but the destruction of a tank to produce the metal will cost approximately 40,000 leva. [passage omitted]

Now is the moment to recall one of the statements made by Mr. Georgi Bozdujanov, secretary of the Government Commission for Control of Production and Trade in Military and Special Products, in which he asserted that our authority will be ruined if we resort to trafficking in arms, and that the world will not help us introduce state-of-the-art technologies, revive our industry, and so on. This is certainly the case. One hopes that the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls will soon lift its restrictions against Bulgaria, but it should know that we will strictly fulfill our obligations regarding disarmament and implementation of the CFE Treaty.

However, the only thing not clear is why the biggest arms producers (and sellers) in the world are the most democratic of all the democrats. Since we have to learn from the United States, let us learn our lesson properly. If we want to remember the past, let us tell ourselves that this year Russia announced receipts of \$5 billion from arms exports (although the weapons are not being sold to Libya, Iraq, or Yugoslavia).

In a situation like the present, no one can determine what weapons will be used to conduct local conflicts, now that impeccable tolerance holds sway in the accords reached in the arms business throughout the world.

## POLAND

## 5,500 Russian Troops To Remain Until End of 1993

LD1212153292 Warsaw PAP in English  
1330 GMT 12 Dec 92

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 12—A total of 5,500 Russian soldiers and officers will remain in Poland until the end of 1993 to supervise the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from Germany to Russia across Polish territory, the office of the Polish Government Plenipotentiary for the Stationing of Former Soviet Troops in Poland said. At present there is not a single Russian combat unit left in Poland.

A total of 583 Russian soldiers and over 2,000 tonnes of ammunition and fuels left Poland in November. Last month the Polish side took over 292 buildings and 95 hectares of land left behind by the former Soviet Army in the Baltic port of Swinoujscie.

## PAKISTAN

### India Urged To Stop Opposing Nuclear-Free Zone

*BK1412130992 Islamabad THE NEWS in English  
14 Dec 92 p 7*

[Editorial: "Delhi's Nuclear Folly"]

[Text] One of the many distinguishing features of the post-cold war world is its emphasis on nuclear non-proliferation and regional disarmament. Even though both these concerns were significant themes in the era before what has been depicted as the end of history, the manner in which these dominate international attention in today's world is unprecedented. Crucially, unlike the past, many Third World countries now share the concerns of ridding humanity of the curse of doomsday weapons and working towards a nuclear-free world.

Pakistan has consistently supported nuclear non-proliferation both at the regional and global level. In this regard Islamabad has made more than a dozen proposals over the year. Of these Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's suggestion for a five nation conference to create a nuclear free zone in South Asia is particularly significant. This has been backed by almost all the major states of the world, including the United States, China, France and Russia.

On umpteen occasions, similar proposals on non-proliferation have been endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. The latest endorsement came on Wednesday when the 179-member Assembly approved Pakistan's proposal which underlined the complementary nature of both the regional and global approaches to solve the nuclear problem. India abstained from voting on a suggestion which was unanimously adopted. Pakistan also presented two other proposals: one called for a

nuclear-free South Asia and the other for strengthening security guarantees to the non-nuclear states. These too were endorsed. India again abstained.

The rapidity with which efforts against nuclear proliferation are gaining pace and momentum, is reflective of a growing international consensus on the issue. The fear of a nuclear holocaust and its frightening fallouts, are no longer seen to be bogies, as they once were, created by the West to hold on to its monopoly over nuclear weapons. These have now come to be recognised by a majority of states as concrete issues, which require urgent attention and effective long-term solutions.

Unfortunately, countries like India, in their unbridled pursuit of misguided ambitions for power and hegemony, are still resisting this welcome change of attitudes. On one pretext or the other, Delhi has persisted with its nuclear ambitions and has constantly ducked the question of establishing a nuclear-free zone in South Asia. Delhi's longstanding argument that the nuclear issue has to be solved at the global level has been rendered pointless after both China and France acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) this year. Even South Africa has more [or] less agreed to abide by the treaty.

Ideally, China's entry into the NPT club should have assuaged India's (baseless) fears that Beijing's nuclear muscle was a direct threat to its security. Ideally also, Delhi should have appreciated the relevance of accepting Pakistan's efforts to make the South Asian region a nuclear-free zone. This has not happened, and Delhi continues to persist on a disastrous nuclear path. It is time for India's policymakers to realise the folly of its intransigence on an issue on which hinge the prospects of lasting peace in the region. The sooner this happens the better.

## GENERAL

## Nuclear Weapons Scientists Interviewed

934P0026A Moscow VEK in Russian  
No 15, 4 Dec 92 p 10

[Interviews with nuclear scientists and designers Academician Yu. Khariton, Federal Nuclear Center Director V. Belugin, Academician A. Pavlovskiy, Academician A. Trutnev, and Chief Designer S. Voronin, by Vladimir Gubarev at Arzamas-16; date not given: "The Atom Bomb—Superstar"]

[Text] *Politicians and journalists, housewives and journalists, "greens" and diplomats are today contemplating, arguing, and chatting about the fate of nuclear arms, the disarmament process, and the future of the nuclear arms industry. Unfortunately the only voice that is not heard in this chorus is that of the creators of nuclear and thermonuclear arms. Unlike others, they fully understand the complexity and length of the process currently called disarmament.*

*A group of journalists specializing in science, who formed the Nekos studio, visited the Russian Nuclear Center—Arzamas-16, where these arms are developed. They met with distinguished scientists and designers. We offer their point of view to VEK readers. The interviews were conducted by the head of the Nekos studio, Vladimir Gubarev.*

*So, here it is.*

## Academician Yu. Khariton

*[Gubarev] Yuliy Borisovich, what are modern nuclear arms?*

[Khariton] You see, a modern atom bomb is a rather delicate and elegant, I would say, construction. Everything about it: the method of initiating the detonation in order to produce a converging spheric wave, the method of placing the plutonium, the assembly—there is a lot of subtlety and ingenuity there. We cannot share these design details with anyone because it may lead to very widespread nuclear proliferation.

*[Gubarev] Yuliy Borisovich, it is quite natural that the general public has a wary, to put it mildly, attitude towards such a formidable weapon. To put it simply: People are afraid of the bomb! We are concerned: Can what happened to the Chernobyl reactor happen to the weapons as well? After all, just shortly before the catastrophe physicists maintained that nuclear power stations are absolutely safe. And then a major disaster... Are there any guarantees with respect to weapons?*

[Khariton] We have never said that our "products" are absolutely safe! On the contrary, we emphasize in every possible way that they are dangerous and that a great degree of care is required in working with and gaining access to nuclear arms. They have to be transported, for instance, by rail, where accidents are possible. Moreover,

there are occasionally fires and derailments on the railroad. Therefore we constantly call for the greatest possible care, keeping transportation to a minimum, and so on. We made this margin of safety a special area of our efforts. Production facilities were spread out, so we had to do some reshuffling in order to reduce the transportation of assembled warheads to a minimum... In the past, in my opinion, this used to be done very frivolously, but since our interference much has changed, and unnecessary transportation reduced. We are not talking about a nuclear explosion. If, for instance, a malefactor takes a shot at the spheric charge, in a number of designs this may cause a detonation of the explosives. The shock wave reaching the plutonium by itself may cause dispersion, possibly with an attendant atomic cloud—then the wind carries it and contamination occurs...

*[Gubarev] Have you been present at hydrogen bomb testing?*

[Khariton] Of course. I was 70 kilometers away. At the edge of the settlement was a building, and below, something like bleachers. There were many military people and scientists there; they were learning, or, more precisely, trying to understand what this bomb is... Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov and I were in the upper row... The explosion took place in the air—the bomb was dropped from an aircraft... The shock wave came three minutes later; it blew the caps off all the military people. It took them a long time to find them afterwards... After the explosion we went to the site, that is, under the point of explosion, and saw how the earth had "buckled"... This is a horrible weapon; it was necessary for the preservation of peace on the planet. I am convinced that without nuclear deterrence the course of history would have been different—more aggressive, probably. I am convinced that nuclear arms are necessary for stabilization; they can help avoid the big war, because only a madman would attempt such in our times. As long as we have modern nuclear arms, they meet the toughest standards. Nevertheless, I constantly bring up the issue of security, the complex of measures that must ensure it. In my opinion this is the main problem today. The rest we have already found solutions to in the past...

## V. Belugin, director of the Federal Nuclear Center

*[Gubarev] Your main task is the development of state-of-the-art nuclear arms that meet modern tasks. Correct?*

[Belugin] Yes, but not entirely, because there is no plan. Nor is there any certainty in our business. The president of Russia came here and said that we are needed, after all. He said it for all to hear. Before that a number of public figures, ecologists, and scientists were saying that we were not needed, that all we can do is harm the planet. Now the word is: We are needed! It turns out, however, that this is not enough, given our system, our structure. Nobody respects the law or the rules... Uncertainty is our chief bane. We are not saying that all of us have to make nuclear arms, and lots of them at that. We agree that reductions are needed, that they have to be

brought to a certain minimum that ensures security. But nobody knows yet what "security" is and what "sufficiency" is. There ought to be some kind of security doctrine, in which the role of nuclear arms should be defined. It is the responsibility of the politicians together with specialists to do this work.

So, you define its place in the military doctrine, then create a program for carrying it out, and it has to be a long-term one. This is a rule for every kind of production. Even if you decide to grow bananas, you cannot do so without a program. People must know to what extent they are needed, what they will be doing this year and five years from now. What I am talking about is not that much production but first and foremost science and development. With this comes confidence, effectiveness, and everything else. In short, everything positive. This is what is lacking today.

*[Gubarev] Neither the politicians of the past nor the current ones can put this program together on their own. You probably should have your own state policy, which you should present to the government, the Supreme Soviet, and the president. Do you have such a policy? It is another matter whether others would agree with it or not, but at least it would provide a subject for discussions and decisions.*

[Belugin] We have already presented our proposals to both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. We have our own understanding of the problem. We do not claim that we know the ultimate truth, but we do have an understanding of the role and place of nuclear arms in the modern world. We have described it many times, and sent papers "up the line" with varying degrees of classified contents—I think this is all we have been doing over the past few years. We have literally pursued Gorbachev, but he never bothered to reply to us. Just once he attached a resolution saying that this should be considered, but from then on—silence... Political turmoil has not done any good for us. There was an attempt to reduce the administrative system, but instead it became more bloated. There are new people coming all the time; the structures are unstable. No traditions... Sometimes they ask such naive questions that it leaves you at a loss, not knowing why a question is being asked. Therefore, it is hard to demand something serious from such people. Still, I am an optimist by nature, and therefore I hope that within the next few months things will fall into place, the problems of security and sufficiency will be resolved, and thus the place of nuclear arms in our life will be defined.

*[Gubarev] Do you not think that a major mistake has been made over the past 10 years? Both we and the United States have accumulated so many nuclear arms that each country now has enough to annihilate the globe 10-15 times over.*

[Belugin] We were warning about this five, seven years ago, but we were told that it was none of our business. Now as to whose fault it is... We could, of course, beat

ourselves up and repent. But neither scientists nor weapons designers (and I am one of them) feel that they are to blame, because we had a completely different psychology. You cannot look at every past event from the position of today, without taking into account the situation in the world, the psychology of people, and the real state of affairs. At that time our task was to ensure national security. We were not privy to many issues. We knew our secrets and protected them, but we did not have any notion of the quantity of our "product," even less its intended targets—these were secret—we were not supposed to know... Long before perestroika, by the way... We knew what the Americans have. We knew that our range of weapons is considerably broader. We did propose to make cuts and redirect the resources into advanced development that promised great effect in the future. Frankly, we were coming up against a stone wall... Then we began to realize that there are too many incompetent people "at the top." First, a fact here and there pointed to that; then later we learned that the nuclear arms advisers to the national leadership are people who have no notion of it. That is when we really started sounding the alarm, but unfortunately we were not heard and still are not being heard—are they deaf or what?

#### Academician A. Pavlovskiy

*[Gubarev] Are you trusted as a nuclear arms designer? Your ideas, your words? Or not always?*

[Pavlovskiy] Fortunately my circle of friends and acquaintances is such that I am trusted. It is natural... In a normal society everything should be based on trust. In this city, among the people within my orbit, this has always been the case. It would have been impossible to accomplish what we did in a different atmosphere, and it would be impossible to work. This is an unshakeable moral principle. Perhaps it is not applicable in society as a whole today, but trust is the only solid guarantee.

*[Gubarev] As is known, there are goods that are being diverted. Is this possible with respect to an atomic bomb?*

[Pavlovskiy] In principle, nothing is impossible. I can allow for the possibility that such a task will be set: to steal a nuclear warhead, and some group of people will attempt to accomplish it. If they come up with something original, such an operation could be successful. In short, I admit such a possibility. But a nuclear warhead is a somewhat unusual item; one has to be a good specialist—of very broad expertise in the area of warhead construction, by the way—in order to first accomplish this and second, attempt to use it. But this is pure speculation, since apparently the existing system of accounting precludes such a possibility.

*[Gubarev] I realize that the degree of control reliability is very high when, for instance, five warheads a year are produced. But what if there are hundreds or thousands?*

[Pavlovskiy] The system of control does not depend on quantity. It has been formed over many years and there

are several independent organizations that prevent accidental mishaps. In principle, it is possible to steal a bomb, but in practice it is not. At least, if you offered me this task, I would not be able to accomplish it.

I want to add that any bomb produces too much "noise" and this is such an effective method of control that there cannot be anything better. A man can be deceived, his vigilance relaxed, but there is not much we can do about physical laws—we do not yet have power over them.

*[Gubarev] Are you an optimist?*

[Pavlovskiy] I am concerned that we may deprive ourselves of our future. I am not talking about the impending impoverishment, the disintegration of industry, and the state of the economy. This much is obvious. But also there is a falling birth rate, and our youth is becoming engaged in business, which in our understanding and our reality is nothing other than reselling, speculation. We are gradually becoming a country without a future, and this is the worst. The people who are making mistakes today will be gone, but where will others come from? We used to have one advantage—the children... I recall a joke. Our citizens ask a Japanese man for his impression of the country, and he says: You have good children, but you do not know how to work with your hands... Unfortunately, we are now losing this advantage as well... We had an arts school in the city; at the time, a lot of resources were put into it. Now it is being liquidated—there is no money, they say.

*[Gubarev] Do you feel that the inflow of young people into your business is diminishing?*

[Pavlovskiy] Of course. I can even allow for a possibility that after a certain number of years there will not be anyone left who will know how to handle nuclear weapons. The weapons will still be there, but everyone will be afraid to touch them. Without young people our field will die. Even now we, people of advanced age, are forced to a certain extent to continue working, although by all logic we should have made room for a new generation. It is slow in coming, though... In short, problems that are sometimes barely perceptible in society come into sharper focus here—it so happens that we have to live in tomorrow and constantly think about it.

#### Academician Yu. Trutnev

*[Gubarev] Do you have a special point of view on nuclear disarmament?*

[Trutnev] Why "special"? I think of it as a citizen and as a specialist. We are getting used to hearing! "All they want to do is blow things up!" It is imputed that we fear losing our jobs, etc. We will never be out of work, even if we stop making weapons. Our profession requires such a broad range of skills—we deal with various fields in physics, technologies, design—that we will always find

somewhere to apply our expertise; it is already happening now to a certain extent. Because of the cutbacks in the spectrum of work. It is important to understand that arms reduction is a very natural process. So this kind of talk about losing jobs and the "blow-up itch" often reflects not merely incompetency but a desire to earn political capital. It is fashionable now to berate nuclear arms and everyone involved in military subjects. We should not forget, however, that in our world—complex, gripped with crises—the country still needs defense. In my view, nuclear arms are the cheapest way to avert any threat, any danger. Nuclear arms are also a political weapon. A potential aggressor is forced to think twice before engaging in a conflict with a country that possesses nuclear weapons. For us it has a special importance, considering the geopolitical situation of our country. Americans have it good—they are surrounded by three oceans, while we are right in the middle of a continent. And who says it is a quiet one? Remember the borders, the territorial claims against one another, including those against Russia. I am not speaking from the point of view of imperial ambitions; I am simply describing reality.

*[Gubarev] Were you just fulfilling tasks? Or did you actually define the country's nuclear strategy?*

[Trutnev] Of course, we did not define it, but our work did influence the behavior of political figures. I want to tell you that I have no intention of apologizing, moreover, I have no regrets about coming here and participating in the development of nuclear arms. We worked for the strengthening of the defense capabilities of our country; we gave it our all. Together with the entire country, because nuclear arms are the product of the work of many thousands of people. Our conscience is clear, because we did not have Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Neither did we have any weapons-related nuclear accidents...

*[Gubarev] A group of specialists was recently invited to the United States where they were shown ways and methods of dealing with such accidents—the Americans were, so to say, sharing their own sad experience.*

[Trutnev] Fortunately we have never had such serious accidents... As to the current situation... I think nuclear arms will exist for a rather long time. They are called "weapons of mass destruction." But what about Dresden? How many people died there as a result of "blanket bombing raids"? About 40,000... This is without any nuclear weapons. And what about Iraq?.. Of course, nuclear weapons have their own peculiar qualities, a multifactor effect, but modern weapons also are. I would say...

*[Gubarev] Not a gift to humanity.*

[Trutnev] Exactly! So we have to think more broadly, not just about nuclear arms, although their quantities have to be reduced, of course. In my opinion the future of nuclear arms is first and foremost reduction in the

number of armaments and their increased safety, especially in our country, as well as the creation of new, more reliable and safe types

*[Gubarev] Which means testing is needed*

[Trutnev] Nuclear arms cannot exist without it. I sometimes hear the opinion that it is possible to create nuclear weapons and not test them. Those who say this refer to Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. I talked to him about it three days before he died; he did not change his point of view, although I tried to argue my point, and reminded him of several incidents from our joint work. I have the greatest respect for Andrey Dmitriyevich and I am one of his disciples, but in this case he is wrong. If we treat arms as technical means, we cannot do without testing... By the way, most interestingly, people who say this are those who stop working in the field or have nothing to do with weapons development... In reality, the issue of testing is very politicized. Yes, there had been above-ground tests. This is one thing. Underground testing is something completely different. Even during our memorable conversation Andrey Dmitriyevich admitted that underground nuclear explosions are safe. I am saying this for those who are used to quoting authoritative sources

*[Gubarev] Is the problem of the "brain drain" artificial?*

[Trutnev] Much will depend on how the events develop. I personally think that it is unlikely that our people will leave, although I cannot preclude it. Actually, many of those who worked in Arzamas-16 have now found themselves "abroad"—I mean Ukraine, Kazakhstan... But this is not the most important issue.

*[Gubarev] And what is?*

[Trutnev] I am concerned about something else. Over the decades—almost half a century—a unique scientific-technical collective that joins the efforts of professionals of the most varied specializations has been created and is functioning here. Such is the specifics of nuclear arms, whose development brought together theoretical physicists, experimenters, technologists, designers, chemists, etc. This conglomerate is a unique phenomenon. I am afraid that under current circumstances this collective will disintegrate. And this will be a loss not only for Russia but for world science as a whole. This concerns me more than anything else.

**Chief Designer S. Voronin**

*[Gubarev] What is happening today with respect to nuclear arms?*

[Voronin] We are at a new stage now. The arms that are left after deep cuts require a different approach. The fact that we have accumulated so many arms is madness! There are about 50,000 warheads on the planet—15,000-20,000 megatons. I repeat, this is madness. They are not needed for military purposes or even as a deterrent; I think even the most militarized circles understand this now, regardless of where they are—across the ocean or here. And it makes sense that

negotiations on arms reductions are going on, except that they need to be conducted in such a way that at any given stage the nuclear balance will be maintained. Tilting it leads again to global destabilization, so it is very important to maintain this balance—then under the threat of retaliation nobody will think of using nuclear arms.

*[Gubarev] But is this possible at all?*

[Voronin] At the initial stage not much thought was given to the fact that nuclear arms are not designed to be used on a battlefield. Now it is clear that they are a political weapon, a means of deterrence. Sensible people will never use them, but they force any aggressor to refrain from adventurist decisions. Anyone who may conceive or is conceiving something bad understands very well the terrible retaliation strike that may befall him.

*[Gubarev] You mentioned some figures—50,000 warheads and 20,000 megatons. If all of this explodes at once, what will happen to the planet?*

[Voronin] Everything that lives will be annihilated many times over.

*[Gubarev] You knew very well that there is no need for so many armaments. Why did you not protest?*

[Voronin] When I was young I frequently had the opportunity to be in the company of Andrey Dmitriyevich Sakharov. I was a designer, worked at a drafting table; the theoreticians, headed by Sakharov and Zeldovich, frequently stopped by. And almost by default, while discussing design they touched upon more philosophical issues, such as whether we are doing something useful, what the consequences will be, and so on. Andrey Dmitriyevich—and he was an unusual man!—even made impromptu calculations as to what would happen if a bomb of this or that capacity was exploded, in what generation gene mutation may take place, and who would suffer from this. Therefore, as a result of these discussions all of us were concerned from the very beginning with the consequences of the work we were doing. When some time later I had to get involved in the problem of nuclear arms effectiveness and strategic balance, we paid attention to the American approach, which was more sensible—they used a systems approach and did not spend money thoughtlessly. They had longer-term programs, with more clearly defined goals, and they made cardinal changes to the weapons once every 10-15 years. Under our system of totalitarian, central leadership changes were demanded constantly, and we created new prototypes practically every three to four and sometimes every two years. Thus we acquired an immense range of hardware. As well as excessive quantities. All of that involved expenditures, spending. We knew the real state of affairs, expressed our negative opinion, but bringing this kind of information to the highest level just was not the way things were done in those times. We have reports that analyzed in detail the state of affairs in the United States and in our country; by the way, we compared quite unfavorably with the

Americans. It was clear that the work was not organized well, but the people who were receiving such materials from us and who had access to the higher echelons of power, in my opinion, were simply afraid to report this. After all, this could have produced an unpredictable reaction—first and foremost directed at themselves.

[Gubarev] *Have you stopped this kind of work?*

[Vorонин] *Why should we? No. We keep doing it even now.*

[Gubarev] *What are the complexities of nuclear arms destruction, their storage, dismantling? Or is it simple?*

[Vorонин] *No, there are quite a few difficulties. Mainly it is that in the past we made a certain quantity of weapons—to modernize the arsenal—and dismantled the same quantity, that is, there was a routine volume of work. Now the process is proceeding differently. There are huge quantities of warheads to be utilized, and immediately several problems popped up. First, ensuring safety of transportation. Right now the volume of dangerous cargo being moved around has increased dramatically. And it is not just the quantity but also the attending circumstances: the condition of the railroads and rolling stock, increased crime, unpredictability of events, up to the point where a train may get shot at.*

[Gubarev] *Is all of this not taken into account in advance?*

[Vorонин] *Do not forget that a routine event in an unusual situation is already dangerous by itself. Is the situation normal now? ...Second. By itself, the process of dismantling differs from that of assembling; the danger is somewhat higher. Because of the aging of materials; also, the construction gets "compacted", and so on. We take all precautions in the production environment; we know the technology, and we know what to do under particular circumstances... And, of course, there is a problem of storing what has been dismantled. We have envisaged all the technical steps to provide the technical aspects, but sometimes they cannot keep up with the political ones. Therefore, there should be no haste in our business... And lastly—storage of fissionable materials and ensuring their security. There is one inconsistency there, however. For some reason we are only talking about security on our side—how we will store fissionable materials. In my opinion, this is a common problem. If the Americans want to know how we store our plutonium and uranium, we should also monitor how they keep theirs. If we keep it sealed and locked, they should too. In reality, however, there is currently no security mechanism and, as far as I know, no negotiations are being conducted in this respect. There are demands on their part, but so far everything is going on unilaterally; we cannot agree with*

*this state of affairs; there should be order brought into this, on a parity basis. The security mechanism should be an international one, and it should be the same for all.*

*[Gubarev] You have spent 38 years here; do you have regrets about the past years?*

[Vorонин] *You know—no!.. Where would I find more interesting, fascinating work? Probably nowhere. Our work is unusual, nonstandard. Also, where would I meet so many outstanding people?! And, most importantly: I had an opportunity to travel a lot around the country; I visited all kinds of collectives, and I can tell you frankly: I have never met a collective like the one we used to have and still have... Or perhaps it is my character trait: If I get involved in something, I see it through to the end. As to our collective, it truly is unique. We have a more or less permanent core of personnel, and we have great traditions—we ourselves have developed them and enhance them all the time. Therefore, life and work here bring satisfaction. We have absorbed the best there was in the country; hence, high reliability, quality, and attitude towards work. I believe that our system of design development is the best in the country. So it would be a sin to ask for anything else...*

#### Parliamentary International Affairs Committee on SSD Controversy

##### Yeltsin Names Mikhaylov as Representative

OW0812195992 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1927 GMT 8 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin has appointed Russian Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov his official representative at the discussion by the congress of the Russo-American agreement on the safe and reliable transfer, storage and destruction [SSD] of weapons and the prevention of their distribution. The agreement was signed by the Presidents of both nations on June 17th, 1992.

The agreement is being interpreted by the opposition as a "secret deal" between the two Presidents with the aim of bringing about the "unilateral disarmament of Russia." The Russian president's press secretary has described the authors of such allegations as "falsifiers and provocateurs."

The parliamentary International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee has, for its part, found some of the provisions of the agreement unclear and ambiguous and has expressed its desire to see these edited more precisely.

**Committee Chairman Welcomes SSD Pact**

LD0812170192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1526 GMT 8 Dec 92

[By ITAR-TASS parliamentary correspondent Igor Veksler]

[Text] Moscow December 8 TASS—A Russian parliamentarian has welcomed the U.S.-Russian agreement on safe transportation, storage and elimination [SSD] of nuclear and chemical weapons and on the prevention of their proliferation.

Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, head of the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, said on Tuesday that the agreement does not infringe on Russia's interests. The document allows American partners to check on the use of 400 million dollars granted to Russia by the United States to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons. The money will be used first of all to build a special storage facility and purchase containers to store uranium removed from warheads, Ambartsumov said.

"Under no circumstances should the agreement be broken because it will blow up our relations with the U.S.," Ambartsumov said.

"In order to prevent such collisions in the future...such agreements should be prepared more thoroughly and considered by the Supreme Soviet," Ambartsumov said.

**Committee To Issue Findings to Supreme Soviet**

OW0812153792 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1518 GMT 8 Dec 92

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Andrey Borodin, Dmitriy Voskoboinikov, and Igor Porshnev; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature; following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Since the parliamentary Committee on International Affairs and External Economic Relations decided to submit its conclusions concerning the Russian-American treaty on control, storage and elimination [SSD] of weapons of mass destruction to Russia's parliament, and not to the Congress of People's Deputies, its chairman, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, intends to circulate his personal observations on the documents among the people's deputies "to prevent the Congress' instructions from being ignored." "Some of the treaty's provisions were drafted carelessly," he told DP ["Diplomatic Panorama"].

According to Ye. Ambartsumov, the document "contains provisions which are too general, and ambiguities, which may, though not necessarily, be interpreted incorrectly." In addition, the wording of the agreement "gives rise to the concern that Russia's sovereignty may be violated." However, "this doesn't mean that such violations will necessarily be made by the Americans."

The MP called for "drafting such agreements more carefully, and for holding preliminary consultations with the relevant parliamentary structures."

Russia's Ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, said that the special rights of foreign citizens, who will perform the functions under the Russian-American agreement, are no novelty in international practice. The Ambassador is confident that "no one had the intention of infringing upon Russia's sovereignty." "Nevertheless legal wordings could have been more precise," he told DP.

**Committee Says Ratification 'Unnecessary'**

MK1012172092 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY  
in Russian 10 Dec 92 p 12

[Anastasiya Romashkevich report: "Treaty Need Not Be Ratified"]

[Text] Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Committee, was to have spoken at the Congress of Russian People's Deputies yesterday evening. He was supposed to set out the committee's position on the question of ratification of the Russian-U.S. agreement on the monitoring, storage, and elimination [SSD] of mass destruction weapons [SSD]. According to information from the committee, this position is that the agreement is a good one, but that it should not [ne nado] be ratified.

The agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the monitoring, storage, and elimination of weapons of mass destruction was signed during Boris Yeltsin's visit to the United States on 17 June 1992. The agreement envisages the allocation of a \$400 million credit to safeguard security during the shipment, storage, and destruction of nuclear and chemical weapons. It is planned that monitoring of the implementation of this program will be carried out by the U.S. Defense Department.

The agreement was examined by the Russian Supreme Soviet parliamentary Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations Monday in conjunction with the Foreign and Defense Ministries. A conclusion was reached containing a number of comments on the formulas used in the document. The agreement as a whole was approved. Because of opposition criticisms, committee chairman Yevgeniy Ambartsumov wished to set out to Congress participants his own views on the matter. He admits that the text of the agreement contains certain shortcomings and, moreover, that the relevant [profilnyy] Supreme Soviet structures were not involved in the preparation of the document.

The opposition tends to see the main damage to Russia's interests as lying in the paragraph relating to the U.S. side's monitoring of the weapons' destruction. In this connection the agreement's opponents are inclined to view it as a secret deal between the Russian and U.S.

leadership which will result in the unilateral disarmament of Russia. But Vladimir Lukin, Russian ambassador to the United States, has already stated that, despite the existence of a number of "legal inaccuracies" in the agreement, the paragraph at issue is nothing new in international practice.

The International Affairs Committee announced that its current position is that the ratification procedure envisaged by the USSR Constitution is unnecessary because the agreement is a good one and Russia is already getting the money stipulated under the agreement. But it is not yet clear what the U.S. reaction to a refusal to ratify the agreement will be. *KOMMERSANT-DAILY* will return to this subject tomorrow.

### Chairman Criticizes Russian SSD Negotiators

93P50033B Moscow *NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA*  
in Russian 11 Dec 92 p 2

[RIA report: "They Put the President in a Difficult Position"]

[Text] On 9 December the Congress of People's Deputies adopted a decision directing the Supreme Soviet to continue studying, jointly with the Russian Federation Government, the question of the agreement with the United States on the safe transportation, storage and destruction [SSD] of nuclear weapons and of some other types of weapons, which are subject to reduction.

After studying the conclusion of the parliament's Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, which was presented by its chairman, Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, and the report of the minister of atomic energy, Viktor Mikhaylov, the deputies did not reach a final conclusion about the legal force of this document or about its correspondence with Russian constitutional norms.

Ambartsumov emphasized in particular that the American side wanted, with the help of this agreement, to guarantee that the 400 million dollars allotted from the U.S. military budget would be used effectively for the purposes intended. Nonetheless, in his opinion, it is obvious that some provisions of the document have many ambiguities and incorrect formulations. Ambartsumov said that the people who worked it out had put the Russian president in a difficult position, since they had grossly violated the procedure for preparing agreements.

### Russian Congress Discussion of SSD Accord With U.S.

#### Atomic Energy Minister Speaks

LD0912194292 Moscow Radio Rossiia Network  
in Russian 1511 GMT 9 Dec 92

[Speech by Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Viktor Nikitich Mikhaylov at Seventh Congress of Russian People's Deputies in the Kremlin, Moscow, on 9 December—live]

[Text] Esteemed chairman, esteemed people's deputies: I would like to say a couple of words about the history of the [SSD] agreement with the United States. The thing is that the U.S. Congress and Senate adopted a legislative enactment in 1991 on rendering help to Russia for the elimination and reduction of nuclear arsenals. It amounted to \$400 million, depended on six conditions, and included provisions for compensating these expenses with oil, gas, or strategic materials. [commotion among audience] Two of these six conditions were absolutely unacceptable for Russia, just like the provisions for compensation.

Which two conditions were unacceptable for Russia? The first condition was control over defense scientific research and experimental design groundwork in order to define whether they were sufficient for defense purposes. The second condition was control over nuclear disarmament during all stages of disarmament. Naturally, President Bush's administration was informed that these conditions were under no circumstances to be accepted by our state.

After that, very thorough and serious work was carried out by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, among others, who stated the Russian stance on this issue at several meetings with President Bush. Apart from that serious work was carried out in the U.S. Congress and the U.S. State Department, bearing in mind the thought that Russia did not need help of this sort, with these conditions and provisions for compensation.

An unconditional agreement came into being after these consultations, granting us \$400 million for safe and secure transportation of nuclear ammunition to the place of its dismantling, for safe and secure preservation of uranium and plutonium extracted from nuclear ammunition, and for equipping existing rapid deployment teams to be ready for any accidents which might occur in this technological chain. The agreement signed in June was prepared by four departments—the Russian Ministry for Nuclear Energy, the Russian Defense Ministry, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, and the Security Ministry.

It must be said that there has never been anything like this agreement anywhere in the world. All questions connected with nuclear technology, with nuclear weapons technology were secret, they were each side's property and there were no exchanges.

For the first time in the history of our two countries an agreement was elaborated which deals with—I would like to repeat this once again—a reliable and safe reduction of Russia's nuclear arsenals. Taken as models for this agreement, or rather for its drafting, were the 1986 Vienna convention on participation in the elimination of nuclear accidents and also the legislative acts which exist in the United States on nuclear weapons problems. Unfortunately, in our country these legislative acts on atomic energy and on the nuclear weapons complex are still only in the formative stage.

The agreement signed on 17 June is an overall or framework agreement for such assistance and it determines the basic conditions for this assistance. Article 2 of this agreement very clearly and precisely states that, in order to implement this agreement, the executive bodies

of Russia and the United States elaborate and sign specific agreements on the types of activity connected with transport and storage and with equipping rapid-response brigades for accident situations. This Article 2 indicates that the framework agreement has no point, in itself, without additional agreements on specific plans, some of which have already been concluded.

As far as Article 7 is concerned—which gives privileges to the personnel who will be invited or may be invited by the Russian executive bodies for some particular work—it envisages those benefits which are usually granted in such cases to for those working in the nuclear complex, working with radioactive materials.

In no way can any American bear responsibility on our territory for safety devices during work carried out with various equipment, even if we have acquired it in the United States, or be responsible for nuclear safety during such work. Naturally, all responsibility for this work is borne only by the Russian side, only by Russian personnel, and, to be precise, by those who are in charge of the work. Consultants and other specialists who may be present do not bear this responsibility.

Moreover, this article, Article 7, states clearly that with the exception of normal treaties—that is, there are treaties between states which are valid and this article does not abrogate those treaties but, on the contrary, lays stress precisely on work in the nuclear technological chain, in the nuclear technological cycle [sentence as heard].

Regarding Article 14, which has also come under very heavy criticism here, including from the preceding speaker, I can tell you that this article says that either of the sides, the United States and Russia, may leave this treaty if they give 90 days notice of this. But at the same time it says that particular articles of this treaty will operate until written agreement for their elimination is received by the sides. This is an absolutely legitimate demand and it concerns the question of the observation of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear technologies and nuclear weapons, the 1968 treaty. Those materials—I will tell you what they are—*instruments and systems*, which Russia receives under this treaty, naturally we cannot transfer them to third countries or use them, on the contrary, for the creation of a new generation of nuclear weapons without the written agreement of the United States. This is an absolute correct and legitimate demand, I think.

On the subject of the agreements on the plans, they have not all been concluded. Our ministry has five such agreements. Under these agreements the Ministry of Nuclear Energy together with the Ministry of Defense receives 450 sets of protective material whose use considerably alleviates any hazardous situation, by covering nuclear warheads with this particular protective material which is bullet-proof and protects its contents from splinters.

Second, under these agreements, we have received today and are already receiving, we are in process of receiving, 200 sets of instruments for rapid-reaction brigades, including 100 sets of special clothing. Today, unfortunately our brigades over the past six years have been impoverished and we have been obliged to make use of this in order to have very mobile and well-equipped brigades in case of accidents.

The number of nuclear weapons transported is fairly large. It now reaches tens of thousands a year. So you can imagine what danger and risk the country or a region could be subjected to if the appropriate requirements are not observed. In accordance with the last agreement which we concluded we are receiving 115 specialized cars from the United States which ensure reliable protected transport of nuclear weapons. This is very important for us because the pool of our specialized cars today, of course, needs to be better.

It is very important, I believe, that in conditions when we have to transport these nuclear weapons, including from Commonwealth countries today [shouting from hall; Supreme Soviet Chairman Khasbulatov says "There are probably questions for you, Viktor Nikitich"]. Apart from this, in accordance with these agreements we receive 10,000 containers for storing uranium and plutonium, 10,000 which meet contemporary requirements for safe storage of these materials in unusual situations, fires, shooting etc. We have signed agreements to the tune of \$100 million. If you count this in our rubles, then these agreements today add up to 40 billion rubles.

I consider that we have removed an important burden from our country's already overloaded budget, 40 billion rubles. I can tell you that it would be necessary to halt all scientific investigative projects in our ministry for two years in order to buy these materials for this amount of money. Specialists from our country's nuclear weapons complex, including specialists from Arzamas-16, participated in the creation and development of these agreements, which supplement the framework agreement, and no one can suspect that people who have devoted their whole lives to the defense and prestige of the country will damage that defense and prestige.

However, the arsenals we possess today are stored with major deviations from the requirements, and naturally we welcome such free aid, moreover because the specialists whom we will invite, if it is necessary, I want to stress this, if it is necessary, must without doubt have some kind of privileges. What is under discussion here is the question of examining these specialists. As for examining the equipment, it is examined, and this is laid down in agreements on each project.

[Khasbulatov] Viktor Nikitich, I feel that you can easily talk like this for another hour and a half or two hours. But that is not our practice here. So, could you concentrate your attention on answering questions—people are waiting to ask you questions.

[Mikhaylov] I need two minutes to finish.

[Khasbulatov] Two minutes? The minister asks for two minutes. We give you two minutes and then questions.

[Mikhaylov] I should like to note that these specialists took a most active part in these agreements and, naturally, in the specific agreements on the projects, the conditions for examining and commissioning the equipment and for returning it were determined, that is, all the procedures which we used, incidentally, were from the paving treaty on monitoring nuclear tests. It was in 1990 and these procedures are used at present. Nothing arrives in Russia without examination, and the things which are not suitable for the Russian side are returned to the United States within 10 days.

In conclusion I can say one thing: These two agreements are without any doubt a new stage in cooperation with the United States. I would say that the issues of security and safety in transporting and storing nuclear materials, equipping rapid-reaction groups, and providing aid here are a serious matter, and I regard this as an achievement of our country. Incidentally, I can tell the people's deputies that similar agreements with France, Britain, Germany, and Italy are in preparation. Thank you for your attention.

#### Answers Deputies' Questions

LD0912204092 Moscow Radio Rossii Network  
in Russian 1526 GMT 9 Dec 92

[Question and answer session with Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow—live]

[Excerpts] [Baburin] Deputy Baburin, from the Sovetskiy territorial district. Esteemed Minister, although for the last few minutes during your speech and that of the previous speaker the whole Congress has been thinking about the results of the vote on the head of government and we understand how difficult it must be for you, could you please answer the following questions? Do you have the text of the [SSD] agreement in front of you at the rostrum now so that I could ask questions on the agreement?

[Mikhaylov] Yes, I have it here.

[Baburin] How could you clarify and how are we to interpret Section 2 of Article 7 of this agreement? That is my first question. The second question: Who signed the protocols accompanying the signing of the agreement, which were to have been signed by the minister of atomic energy, and in general, who represented the Ministry of Atomic Energy in the delegation? Why were decisions on many issues there made and advised by the minister of foreign affairs? That is my second question. My third question: In your view, why is it that contrary to the standing orders, that is, breaking the standing orders in a number of ways, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet

forces the congress to examine this most important issue when deputies are tired and their attention is concentrated on other problems?

[Mikhaylov] I will start with the last question. I will say that during the congress I have spent every day here and visited my ministry only during the break. I have been waiting to be given the floor because the charge of high treason which Deputy Astafyev hurled at the president, and at all of us, in fact—those who had drawn up and participated in this agreement—is too grave. I believe that there can be no compromise here. The previous speaker tried to find a compromise. There can be none on this issue. There was no high treason; it was mentioned by someone who would like to discover something of this kind.

Regarding the second question about who signs and who does not, I will say the following: Of course, the government has not yet developed appropriate procedures on who should attend and so on. I can say only one thing, that these document were drawn up by four departments, and being the minister of one of them, which is an executive body for this agreement, I am fully responsible for it. So that is my answer.

As for Section 2 of Article 7, it is in front of me and I interpret it in the following way: if during the work conducted by guest consultants or experts some incidents occur with the instruments that are used only by ourselves, although they are made in the United States, the Russian side will bear full responsibility for this because a source of radiation can be turned in a wrong way, a container can be placed in a wrong way and toppled, and so on. I can repeat that there have been no analogous agreements. It is the first time in the two countries' history that such a precedent has been created. Naturally I feel very much hurt meeting with such a reaction to this agreement, which opens a new stage, if we are truly striving for nuclear disarmament and mutual understanding. I have answered all your questions.

[Astafyev] Deputy Astafyev, from Moscow. Esteemed Minister, first of all, I will dare to remind you that, as you put it, the cost-free disarmament of Germany in 1945 is not quite applicable to us, in my view.

In your speech you mentioned a very interesting detail, to the effect that the U.S. initial proposal was somewhat different. Raw materials, oil, and moreover, access to secrets of a certain kind had been demanded from us for the so-called cost-free disarmament. Do you not think that this provides the most apt description of the so-called policy of new political thinking, when you are told that all this is free and for friendship's sake, but nevertheless the high contracting party has furtively incorporated all these possibilities in this new kind of agreement? You maintain that you have defended our interests of some sort, but nevertheless, it permits the export of everything one likes without any checks. I insist on this; this is what the document says.

Here is my last question to you—I have asked two questions so far—the third question is as follows: Do you not think that such agreements are meant to be concluded in secret by a government that is outside any control? This is precisely what we are coming out against, including at this congress.

[Mikhaylov] I was waiting for a question about—I have been told this already—why it is profitable for the United States, since \$400 million are involved. What is the matter here if at first they demanded a compensation of conditions? I have said already that I spoke at the U.S. Congress personally and insisted: If you want to cooperate, then it must be cost-free. It is very difficult for Russia to find this money at present. Now, why did they go for it? That is a good question. Why did they go for it? I will tell you: For two reasons.

The first reason is certainly the fear that in the situation in which Russia finds itself at present an accident could happen while transporting or storing nuclear munitions. In any other situation such an accident could seem like a local event, but in the present situation it could turn out to be a spark with very grave consequences for our country. That is is the first reason.

The second reason: I would like to say that, according to the conditions of the initiatives of the presidents, Bush and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin, the dismantling should be undertaken and sometime by the end of our century it should be finished. It is under way in the United States.

As for us, unless the safety and security of transporting and storing nuclear materials are guaranteed, we will have to suspend it. I would say that that was also one of the major arguments when many hotheads in the United States pondered that Russia could find itself... [changes thought] For example, the United States will have 10,000 items of ammunition by the end of this century, while Russia will still have 35,000 because it is impossible to carry out the dismantling if you do not have appropriate provisions for the security as well as safety of these processes. [Passage omitted]

[Vorontsov] The second question is as follows: Why were all the documents we have been given signed by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, the Defense and Security Ministries, and where is the monitoring body, the Ministry of Ecology? Transportation of nuclear weapons is under discussion in this agreement, and chemical weapons, which have nothing to do with your ministry. Who will monitor all these processes? The agreement says that your ministry will be an executive body. Why is your ministry not monitored by the Ministry of Ecology? I cannot understand this and I am completely dissatisfied with your report. [no answer from Mikhaylov as heard]

[Nesterov] Deputy Nesterov, Constituency 632, of the Ecology Committee, Viktor Nikitich. I know you very well as a fine armorer and I consider that the treaty you have prepared is a fine bomb, which will explode not only our legislation but also, possibly, our relations with

the United States. You understand that in this treaty you have touched on a whole gamut of spheres that are exclusively within the competence of the Supreme Soviet: Customs policy, the tax sphere, the sphere of ecology, and the strategic interests of the Supreme Soviet and of Russia.

What amazes me most, however, is the following: You know that the committees of the Supreme Soviet, and in particular, our Ecology Committee, are now elaborating draft laws on questions that are reflected in this agreement. These are questions of transporting, the mechanism for destroying, licensing, and other questions connected with and directly touched on in this agreement. I think that in the very near future—such drafts are ready already—the Supreme Soviet will approve these draft laws. So how do you intend to get out of this collision? They, the legal provisions, will very seriously contradict what you have signed.

[Mikhaylov] I would like to say to you and I would like to reply that there is an executive body, but this does not mean that it is necessary to violate the established procedure for coordinating these questions between the relevant ministries that oversee the various questions, including ecological ones.

As far as the import of materials, instruments, and containers is concerned, these articles, themselves, are not radioactive. They are articles to use for technical work with radioactive materials. So there is just one problem here: The possibility of using them in the technological networks that have been appropriately standardized, documented, and coordinated in accordance with the procedures established in this country.

[Khasbulatov] Sixth and last, please.

[Arslanova] People's Deputy Arslanova. Esteemed minister, you were not sincere when you told deputies that customs inspections and freedom from customs inspections applies only to operational personnel from the United States. I would call your attention to Article 5 of this agreement and to Part 2 of Article 10, which state that aircraft and ships, apart from commercial aircraft and ships, on flights and sailings used by the United States in connection with this activity are not subject to customs inspection. Article 10 says that in connection with the fulfillment of this agreement the United States and its personnel are not at all subject to customs inspection.

In this connection I have two questions. What do you think? Why did the other side so insistently decide for itself this problem of freeing its aircraft, ships, and personnel—and the United States altogether—from customs inspection in connection with implementing this agreement? My second question: What do you think? Why is it that this agreement is signed on our side by the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and on their side by the U.S. Defense Department? My third question: What do you think? Why was it that until the U.S. Congress had made

its decision, the Defense Ministry did not dare to decide the question in favor of our country under this agreement? Please Thank you.

[Mikhaylov] I will begin with the last two questions: that the executive body on our side is the Ministry of Nuclear Energy and on the U.S. side, the Defense Department. On our side it is because the Ministry of Nuclear Energy is responsible for all this work for the transportation, dismantling, and storage of radioactive materials. It is the executive body responsible for the whole safety and reliability of this work and it carries it out. That is as far as our ministries are concerned.

As for the Defense Ministry, this has been explained already. I will remind you again that the U.S. Congress allocated the money, this \$400 million, from the 1992 budget of the Defense Department. This document exists; I presented it to the committee, which examined these documents, and in it you can read: from the budget, from the specific articles of the U.S. Defense Department this money was allocated for this assistance. Therefore, the executive body, according to U.S. laws is the body that allocates these funds.

As for the articles about air and sea transportation, I was not trying to fool anyone. I simply did not have enough time to read the whole text; it has been distributed and you can see it. This inspection of the equipment, no matter how it arrives in our country, is carried out by a specially created commission, which includes representatives from the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, from the Defense Ministry and from the Security Ministry. This takes place in Mytishchi, in one of our enterprises where an appropriate base has been created. It was set up in 1990 to receive equipment for monitoring nuclear tests and precisely the right algorithms are in place. They have been bedded in and we can see that they work very well without violating the sovereignty of our country or of the individuals who come to us to do this work.

[Khasbulatov] Esteemed people's deputies, it is probably clear to all of you, most of you at any rate, that further debate is pointless. That is why [noise in hall]—wait a bit, wait a bit—the correct decision would consist in this: It is necessary to instruct the Supreme Soviet to sort this out properly. In my view, our colleague, Deputy Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, was right when he asked why, say, the Ecology Committee or the Industry Committee failed to be drawn in. Some sort of parliamentary hearings are possible with the participation of these committees and experts. It is not a simple issue. For us—for a majority, at any rate—it is a rather, well, complex issue. That is why even if we spend the whole of tomorrow debating, it would be very complex to arrive at some sort of unequivocal conclusion. That is why—we have spent

50 minutes on our debate; it is surely necessary—at any rate, we focused our attention on one of the most important aspects, not only of the foreign industrial and defense strategy, but also on certain elements of foreign policy.

In the second place, I specifically set this task: Let the Supreme Soviet, together with the government, be entrusted with the carrying out of an appropriate analysis, discussing this issue at the Supreme Soviet. That is to say, you are to make a specific instruction to the Supreme Soviet. If you like, you may put some sort of timeframe on it. I can see no other solution.

I put this to the vote. [indistinct shout from the audience] Yes, of course the committees, that is clear. If the Supreme Soviet is involved, this does mean the committees. I have stated this already. Ah, a point of order? Second microphone, please go ahead.

[Andronov] Andronov, Vladimir Oblast, deputy chairman of the International Affairs Committee. Comrades, I am in complete agreement with what Ruslan Imranovich has just said. I want only to explain something to you. Well, you have just torn Mikhaylov, minister of power engineering, to pieces; you have criticized him. After all, however, he is really neither here nor there; he is a whipping boy. The documents you have, where it is written minister of power engineering, Kozyrev's signature is appended. Have a good look. They simply hid themselves behind the back of this brilliant scientist, this naive politician. We sorted this out in detail. At the Supreme Soviet I hope to present you with facts not made public here, facts of which you are unaware, facts that show clearly one and the same direction: Kozyrev did all this. He palmed Boris Nikolayevich off with this, as he did with the Kuril Islands and other similar things. Indeed, we must take measures so that such things do not recur.

Thank you, that is all I wanted to say.

[Khasbulatov] Leon Leonovich, I understand, esteemed deputies that, well, let us conclude. Yes? What? First microphone, what is it you wanted to say?

[Surkov] People's Deputy Surkov, 40th territorial constituency. Esteemed colleagues, we must not go so far as to besmirch—without fail—Russia's foreign economic activities in our own eyes. We must, after all, respect our own homeland. We heard, Ruslan Imranovich. We held four sittings: The Ministry of Defense, the Security Ministry, the Ministry of Internal... [corrects himself] Foreign Affairs. It is a complex issue and it is right for a decision to be made now. An issue like this must not be discussed at such a rally as this. It must be discussed calmly by committees. [Passage omitted]

**International Affairs Committee Chairman Speaks**

LD0912183592 Moscow Radio Rossiya Network  
in Russian 1454 GMT 9 Dec 92

[Speech by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee, at Seventh Congress of People's Deputies in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed colleagues: You have now been given documents connected with that sensational [SSD] agreement between the United States and Russia that was signed by the two presidents. Let me first draw your attention to the fact that this selection contains three documents, two clipped together and a third separate. They contain the committee's conclusions, which I shall comment on briefly, attached to which is a statement—or, rather, an opinion—from the heads of the four departments, the Ministry of Atomic Energy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Security concerning this agreement, and finally, the actual text of the agreement together with a group of other agreements—the first a framework agreement and the others technical agreements or, as the Americans call them, implementation agreements, meaning agreements for the implementation of the first agreement.

I have mixed feelings about this document. On the one hand, I have no doubt about the usefulness of the essence of this document, the fact that we are using technical and financial assistance from the United States for the safe storage, transportation, and, where necessary, reduction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of their proliferation.

Is this purely an act of generosity on the part of the United States? I think it is enlightened self-interest, so to speak, an act of enlightened self-interest because the United States is seeking to counter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and wants to implement the envisioned reductions and make them secure. Besides, it naturally wants to prevent any accident with such weapons or nuclear materials. That is what I want to say regarding the content.

At the same time, we have, as they say in dialectics, a contradiction between form and content. The form in which the idea is revealed arouses in me a feeling of dissatisfaction and protest. The point is that, as you can see from our conclusions, there is a whole series of ambiguities which give an extremely unpleasant impression; and not only ambiguities, but unclear and incorrect phrases that give the impression of possible interference by the United States in Russia's sovereignty.

This conclusion, as you will see from the signatures, was adopted—well, it was developed with the participation of a large group of experts—and was adopted at a meeting of deputies, a group of deputies from our Committee on International Affairs. At the same time I will say openly that I would have preferred a more rigorous formula, but as chairman of the committee, I had to strive for consensus on the formulas of this conclusion.

Next, what weaknesses, what deficiencies are there in this conclusion, in this agreement? First of all, some formulas create the impression that the U.S. side could abuse this agreement so as to, say, export some kind of items which should be examined by our customs officers. At the same time, in these additional agreements it is very clearly stipulated that our appropriate departments, namely the Ministry of Atomic Energy—and I hope that Atomic Energy Minister Mikhaylov will speak here—that the Ministry of Atomic Energy undertakes inspections, technical inspections which our customs officers cannot make because they are unqualified. And this is to be done both when importing and exporting the materials and equipment concerned.

However, since the general, outline agreement, the first agreement in this package of documents is the most important and it is precisely this agreement that we should all be referring to, an impression could be created—since these details have not been mentioned in the outline, the main agreement—that the Americans could abuse this. Hence, as far as I can understand, some deputies are seriously concerned, expressing fears in a dramatic manner about our sovereignty being violated. Even such strong words as "treachery" and the like have been voiced here. This is one aspect.

The second aspect is the procedure of preparing this agreement. Unfortunately, when the president's trip was being prepared in the summer, parliamentary structures failed to participate in the preparations. But the agreements are in themselves of exceptional importance, and I think that the kind of practice where parliamentary structures are kept at arm's length from preparing most important international agreements is unacceptable.

True, it must be said that the situation has been improving here over the past few weeks or months. We work jointly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on a more frequent, more everyday basis. Nonetheless, I cannot but recall that when the main outline agreement between the two presidents, Yeltsin and Bush, was being prepared, at the last moment, while I was visiting Sergey Aleksandrovich Filatov—Andrey Vladimirovich Kozyrev came in, too—literally a few hours before the departure for the United States by air, he showed me this main outline agreement and, literally on my lap, I spotlighted serious gaps and shortcomings in the wording.

Of course, that is not the point—at that time I told Minister Kozyrev that such things were inadmissible. Now as far as this agreement is concerned, our president was unfortunately left exposed. The point is that Article 121.5, and Section 10 of the Constitution provide for ratification of international treaties signed by the president. But this agreement says that it comes into force forthwith, that is to say upon signing. There is a conflict here. People can say it is not a treaty, but an agreement—but, according to the Vienna Convention, all such documents are regarded as international treaties.

I understand the Americans, who wanted to obtain a weighty signature to that agreement. Since they are providing the money, they want the correct spending of it to be guaranteed by the first person in the state. But the Americans are not obliged to see whether something conflicts, or does not conflict, with their partner's Constitution. So I consider that, in the present situation, the president was put into an exposed position.

It has to be borne in mind, though, when reproaches are made over the agreement, when it is said that we are forfeiting inspection rights or that we are forfeiting the rights of instituting proceedings if there is a violation by the Americans, if, let's say, some, let's say, accidents occur which could entail casualties or something else of that sort, that the Americans are being given total rights during the transit, import, and export of material.

Just look. Virtually every article of this framework agreement says that in the case, let's say, of imports, there could be exemptions from inspection or exemptions from customs dues only in connection with this agreement. In other words, if the Americans are exporting gold or, let's say, oil or something else, then they must naturally be liable to inspection and to the imposition of customs duties and so on.

Now the last thing: How are we to get out of this situation? We are faced with undoubtedly deficiencies, shortcomings, and, I would say, gross errors, including linguistic ones: It is sufficient to look up what an agreement is in Russian to see that this is simply not Russian. How are we to get out of the situation? I have spoken to representatives of the U.S. Embassy. They agree with me that an exchange of notes or letters is possible between our institutions—let's say between our Foreign Ministry and the State Department—that will enable the agreement to be modified without torpedoing it. Incidentally, there is provision for this procedure in Article 14 of the present agreement. I think that such modification is essential. At the same time, I think that it would be a mistake if we were to torpedo the agreement. The point is that this is only one of the numerous agreements that we have with the United States. And there will simply be a domino effect: one piece falls and all the rest follow suit. So I think one has to adopt a truly statesmanlike attitude toward the document so as to appreciate the consequences of, let's say, a proposal like the one put forward by one of the deputies to denounce it, and so on.

I regard that as being absolutely unacceptable. But, at the same time, I think that our parliament, our legislative institutions, our legislative control institutions must indicate to the Foreign Ministry the impermissibility of the practice whereby such vital documents are simply not cleared with our institutions, and, as a result, such extremely unpleasant conflicts arise.

We in the committee propose that this question should be implemented in practice by our Supreme Soviet; and

our committee, together with the committee on defense and security, is prepared to take part in this.

#### **Further Discussion of SSD Agreement With U.S.**

**Foreign, Atomic Energy Ministers Defend Accord**  
PM1012125192 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Dec 92 p 3

[Article by Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and Russian Federation Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Mikhaylov: "How We Will Destroy Nuclear Weapons. Concerning the Agreement on Cooperation Between Russia and the United States"]

[Text] The attack on the government made at the current Congress of People's Deputies was no surprise. It was clearly inevitable. Any young democracy is predestined to pass through a crucible of clashes of positions and arguments, and Russian democracy is no exception here. Moreover, we think that open and honest discussion and even tough discussion can only temper democracy.

However, what is sometimes utilized by the opponents of reforms and opponents of the new, democratic Russia's entry into the civilized world now not so much surprises us as evokes a feeling of disappointment at the quality of the political means being utilized in the struggle and at the methods derived from days gone by. In particular, these are being introduced on the "sell out" to the West of Russia's interests by its government and on the threat arising to the homeland's security. This time deputies and the press have been presented with a sensational theory of an allegedly "secret" pact with Washington that opens up an opportunity for the Americans to "operate" unchecked on our territory without bearing any responsibility to us.

We think that our deputies and the mass media deserve much more respectful treatment. The real facts are needed, not politically motivated conjectures and interpretations.

These are the facts.

During last June's Russian-U.S. summit meeting, a package of agreements was signed on cooperation on the secure and safe transportation, storage, and destruction [SSD] of nuclear and certain other types of weapons. This package of accords in many respects reflected the attainment by relations between Russia and the United States of a qualitatively higher level based on mutual trust and respect and on the development of relations of partnership and friendship, including in such an important and sensitive sphere as the handling of nuclear weapons. The scale of and the relatively tight deadlines for implementing the nuclear weapons reduction program in both Russia and the United States urgently placed on the agenda the question of cooperation between them on technical problems in ensuring safety in the elimination of the nuclear weapons being cut and in the sphere of safe procedures for the transportation, storage, and handling of such weapons.

The United States offered, in particular, to give us material and technical assistance for achieving these objectives. The U.S. Congress allocated \$400 million from the budget for fiscal 1992 for these purposes, taking the sum from appropriations for the Pentagon's programs. Additional resources have also been allocated from the fiscal 1993 budget.

It is worth noting that it was not easy for the Americans to make this decision. It was defended in serious debates: Influential forces in the U.S. Congress attempted to link the provision of aid to us with the adoption of all kinds of provisos, conditions, and "killer" amendments. G. Bush's active personal support helped to decide the question.

As a result it was possible to ensure that the preliminary conditions set by the U.S. Congress were not reflected in the agreement's text. (In particular, those on compensating the U.S. side for its expenditure, including with oil and other strategic materials; on terminating our military programs which, in the Americans' opinion, go "beyond the bounds of legitimate defense interests"; on monitoring how nuclear munitions are destroyed in our country; and others.)

By the June meeting of the Russian and U.S. presidents, a package of agreements on this subject had been elaborated. Talks on these questions were held by experts from the Foreign Ministry, Atomic Energy Ministry, and Defense Ministry on the basis of the president's corresponding instructions. Of course, the state leadership was briefed on the talks' progress.

The agreements were signed. Nobody thought to make a secret of them. Following the Russian delegation's return from Washington, a full list of documents adopted during the state visit was sent to the Supreme Soviet, including to the Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, with a description of the main provisions of each of them. The texts of all documents and materials signed or adopted during the visit were also submitted. A brief account of all these documents was published in *DIPLOMATICHESKIY VESTNIK* [Diplomatic Bulletin], while the full texts were published in the special collection of documents entitled "B.N. Yeltsin's State Visit to the United States" and published by the "International Relations" publishing house, which went on open sale. Everyone interested in the details of the accords could get them from absolutely accessible sources. Moreover, the Russian ministries involved in implementing them were ready and remain ready to give the necessary explanations.

As regards the crux of the matter, the package of signed agreements regulates the conditions and parameters of cooperation. The starting point in the formulation of these questions is the so-called "framework agreement." Furthermore, in every case, depending on the specific nature of the specific project, the details of its implementation are amplified in special agreements on implementation. Thus the full picture of conditions for carrying

out each cooperation project is formed from two documents—the "framework agreement" and the specific agreement on implementation.

U.S. assistance in the sphere of ensuring security in the handling of nuclear and certain other types of weapons at various stages of their elimination—this is in fact what the agreements relate to—gives us the chance to solve a whole host of technical problems without recourse to the country's already strained budget. The agreements already signed will alone enable us to save 40 billion rubles [R]. From these resources Russia is acquiring 10,000 secure containers for storing plutonium and uranium, 115 railcars to increase the security of shipments of nuclear munitions to the plants dismantling them, and over 200 instruments and devices for rapid response teams for use in possible accidents. This is quite substantial aid.

Of course, we and only we determine specifically which munitions are to be destroyed and exactly how to do this. And only Russian specialists are carrying out work to dismantle nuclear munitions at enterprises.

The Russian departments engaged in the transportation and elimination of the relevant munitions (primarily the Atomic Energy Ministry and Defense Ministry) formulate the requirements for specific technical resources, equipment, and technical documentation. These are ordered from the Americans according to our specifications, with payment being made from the resources allocated by the U.S. Congress.

Our priority areas for the utilization of this assistance were defined—they include technical means of increasing the security of transportation of nuclear weapons, equipping special subunits with technical means of eliminating the effects of possible accidents, and the construction and equipping of storage facilities for the secure storage of fissile materials released during the disassembly of nuclear munitions.

On the basis of Russian specialists' proposals, the U.S. side is elaborating the relevant means, equipment, and documentation and will deliver them to us. All equipment coming into our country undergoes the necessary tests and checks and only after this can it be used. The inspection and acceptance of equipment received from the United States is carried out by subunits of the Russian Federation Atomic Energy Ministry with the involvement of qualified specialists of the necessary type. If the equipment does not meet the specifications it is returned to the United States for replacement, as is usually done in such cases.

It is clear here from the text of the agreements as a whole that it is a question of importing and exporting equipment "necessary to implement the agreement," that is, only the equipment that we ourselves determine is necessary. The import and export of any items and commodities not relating to activity within the agreement's framework is, of course, regulated by Russian legislation.

Because imported and exported equipment is subject to strict checking by Russian organizations during acceptance procedures, it was deemed possible to exempt it from customs examination. And it is important to mention that by no means all the U.S. aircraft and ships delivering equipment to us are exempt from customs examination, taxes, duties, and such like. Commercial ships and aircraft are by no means subject to this exemption.

The agreements do not provide for the admission of U.S. specialists to facilities in the Russian nuclear weapons complex in order to participate in any work or operations involving nuclear weapons. The U.S. side will have the usual right in such cases to occasionally verify that equipment is being used for its intended purpose. The verification procedures are subject to additional agreement.

Let us note that during the elaboration and implementation of the agreements our specialists were for the first time given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the equipment used by the U.S. in handling its own nuclear weapons. We are indeed reaching a new level of trust and civilized openness without harming each other's security.

In conditions where we are being given substantial material and technical assistance free of charge, it is customary and correct to reciprocally grant the U.S. certain conditions which would create a favorable climate for practical work within the framework of the corresponding programs.

This concerns facilitation of the entry and exit of U.S. personnel and the privileges and immunities granted to U.S. state employees who are in Russia in connection with the agreements' implementation. These are the minimum privileges that are granted, on the basis of accepted international courtesy, to a state's official representatives on another country's territory.

Consent to exempt the U.S. side and its personnel from liability for damage that could be caused stems from the real nature of the cooperation. All the equipment provided by the U.S. side will be used only by Russian specialists. The signed agreements do not provide for the participation of U.S. specialists in activity on our territory associated with a radiation risk or other especially dangerous risk. Therefore, realistically speaking, any actions capable of causing serious harm to our citizens or organizations and environment simply cannot be carried out by U.S. representatives during the implementation of the agreed projects. Harm could, of course, be caused as a result of accidents, during the loading or unloading of equipment, and so forth. In these cases the Russian side assumes responsibility for settling claims. Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that we are talking here only about civil law claims. Questions of criminal liability are not broached in the agreements.

Attempts to distort the meaning of the agreements and calls to denounce it could only lead to our partners'

confidence in the possibility of doing business with Russia being undermined. How can they be confident that in the same way any conversion projects with the participation of foreign partners will not be called into question and that the extreme opposition will not declare them to be harmful and start to revise them? It is not surprising that Western business is reacting warily to the possibility of cooperating with us. So much for concern to preserve the military-industrial complex' potential!

In this instance meticulous, responsible work is under way to make the world safer. It is a question of normal cooperation which is primarily in the Russian Federation's interests. Opportunities for similar collaboration with other countries, specifically the UK, France, and the FRG, have been opened up. It is in our interests to use the most modern technical resources and solutions to ensure that the cuts we are making in the most destructive weapons are made economically and safely. Economically and safely primarily from the viewpoint of Russians, relieving our fellow countrymen of the additional burdens of defense expenditure.

#### Atomic Energy Minister Interviewed

PM1112102192 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 11 Dec 92 p 7

[Interview with Viktor Mikhaylov, Russian minister of atomic energy, by Yevgeniy Panov, place and date not given: "Mikhaylov: Such Agreements Can Only Be Welcomed"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] At a press conference 1 December, representatives of Russian Unity talked about a "dreadful" document which threatened many problems for Russia—namely, the agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States on the safe and reliable shipment, storage, and destruction [SSD] of weapons and the prevention of the proliferation of weapons signed by Yeltsin and Bush in June 1992. The Congress instructed parliament to analyze this document. What kind of document is it, why it was concluded, and whether it is dangerous to our country—the minister now talks about that especially for ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's readers.

[Mikhaylov] In November 1991, the U.S. Congress adopted a decision to give Russia technical assistance and free aid amounting to \$400 million (from the U.S. Defense Department budget) for the safe storage, transport, and elimination of Russia's weapons of mass destruction subject to reduction within the framework of the Russian and U.S. presidents' reciprocal initiatives.

The scrapping of tens of thousands of nuclear munitions is a very costly business. It will take between \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion. The Russian exchequer does not have this kind of money.

The U.S. Congress demanded compensation for America's expenses in the form of Russian oil and gas or other strategic materials and set us six conditions. Two of them—U.S. monitoring [kontrol] of our scientific

research and experimental design work in the defense sphere to ensure that this work does not exceed the bounds of Russia's "defense sufficiency" needs—"sufficiency" from the American viewpoint, that is—and monitoring by their specialists of the process of nuclear disarmament in Russia—were totally unacceptable. Like the compensation condition. This must be a question of free aid.

That is why painstaking work on the agreement began. We had to convince the U.S. side first that in a situation of political and economic instability in Russia the ill-prepared destruction of nuclear warheads involving their dismantling and shipment is dangerous for it and the whole world. And second, if the destruction of nuclear weapons in our country is halted as a result of financial and technical difficulties, by the year 2000 the Americans will be scrapping their own weapons but we will be unable to. They will have 10,000 charges left, we will have 35,000. To cut a long story short, the point is that free aid and technical assistance to Russia directly meets U.S. interests.

The agreement appeared in its final form after the June meeting between B. Yeltsin and G. Bush. For our side it was prepared by the Defense Ministry, the Security Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, and the Atomic Energy Ministry (the latter has been given executive functions). The agreement is based on the Vienna convention on help in the event of nuclear accidents or a radiation emergency situation and on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It is a general—"framework"—agreement. It clearly defines the criteria for the granting of U.S. aid and stipulates the need for the conclusion of additional agreements regulating specific forms and mechanism of cooperation between Russia and the United States. The Defense Ministry and the Atomic Energy Ministry have already signed five such documents.

Are there any points in the "framework" agreement which could be viewed as a betrayal of Russia's interests? The agreement stipulates points of principle. For example, the procedure for the reliable transportation of munitions to the dismantling site and the storage procedure. On all these questions the U.S. side is giving us technical assistance. This presumes the participation of U.S. specialists. It is logical for them to enjoy certain privileges relating to entry and exit and visits to our facilities. But this does not mean that they can behave as they like in Russia and bring in or take out whatever they want. This preferential regime applies only to that sphere covered by the agreement. In addition, the specialists invited have the status of consultants. All decisions will be made by us and all supplies are strictly monitored by us. The Russian side alone is responsible for all operations involving U.S. equipment.

We, in turn, must guarantee the U.S. side that the equipment that we receive will be used only for its specific purpose, will not end up in any part of the Third

World, and will not be used to produce weapons. This is also the reason for the complex and lengthy procedure for canceling the treaty.

On the whole I have to say that the agreement marks a new approach to the problems of disarmament and collective security. For our part we can only welcome this aid. What is the scale of it? Under five specific projects the United States will supply Russia with 450 sets of soft protective covering which will protect the nuclear munitions from being punctured in the case of sabotage; 200 sets [komplekty; not further specified] for the rapid reaction groups operating in various emergency situations; and 115 sets of equipment for special freight cars. The latter alone will cost \$20 million. Add to that 10,000 containers for the storage of uranium and plutonium costing \$5,000-\$6,000 each and equipment for modern storage facilities for fissile materials. Under the agreement we will not receive a single actual cent—just equipment or technical solutions [projektnyye resheniya]. The aid included in the aforementioned five treaties is worth \$100 million, which, we calculate, is equivalent to 400 billion rubles [R]. Meanwhile, we have received R20 billion from the budget this year for all the research and development work involved in preserving the potential of the nuclear weapons complex.

Where is the harm to Russia here? Where is the betrayal of its interests? And who is being accused of doing that? Do they mean people who have devoted all their efforts to creating the country's nuclear shield? In purely formal terms the general "framework" agreement gives no justification for such accusations. If you examine it in the context of specific additional projects the absurdity of these accusations becomes obvious.

Today talks on questions of the safe elimination of nuclear weapons and the prevention of their proliferation are being held with Britain, France, the FRG, and Italy. All the countries of the world should be interested in the reliable reduction of the nuclear arsenals.

#### Deputy, Former Diplomat Assail Agreement

PM0912131592 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 8 Dec 92 p 3

[Interviews with Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, and Georgiy Korniyenko, former USSR first deputy foreign minister, by N. Garifullina; place and date not given: "B. Yeltsin-G. Bush: Agreement Without Parity. Treaty of Unequals"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] As is well known, at a news conference of the "Russian Unity" opposition bloc People's Deputy Mikhail Astafyev read out the text of the Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the United States Regarding the Secure and Safe Transportation, Storage, and Destruction [SSD] of Weapons and Prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons, signed on 17 June in Washington by B. Yeltsin and G. Bush.

Deputies M. Astafyev and V. Sevastyanov submitted a question as deputies that same day. The congress instructed the Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties to investigate the agreement, which entered legal force six months ago. What lies behind this document? Here are two competent opinions.

**Opinion of Deputy Iona Andronov**

Iona Andronov, deputy chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Ties, set out his viewpoint regarding the agreement.

[Garifullina] What is your assessment of the agreement?

[Andronov] After the congress instructed the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee to investigate this strange agreement, Ambartsumov, our committee's chairman, convened the most active members of the committee at the "White House," and Deputy Foreign Minister Berdennikov, who I think has the most direct connection with this, was also invited along. But Aleksandr Georgiyevich Khodakov, deputy director of the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry Legal Department, came instead of him. All sorts of questions and complaints were put to him. I said that so far I have two questions for him. First: According to Articles 5 and 10 this treaty establishes extremely strange and in my view unprecedented relations between Russia and the United States. It says (Article 5 Paragraph 2): "Air maritime craft [as published: vozdushnye morskiye suda]... used by the United States in connection with activities under the present agreement in the Russian Federation are exempt from customs inspection in accordance with international law..." It goes on (Article 10 Paragraph 2): "The United States, U.S. personnel, contractors, and contractors' personnel can import or export from the Russian Federation any equipment, accessories, materials, or services required for the implementation of the present agreement." That is, all this is not subject to inspection by the Russian Federation or any of its organs! In practice anything at all can be exported from our country.

This is not to mention other articles that are rather humiliating for our national dignity and the state. I asked Mr. Khodakov: Why did they need to export anything they liked from our country? What is behind this? Khodakov, who it transpires took part in preparing these documents and in the talks in Washington when they were signed by Bush and Yeltsin and knows all the ins and outs, replied that he does not know and that this means the question should be put to someone else. This indicates that very many people who ought to have been abreast of the situation were cut off from the conclusion of the agreement.

That is not all. The style of the wording of the agreement is often simply not Russian. I spent 12 years working in the United States. I know English, and I can see that this is simply a crude word-for-word translation from English

into Russian. Here I have a very strong suspicion that in fact the treaty was written by the Americans and then they translated it, without even bothering to polish it up, so it looked like a Russian text and handed it over to us. Clearly someone palmed this document off on Boris Nikolayevich. So the first thing we must establish is who.

[Garifullina] What do you think happened?

[Andronov] This was obviously done by a very narrow circle of people or maybe just one or at most two individuals. So I demanded of Khodakov that, in accordance with congress instructions, I be given a key document—the "Certificate of Referrals" [List soglasovaniy]. International treaties to be signed by the president are supposed to carry on the back or at the bottom facsimile signatures of the top officials or official who, before the document is passed on to the president for signature, sign themselves to attest that everything has been checked, everything is in order, in line with our interests, and so forth. This practice exists in both the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Soviet. For the most important documents it is always possible to establish who prepared them and bears responsibility in addition to the president. For three days now I have been demanding this "Certificate of Referrals"...

[Garifullina] From whom?

[Andronov] First from Khodakov. I warned Ambartsumov, the chairman of our committee: Without that certificate not only will I not sign the findings [of the investigation], I will be forced to disclose these strange circumstances to the congress. Ambartsumov conducted further talks, also to no avail.

When we see the "Certificate of Referrals" we will at last learn the name of the person who effectively concluded this agreement with the United States. He clearly had some kind of calculation.

In the meantime I can say one thing: This agreement without any military participation has brought a great nation to its knees...

**Opinion of Diplomat Georgiy Korniyenko**

My interlocutor, Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, worked in the USSR Foreign Ministry from 1949 to 1986 and can be said to have risen the whole way from consultant to first deputy foreign minister. His main sphere of activity was relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and all questions in any way connected with the United States.

[Garifullina] Georgiy Markovich, what conclusion could you draw about this document?

[Korniyenko] The agreement is authentic and not secret, and this could have been discovered from the very start. The text of it is included in the anthology of documents signed by Yeltsin in the United States during this visit.

The questions that form the subject of this agreement are indeed important, and I personally have no doubts about them.

As for the nature of the agreement, in my view, it is totally at odds with the norms by which two sovereign, equal states are usually guided. From this viewpoint the agreement is clearly a one-sided document granting to the United States many rights that the Russian side does not enjoy. Even from the purely formal, juridical viewpoint, a picture uncharacteristic of an agreement between equal countries immediately emerges. Usually a treaty between sovereign states always observes balance between the two sides' rights and duties.

Take Article 1, which says that the sides cooperate in order to assist the Russian Federation in achieving such-and-such objectives.

It should really have said that the sides cooperate in order to assist "each other." In practice each side does not always carry out identical actions, but it must have the right to this if this is an agreement between equal sovereign states.

When you read the document you keep on coming up against provisions that are at odds with the norms between equal sovereign states. It transpires that Russia and the Russian authorities have no control over the United States and U.S. personnel who may be involved in activities on Russia's territory in connection with implementation of the agreement. They are granted privileges and benefits that are always granted on a reciprocal basis in international practice. Russian representatives must have similar rights, benefits, and privileges in performing their functions arising from the agreement on U.S. territory. But from the start the agreement envisages rights solely for the United States on Russian territory.

It is simply astonishing that the Russian Federation assumes a commitment in advance to make no complaints or institute judicial proceedings against U.S. personnel even in the event that their activities lead to the death of Russian Federation personnel or damage to their health. Once again this is a one-sided agreement granting privileges to the United States, and not the reverse.

That is not all. The provision concerning exemption from customs inspection, taxes, duties, and levies is not unusual in intergovernmental agreements, but it is always formulated in terms of reciprocal rather than unilateral rights.

Incidentally, about the provisions exempting the U.S. side from legal liability, taxes, and so forth. Specialists in state law must give their findings about this, of course. Can a head of state, the head of the executive, *ex officio* actually sign such agreements and not submit them for subsequent ratification?

It seems to me that the aforementioned provisions necessitate submitting the agreement for ratification. But in this case for some reason this is not envisaged, although questions of jurisdiction and taxes are the function of legislative organs and not executive organs. Therefore unless the president secured powers in this regard in advance, before the signing of the agreement, it should fall into the category of agreements subject to ratification.

I would also note the following detail: The text of the document contains grammatical mistakes and typing errors, that is, it bears the hallmark of carelessness not only in terms of content, but also in terms of form, which is something for which the perpetrator would have been "flogged," so to speak, in the old Foreign Ministry.

[Garifullina] A statement by the Russian Federation Government press center was circulated at the congress claiming that the agreement "does not impose on the Russian side any commitments going beyond normal international practice. Nor does it contain any unilateral commitments by the Russian side placing it in a position of inequality with respect to the contracting party."

[Korniyenko] The statement by the government press center is clearly aimed at totally justifying the nature of the agreement. I think the conclusion of the International Affairs Committee is more balanced. It also notes the agreement's shortcomings and draws attention to the dubious provisions.

[Garifullina] What may be the treaty's consequences for Russia, in your view?

[Korniyenko] I don't think you should paint some terrible picture of what may happen as a result of implementation of this specific agreement. But I personally see the nature of this document as politically detrimental. The worst thing is that a broader picture can be seen here: Our talks with the United States are now one-sided and lack the necessary balance between the sides' interests, rights, and duties. This agreement reminds me of a remark about the American negotiators in early 1991, soon after Shevardnadze's departure from the post of foreign minister, when Bessmertnykh had taken his place, in THE NEW YORK TIMES. It was about the negotiators dealing with questions of arms limitation and disarmament. Right, in the opinion of THE NEW YORK TIMES, U.S. negotiators admit that when Shevardnadze was foreign minister, any disputed issue was resolved 80 percent at the expense of the Soviet side and only 20 percent at the expense of the U.S. side. But present practice creates the impression that serious questions are constantly resolved up to 100 percent at the expense of the Russian side. From this viewpoint the agreement evokes great concern.

[Garifullina] What is your view of the balance of forces and the nature of relations between Russia and the United States today? There used to be parity...

[Korniyenko] It is totally clear that now there is no parity of military forces or even, more narrowly, strategic forces between Russia and the United States. But this is not the fault of the Russian Foreign Ministry, it is more its misfortune. Parity has been violated as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and internal processes. But this does not mean that the Russian Foreign Ministry should not conduct business in the name of a sovereign state.

[Garifullina] Don't you think that the Russian leadership, together with the Foreign Ministry, is pursuing a frankly pro-American policy to the detriment of Russian interests?

[Korniyenko] Yes, but I have never liked and I still have no taste for name-calling: "pro-American" or pro-anything else policy... I would put it in more balanced and simpler terms: Not everything is being done that, even in the present circumstances, should and could be done to defend the interests of our state and our people. I do not think that, if this is happening, it is because someone is consciously pursuing a pro-American policy. They are not defending our interests. That is the main point.

[Garifullina] You know the United States well. Are you not worried that it is increasingly beginning to play the role of world policeman? The incursion into Iraq, then Serbia, and now under the guise of delivering humanitarian aid to Somalia, and the U.S. President has given the American landing force in that country the right to open fire not just for purposes of necessary defense... [sentence as published] But an incursion into our country, too, would be perfectly possible on that pretext...

[Korniyenko] With regard to Iraq, there was Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, this cannot be ignored, and certain measures, sanctions against Iraq on the part of the world community and the United Nations, were entirely justified. But in fact the upshot was that, with the support of the Soviet Union during Shevardnadze's time, the United States was effectively given a free hand. The Security Council decision was formulated in such general and broad terms that the United States had carte blanche to do what it liked. This was absolutely at odds with both international law and our interests. And this led to extremely grave consequences for Iraq's civilian population.

There are also many questions and doubts about what is happening in Yugoslavia—is the Russian Foreign Ministry doing everything correctly? Not everything, in my view. Once again the question is: What are the sanctions and who is implementing them? And once again the United States and the other NATO countries have a free hand. The same goes for Somalia. Yes, the situation there is tricky, and people are dying, partly because aid is not reaching its destination. Something must be done, we cannot adopt a purely formalistic stance of nonintervention in this situation. I can allow the possibility of

strong-arm methods in order to deliver aid to the dying. But why once again does this have to be entirely in the hands of the United States—given its ways and its well known desire to exploit every situation for its own interests? There could be different ways of delivering this aid.

[Garifullina] The "Russian Unity" opposition bloc has prepared a draft resolution about the agreement and its first paragraph proposes denouncing it as contrary to the interests of Russia's state security and detrimental to its national dignity.

[Korniyenko] The agreement must not be retained in that form, this is clear, and I think it is right to raise the question in these terms. As for the specific method of action, two courses are possible: One course is to begin by directly denouncing the treaty. The other is to instruct the Supreme Soviet to make a concrete, specific analysis of the agreement and to take further actions to channel it to the benefit of Russia.

[Garifullina] Is that possible? After all, the document has already been signed by the heads of the two states...

[Korniyenko] Such cases do occur in international practice. Not all that often, admittedly, and by no means easily, but nevertheless this is not impossible. The Russian side must directly declare "Our legislative organ has doubts about the agreement" and on this basis propose that new talks be held to bring it into line with the demands of the legislative organ. Of course, it would be easier and more logical if the agreement itself were to envisage submission for ratification. But even without that, I reiterate, such cases are by no means impossible in international practice.

#### UN General Assembly Disarmament Resolutions Reported

93P500334 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 11 Dec 92 p 1

[ITAR-TASS report: "General Assembly on Disarmament"]

[Text] The UN General Assembly adopted a large package of resolutions on problems of disarmament and international security on Wednesday [9 Dec] evening. These documents embrace a wide circle of questions—from banning nuclear tests and guaranteeing the security of nonnuclear states to general and complete disarmament and international arms transfers. The Assembly welcomed the important accords between Russia and the United States on limiting and reducing strategic offensive weapons, in particular the accord announced in Washington on 17 June 1992. The Assembly urgently called for these agreements to be turned into an official treaty in the speediest manner. In the same resolution the Assembly called on the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to continue their joint

efforts directed at the elimination of nuclear weapons and strategic offensive arms on the basis of existing agreements.

## STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS

### Ukrainian Deputy Argues Pro-Nuclear Weapons Position

93UN04404 Kiev GOLOS UKRAINY in Russian  
10 Nov 92 p 6, 20 Nov 92 p 7, 21 Nov 92 p 7

[Article in three installments by Major General Vladimir Borisovich Tolubko, people's deputy of Ukraine: "Concern About Security, Or Back to the Phalanx?"]

[10 Nov 92 p 6]

[Text] For Major General Vladimir Tolubko, people's deputy, the missile troops are his entire life. Vladimir Borisovich believes that the decision that Ukraine should become a nonnuclear country without missiles is a long way from being faultless. This is why he has written a series of three articles in which he expresses his viewpoint on nuclear missile weapons in Ukraine. We believe that the arguments of the experts should be brought to our readers.

*The combat experience gained in past wars (and unfortunately the Ukrainian people have endured many of them) should today be regarded as invaluable capital that augments the combat might of our forces.*

*The Armed Forces of Ukraine should include that class of means of destruction and comprehensive support for combat actions that could in the event of aggression destroy any enemy targets with adequate reliability.*

*Ukraine cannot have the reputation of being a weak country. In order to avoid aggressive attacks from outside it is essential to possess the potential to respond to any threat.*

One of the most important problems associated with the development of any state claiming the status of an independent state is the problem of ensuring the security of the state and its defense capability. When this problem is being resolved it is impossible to ignore world military-historical experience in the development of armed forces because an army that is unable to predict new phenomena finds itself prisoner to outworn stereotypes and will inevitably suffer defeat. The combat experience gained in past wars (and unfortunately the Ukrainian people have endured many of them) should today be regarded as invaluable capital that augments the combat might of our forces.

What has victory in wars brought? The muscles of the troops, and initially very simple but later improved weapons, combined with the military art. The first wars in world history (in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.) showed that success in the fighting depended on the military potential of the warring parties. Strong states

had strong armies, and vice versa: A strong army ensured not only the existence but also the prosperity of a country. Success in fighting depended mainly on the numerical strength of troops and the physical condition of the warriors. Each warrior in the formation of the phalanx, legion, or maniple was a master in fighting with edged weapons and was drilled in hand-to-hand combat. Use of cavalry significantly enhanced the troops' ability to maneuver, and consequently made it possible for an army to deal with more complex missions in the fighting. Gradually the victories went increasingly to armies led by the more progressive commanders who used new means to wage armed struggle. It was precisely in fighting that the military art was founded.

An army's weapons were determined by the level of development in craft production and science and technology. In the 4th through the 2nd centuries B.C., compared to other states of the time Greece and Rome had a production technology and qualitatively better weapons. Heavy spears, swords, battle axes, and daggers were used for hand-to-hand fighting; for fighting at a distance there were bows and arrows and metal spears (javelins). Combat resources were developed that were the first examples of combat equipment. Extensive use was made of war chariots and elephants in combat.

The forward-looking development of production forces and production methods opened broader opportunities to equip armies. The development of metallurgy, for example, made it possible to increase the production of edged weapons significantly, and to create the first examples of firearms. These were still primitive cannons and matchlock firearms—harquebuses. In 1521 the musket was invented and put into service with some armies; its shot could penetrate a knight's armor, and this predetermined the gradual disappearance of the tactical principle that had been employed for many centuries, in which warriors fought the warriors directly facing them.

The distinctive features of the preparations for and the conduct of wars by the Slavic fighting forces under the command of Aleksandr Nevskiy (1240-1242), Dmitriy Donskoy (1378-1380), and Bogdan Khmelnitskiy (1648-1654) deserve our special attention. Along with the ability to mobilize and train the popular masses to fight an invader, these figures were endowed with an even greater command talent. Bogdan Khmelnitskiy, for example, used spears, sabers, and firearms in the wars of liberations, and the first examples of artillery weapons. The tactics for actions by the troops consisted of using columns in line of skirmish.

During the latter half of the 17th century the muskets in most of the European armies were replaced first with flintlock smoothbore longarms, and then later, in the 1840's, with percussion firearms. By the end of the 19th century all armies had switched to the rifle, including those with magazines, and other kinds of automatic firearms were being mastered. It was precisely the availability of automatic rifles and machine guns and artillery

with a high rate of fire that enabled the relatively small Boer army to achieve many successes and win a victory in the war against the army with the highest prestige of the time—the British army.

The pattern is obvious: The higher the level of development of production forces in a state, the more efficient the weapons in service with its army; the more powerful the army, the more independent the policy that the country pursues in the world arena.

This circumstance has been seen in particular in the wars of the 20th century. The Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) confirmed that the outcome of war is influenced most of all by the economic potential of the belligerent. Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated where conservatism and stagnation in military development, government short-sightedness, and a state's economic backwardness lead. The passive nature of the defense strategy, the inadequate numbers of what were then the latest automatic weapons and artillery and mortars with a high rate of fire, and the use of old-fashioned methods for troop control predetermined Russia's shameful defeat.

During World War I the means by which war was waged changed significantly. This was the result of the mass use of machine guns, artillery with a high rate of fire, tanks, and aircraft. Compared to wars of the past, the armies involved in that world war were enormous. It was precisely at that time that toxic agents—weapons of mass destruction—were used for the first time on the battlefield.

What were the lessons of World War I? First, it had become clear that a state's sovereignty and integrity depend on its military and economic potential and the level of development in weapons and combat equipment and military science. Second, the war made it clear that mistakes by politicians and diplomats, the niggardliness of officials, and the principles of the pacifists were ultimately paid for by the people and corrected by the military. Third, it became clear that it is impossible to organize armed forces on the national principle in a multinational state.

During World War II the economy, science, and military thinking were directed toward developing new kinds of tanks, aircraft, artillery systems, small-arms, and other kinds of combat equipment. Ultimately the winner was the one who, other things being equal, succeeded in developing the most modern weapons and equipment and mobilizing and training its citizens in the military art. We were late in doing that at the time, and so the price of victory turned out to be extremely high.

The end of World War II was marked with one of the most monstrous events in the history of mankind—the detonation of atomic bombs over cities in Japan. The advent of nuclear weapons ushered in a new era in military affairs, and today they determine the face of the modern world. And it is the availability of these weapons

in particular countries that plays what is by no means the least role in determining the place of that state in the world ranking.

It is common knowledge that nuclear weapons were developed during World War II in the United States mainly through the efforts of European scientists (Einstein, Bohr, Fermi, and others). The first test of this weapon took place in the United States at the Alamogordo proving ground on 16 July 1945 (the Potsdam Conference was under way at the time in conquered Germany). And only 20 days later, on 6 August 1945, an atomic bomb of what was for that time colossal power—20 kilotons—was dropped on Hiroshima, without military need or expedience. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, a second Japanese city—Nagasaki—was subjected to atomic bombing. The aftermath of the nuclear explosions was horrific. In Hiroshima, almost 130,000 of the 255,000 inhabitants were killed or wounded, and more than 50,000 of Nagasaki's population of almost 200,000 were destroyed.

Subsequently, nuclear weapons were developed and tested in the USSR (1949), Great Britain (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). Today, more than 30 states in the world are prepared scientifically and technically to produce nuclear weapons.

The latest achievements of science and technology have increased many times over the force not only of nuclear means of destruction. In fact, massive use of nuclear weapons may lead to enormous losses in a short time that in the age of conventional weapons would have been inconceivable. Even the use of conventional weapons, however, has catastrophic consequences. Recognition of this fact in and of itself is a deterrent factor and determines the interest in improving conventional means of waging war. The possibilities of these weapons today are almost limitless, as was demonstrated to the world community during the recent war in the Persian Gulf. The main distinguishing feature of that war was the fact that the very latest weapons were tested there on a large scale. For the first time, space "worked" on forces right there on the battlefield. It was space surveillance and navigational assets that largely predetermined the success of the actions both of individual soldiers and of entire divisions.

The space-based systems gave a good account of themselves in repulsing attempts made by the Iraqi side to organize mass use of tactical missiles. Within the anti-missile system used by the multinational forces, the space-based early warning system developed by the Americans was actively used early on. In that war, for the first time extensive and diversified use was made of radioelectronic suppression and radioelectronic countermeasures. For the first time the military command also made use of computer games to predict the consequences of various scenarios for the organization of battle. And finally, for the first time in the history of war one of the opposing sides made massive and intensive use of highly accurate weapons systems to destroy the enemy. In terms

of its duration (38 days) the "fire phase" of the operation was many times (nine times) longer than the actions by ground forces.

As a result, Iraq's quite impressive superiority in absolute indexes over the multinational forces (45 divisions against 16, 8,300 artillery pieces against 4,085, and almost double superiority in tanks) had no effect on the final outcome of the combat actions. The Iraqi command lost in the main thing, namely, combat initiative and the combat possibilities of the troops. The conclusion drawn from this is unambiguous: The age of the "Maginot Line" is definitely a thing of the past. With today's means of waging armed struggle, the basis of military action in a conventional war (and the experience of the Persian Gulf confirmed this), is to engage in massive bombardment using highly accurate weapons, space-based acquisition and guidance, and radioelectronic suppression of the enemy in depth through his defense.

It is therefore obvious that the Armed Forces of Ukraine should include that class of means of destruction and comprehensive support for combat actions that could in the event of aggression destroy with adequate reliability (or threaten to destroy) any hardened, important enemy targets. Obviously, during the first stage this class of combat and support assets should be represented by missiles with no limitations as to range, strategic bombers armed with long-range cruise missiles, and, of course, sea-based strategic systems. In the longer term, intercontinental data acquisition, surveillance, and strike systems could be developed on this basis.

Ukraine cannot have the reputation of being a weak country. In order to avoid aggressive attacks from outside it is essential to possess the potential to respond to any threat. No one should doubt the ability of Ukraine to respond to any aggressor.

[20 Nov 92 p 7]

[Text]

## II. Are the interests of Ukraine taken into account in the START-1 treaty?

*In order for Ukraine to be a power to be reckoned with and dealt with as an equal in the world community, it must have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. And this is not ambition on the part of our country's military-industrial circles. It is the interests of preserving state independence and the stability of the state into the foreseeable future that require this decision.*

*Within Ukraine there is now first-class missile equipment and a strategic air force, and Ukraine has at its disposal personnel who are capable of maintaining these weapons at a high professional level, and there are plants producing missile equipment using the most advanced technologies. It would be at a very minimum an extremely frivolous and premature decision to deprive ourselves of these for the sake of some political gain of the moment.*

*Hasty ratification by Ukraine of the START-1 treaty on the latest cutbacks in nuclear forces would place before it the need to destroy its own nuclear missile forces unilaterally.*

Any declaration on Ukraine's nonnuclear status requires in-depth analysis and a well-considered approach. The Declaration on State Sovereignty, in which it is stated that Ukraine will be nonnuclear and not in any bloc, was issued at a time when Ukraine enjoyed the rights of a Union republic of the USSR. Its integrity and inviolability were guaranteed by the political, economic, and military might of the Union. Now, however, the danger exists that Ukraine will be left without up-to-date means of armed defense. And the cause of defense capability is not helped with mere words.

Events recent months in the world indicate that relying on force, and moreover on nuclear force, remains unchanged in the policies of most states. This can be seen by the nuclear force redesign and modernization programs adopted by Great Britain and France, which have an adequate nuclear potential at their disposal. Funding is also being continued for military programs and scientific research and test-and-design work done in the interests of the Defense Department of the leading nuclear power—the United States. The following question arises: "Against whom and with whom are France and England preparing to fight with nuclear weapons? Why do those states have the right to possess nuclear forces and not have to face, as Ukraine does, the question of their destruction? Is not Ukraine also a European state and a member of the United Nations since 1945?"

In Ukraine itself they are still only talking about what Ukraine should nevertheless be—a powerful nuclear state or a nuclear-free territory? Working to earn political dividends, the opponents of nuclear weapons usually cite as an example the position of a traditionally neutral country—Switzerland. But Switzerland is known not only and not even so much for its neutrality as it is for its bank vaults, in which the deposits of the richest and most influential people from dozens of countries are stored. And it is those people who largely determine the economy and policies of their own states, including military policy. Each of them applies every resource to ensure the security of their own savings. But whose savings are deposited in the banks of Ukraine? Who has changed his dollars and pounds and marks into coupons and provided Ukraine with a similar guarantee of neutrality?

The answer to this question leads unambiguously to the conclusion that in order for Ukraine to be a power to be reckoned with and dealt with as an equal in the world community it must have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. And this is not ambition by our country's military-industrial circles. It is the interests of preserving state independence and the stability of the state into the foreseeable future that require this decision. And, moreover, not just military and political stability, but also economic stability.

At first blush nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them seem to be very costly and false for the budget of a young state. But a simple calculation of the cost of manufacturing and operating missile systems shows that the political and economic advantages gained from nuclear missile weapons are obvious.

The cost of maintaining the strategic missile forces of the Soviet Union was some six-eight percent of the total cost of maintaining its Armed Forces. And annual costs to operate and provide combat training for general purpose forces are several times higher than similar costs to maintain strategic missile forces. If we are guided by emotion, then of course it is possible to cut up the missile systems and eliminate the nuclear weapons and receive an award for "obedience" in the form of the latest box of humanitarian aid. But, relying on powerful, modern weapons, it is possible and necessary to sit down at the negotiating table as an equal participant and obtain not humanitarian aid but major credits, buy new technology and know-how, and create our own economic base and maintain it, while not being apprehensive about threats of attack or political diktat. And that threat will always exist until a unified system of collective security has been created.

M. Gorbachev betrayed the national security of the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union because after the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact, the voluntary unilateral withdrawal from East Europe of troops of the country that won the war, and the formation of the independent states that had formerly been part of the USSR, he did not raise in Europe the question of disbanding the NATO bloc and creating a system of collective security that would include countries both from East and West Europe. And obviously, if the United States had so desired, it could also have become a member of such an alliance.

The "good intentions" of the former leader of the USSR led to the breakdown of the Eastern bloc, but the Western bloc continues to improve itself and build up its combat might. Against whom?...

The disintegration of the USSR and the formation of the sovereign independent states led to the creation of their own armed forces on the territories of the former republics of the Soviet Union. As of today, nuclear missile forces make up part of the armed forces of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. While abandoning the ideological and political confrontation between East and West, it is very important that this be accompanied by similar changes with respect to military affairs. The conclusion of a military agreement to create a unified European system of collective security to protect the states, with the participation of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia, would make it possible hold talks to reduce the nuclear forces of all the states. Hasty ratification by Ukraine of the START-1 treaty on the latest cutbacks in nuclear forces would place before it the need to destroy its own nuclear missile forces unilaterally.

At this time, on the question of nuclear weapons we hear from the United States comparisons of Ukraine with Germany. The fallacious nature of this comparison is obvious. Germany did not develop its own nuclear potential, it merely offered its territory for American missiles. Ukraine is a different matter. Powerful ballistic rockets are manufactured in Ukrainian factories. The best Ukrainian scientific and technical personnel were involved in the development of nuclear warheads. And finally, launch silos are located on Ukrainian soil. And in accordance with the treaty creating the CIS, everything that is on the territory of each state belongs to that state. If missiles stand in Ukraine's silos, they are its legal property. Consequently Ukraine has full legal right itself to dispose of the nuclear weapons and means to deliver them located on its own territory. A country that has proclaimed itself the successor to all the obligations of the USSR has the right to consider itself the successor in other matters also.

The complicated situation in neighboring states also insistently demands a strengthening of our country's defense capability and improved combat readiness for its armed forces. And there is yet one more argument in favor of retaining nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine. The presence of those weapons forces other states to think much more carefully about the consequences of military conflicts and not to permit adventurist actions against nuclear power. Lack of this restraining factor might lead to a situation in which the fate of Ukraine would again be decided by someone else, and it is not known whether that would be better than the previous elder brother.

The intention stated earlier of being a nonnuclear state in the future does not contradict keeping nuclear forces on the territory of Ukraine at this time. About 15 countries are now on the brink of developing their own nuclear weapons. They are spending a large part of their own state budgets for the right to possess them. At this time Ukraine needs to take nothing from anyone, nor to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. There is no need for this because it already has them, and already today we are a full-fledged nuclear power. But if we now relinquish our own nuclear potential, we will lose it forever, irreversibly. The United States will never permit us to develop our own nuclear weapons again from scratch; its military doctrine states that in the interests of its own security the United States will not permit the emergence of new nuclear states. And indeed that work would be much more costly than the cost of maintaining nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.

Within Ukraine there is now first-class missile equipment and a strategic air force, and Ukraine has at its disposal personnel who are capable of maintaining these weapons at a high professional level, and there are plants producing missile equipment using the most advanced technologies. It would be at a minimum a very frivolous and premature decision to deprive ourselves of these for the sake of some political gain of the moment. I would

not like future generations to reproach us for condemning them to live in a second-class country.

At all times the interests of national security have been of paramount importance in the activity of political leaders and governments. In order to guarantee their sovereignty and independence states have sacrificed personal aspirations, interests, and sympathies. The memory of political figures who are able to "give full throat to their own song" and move beyond personal ambition and sacrifice their own glory for the interests of the state always remains with the people. But history also has others, covered in eternal shame—the names of political figures for whom the fleeting glory and laurels of leaders were more dear than the fate and future of their own people.

Today the time has come to consider what the Ukrainian people will remember—the wisdom and farsightedness of politicians who ensured Ukraine's security and favorable prospects for economic development, or the pride of politicians that led to a decline in the country's prestige and destruction of their motherland's national security.

[21 Nov 92 p 7]

[Text]

### III. Nuclear missile weapons: past, present, and future

*A policy for our state in the sphere of national security is impossible without in-depth and objective analysis of the real military-political situation in the world and of the policies of the leading states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons.*

*Disregarding the agreements reached between the United States and Russia in reducing strategic arms, the Pentagon has planned and is consistently implementing modernization of all kinds of strategic arms.*

*Military experts in Russia believe that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the armed forces of the former USSR have reinforced the West's military superiority in general purpose resources. Under these conditions, strategic forces and their basis—the missile troops—remain as the last military-political force that is in a state of constant combat readiness, ensuring strategic balance in the world...*

The present session of the Ukrainian Supreme Council is to consider a number of problems connected with military policy and the development of our own armed forces. It is obvious that there are no simple and unambiguous solutions in these matters, nor can there be.

At this time many different opinions are being expressed on one very complicated issue: Should the Armed Forces of Ukraine have nuclear weapons or should they not? Every opponent has many arguments, and these must be considered. But one thing is beyond dispute: A policy for our state in the sphere of national security is impossible

without in-depth and objective analysis of the real military-political situation in the world and the policies of the leading states, first and foremost those possessing nuclear weapons.

For this reason it is important to analyze the views of leading politicians in the world since World War II on the role of the nuclear missile potential in ensuring national security. These were not only discussions but also practical actions by governments led by those politicians.

Let us start with France, since the size of its population is comparable to Ukraine's. At the height of the cold war the president of France, General de Gaulle, repeatedly expressed the thought that "...France's national security cannot be stable without our own nuclear weapons." These ideas did not remain just the thoughts of the president but were embodied in actual state policy to develop France's nuclear potential. And today Paris has its own land, air, and sea strike forces, capable of destroying targets at a range of up to 5,000 kilometers. Suffice it to say that the sea-based missiles alone are capable of destroying 50 million people in 30 minutes.

But perhaps as the result of the radical changes in the balance of power in Europe France has changed its attitude toward the nuclear potential? Nothing of the kind. In February this year President of France F. Mitterrand stated this: "We approve of B. Yeltsin's proposal on nuclear disarmament. We ourselves shall move in the same direction, but only after the nuclear potential of the United States and Russia have been made comparable to the French potential."

In recent years a program has been drawn up in France to improve nuclear missile weapons. In particular it has been decided to develop more powerful S-4 and S-X mobile missiles. It is planned to replace the Mirage-4 strategic bomber with 200 of the new Mirage-2000's. Single-warhead M-20 missiles aboard submarines are to be replaced with multiple-warhead M-4 missiles. This change will lead to a situation in which 16 M-4 missiles on one submarine will be the equivalent of all of France's nuclear forces at this time.

The position of political leaders in Great Britain in this problem is certainly of interest to us. Former British prime minister M. Thatcher has become the author of a theory according to which nuclear weapons are an important factor in preventing war in Europe and the world. "Nuclear weapons," M. Thatcher emphasized in a speech at the congress of British Conservatives, "will in the future also play a vitally necessary role in the cause of preventing war in Europe." And later, in 1989, she gave it to be understood that Great Britain "... cannot delay in modernizing nuclear weapons." And again: "... Countries with reliable defense avoid wars." This kind of approach was seen in the military policy of the government led by M. Thatcher.

As far as Great Britain's position on the question of reducing its own nuclear potential is concerned, Secretary of State for Defense T. King has said that the British Government undoubtedly welcomes the steps announced in Washington and Moscow, but he emphasized that at this time Great Britain does not intend to join the process of nuclear disarmament because, in his words, it possesses the absolute minimum deterrent forces. On the contrary, since it has nuclear-capable aircraft, Great Britain plans, first, to develop a nuclear cruise missile and put it into service with its air force in the years immediately ahead, and second, to add to the 150 American FB-111 fighter-bombers based on its territory another 60 of this type of nuclear-weapon delivery platform. As a result of these measures, by 1995 the number of American nuclear warheads in Great Britain will have grown from its present 775 to 1,193. Thus, Great Britain has no intention either of reducing or, even less, eliminating its nuclear weapons.

The position of France and Great Britain in the field of nuclear missile weapons has been determined largely by U.S. policy, and it still is. A quite graphic idea of the way that the American military itself understands this is offered by a statement made by General C. Powell (chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff): "U.S. national strategy continues to be based on four elements—global deterrence, forward basing of troops, a readiness to respond to crisis situations, and reorganization of the armed forces. I would like everyone to be mortally afraid of us." And here is the "Defense Directive for Fiscal Years 1994-1998": "Our primary task is to prevent the emergence on the territory of the former Soviet Union or anywhere else a new rival representing a threat to the United States."

The U.S. arguments in favor of carrying out the task of "having everyone mortally afraid of us" are more than convincing. The basis of the United States' strategic offensive forces is that same "triad" that includes land-based missile forces, a nuclear submarine fleet, and the strategic air force.

The combat composition of the land-based missile forces includes 1,000 launchers "armed" with several modifications of the basic Minuteman and the latest MX ("Peacekeeper") missiles. The Minuteman-2 (450 of them) was put into service in 1965 and is equipped with a single 1.5-megaton warhead. The Minuteman-3 and Minuteman-ZUS (200 and 300 of them respectively) are equipped with multiple reentry vehicles having three warheads (the yield of a warhead is 0.33 megatons and 0.5 megatons respectively). Of special interest is the MX missile, put into service in 1986 and today still one of the world's most powerful missiles (maximum range 11,000 kilometers, accuracy (circular error probable) 100 meters, with multiple warheads—10, each having a yield of up to 0.6 megatons). Suffice it to say that just one of the 10 warheads on an MX missile is 30 times more powerful than the weapons dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. MX missiles are designed to deliver a preemptive or disabling nuclear strike. Today there are 50 of

them in the U.S. land-based missile forces. However, whereas all 450 Minuteman-2 missiles could deliver 450 warheads in a single salvo, the 50 MX missiles could deliver 500 nuclear weapons to targets simultaneously.

The U.S. nuclear fleet numbers more than 30 submarines of two main classes—the Ohio class and the Lafayette class—and each submarine can carry 24 and 16 ballistic missile launchers respectively. Three types of missiles are in service with the nuclear submarine fleet. The oldest is the Poseidon-C3 (maximum range 4,600 kilometers, accuracy (circular error probable) 450 meters, multiple reentry vehicle with 10 warheads each with a yield of 0.05 megatons). From 1979 the Trident-1 missile was put into service; this has eight individually targeted warheads. But the yield of each one is three times greater (0.15 megatons), and accuracy is about 1.5 times better than the old generation missiles (about 300 meters). Range is about 8,000 kilometers. And finally, the latest and best missile in the Trident family, which went into service in 1989—the Trident-2. There are now 96 of them in the force composition (there are 384 Trident-1's), but in terms of combat capability each of them is comparable to an MX missile (range 9,000 kilometers, accuracy less than 100 meters target error, multiple reentry vehicle with eight warheads each yielding 0.5 megatons).

The third component of the strategic "triad" is the strategic air force—the patriarch of the U.S. nuclear potential, which has experience in the combat use of nuclear weapons. The number of aircraft in the force composition of the strategic air force changes frequently. Today it is possible to talk of approximately 100 of the latest B-1B bombers and about 150 B-52 strategic bombers with various modifications. Despite the relatively small numbers compared to the other components of the "triad" of means to deliver nuclear weapons, the strategic air force is capable in a single sortie of carrying up to 5,500 nuclear bombs of various types.

Disregarding the agreement reached between the United States and Russia on reducing strategic arms, the Pentagon has planned and is consistently implementing a modernization of all kinds of strategic arms. The buildup of work on an antimissile defense within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative is cause for particular alarm because under the conditions of nuclear weapons cutbacks this will lead to an upset in the balance in favor of the United States and its allies. What do we have in mind here? There has recently been talk about developing a global antimissile defense system to protect against limited strikes and terrorists. Today in the United States preparations are under way to develop during 1994-1996 within the framework of the 1972 ABM Treaty 100 antiballistic missiles at the ICBM base at Grand Forks, and this is essentially the initial stage in developing a multilayered antiballistic-missile defense for the United States. Thus, even before the end of the period for the cutbacks in CIS strategic nuclear arms and the strategic offensive forces of the United States to the

levels determined by the treaty, a start will have been made on destroying nuclear parity.

As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, new states have recently appeared on the political map of the world, and particular ones of these states have still to shape their policies in the field of the nuclear missile potential. Russia's position is particularly important for us. Leading politicians in Russia are suggesting that the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces as the main component of strategic nuclear forces should be retained. Military experts in Russia believe that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Armed Forces of the former USSR have reinforced the superiority of the West in general purpose resources. Under these conditions strategic forces and their basis—the missile troops—remain as the last military-political force that is in a state of constant combat readiness, ensuring strategic balance in the world and Russia's security, and preventing it from being moved into the ranks of second-rate powers.

The present leaders of the nuclear states believe that their strategic nuclear forces should ensure deterrence against aggression, and also against political and economic blackmail from outside. The question involuntarily arises: So does this problem not also exist for Ukraine?

**EDITORIAL COMMENT.** The arguments of General V. Tolubko in favor of a nuclear future for Ukraine cannot be called unconvincing. On the other hand, however, are the United States, France, and Great Britain really trying to conquer nonnuclear Japan, Finland, and Hungary?

We invite military people, politicians, and scholars to a debate on the subject "Should Ukraine Have Nuclear Weapons?"

#### Scientists Assert Mobile Missiles Are Safe

93UM0242C Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY  
in Russian No 48, Dec 92 p 4

[Interview with Professor V. Chobanyan, doctor of technical sciences; Professor Ye. Sushkevich, candidate of technical sciences; and Professor V. Blinov, doctor of technical sciences; by unidentified correspondent; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Specialists Comment": "The RS-22 Remains Functional"]

[Text] In ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 15 for 1992 a short piece was published under the title "Missiles Leave a Trail of Dust" with reference to the expert P. Belov. Today viewpoints are presented by a specialist for operation of missile arms, Professor V. Chobanyan, doctor of technical sciences; a specialist in the operation of nuclear

weapons, Professor Ye. Sushkevich, candidate of technical sciences; and a leading specialist in explosive safety, Professor V. Blinov, doctor of technical sciences.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] Recall that our piece discussed the idea that the RS-22 and RS-12M mobile missiles presented a greater danger to the population itself than to a possible enemy.

[Chobanyan] As for the danger these missiles present to the enemy, one can give this example. Upon the elimination of medium-range mobile missiles (SS-20) by the launching method, 71 of the 72 missiles hit their mark accurately.

Is there a problem with providing for security of mobile missile systems? Undoubtedly there is. Any weapon is dangerous.

[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY] People give the probability of an accident involving a nuclear warhead with a discharge of radioactive substances as 0.01-0.1.

[Sushkevich] The absurdity of these figures is confirmed by the fact that if one were to follow this "calculation," during the last two months, for example, in the Armed Forces there should have been from 50 to 500 accidents with warheads, which is comparable to 50-500 Chernobyls.

If one is to speak about the relative evaluation of the consequences of a nuclear explosion (the more so an accident with a nuclear warhead with radioactive discharge) and the accident with a nuclear reactor at the nuclear power plant, the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster were incomparably graver. In particular, the decline of activity with a nuclear power plant accident is considerably slower than with a nuclear explosion. Thus, for example, the active contamination of the locality with a nuclear explosion decreases 3,000-fold during the first hour, and with accidents at nuclear power plants—2.5-fold. Within 10 days it is a million-fold as against eightfold.

[Blinov] In all stages of the life cycle of a missile system there are theoretical studies and experimental tests of individual components, combinations of them, mock-ups, and experimental models, and rehearsals in keeping with fairly strict requirements. In tests a missile is dropped on rocky ground from an altitude of one kilometer, washed with combustible materials and ignited, and shot out of various kinds of weapons.

The requirements for explosion safety for domestic missiles (particularly missile fuels) are stricter than for analogous foreign models. Convincing evidence of this is the accident-free operation of the SS-20 missile system under severe conditions over more than 15 years.

**Ukrainian Officials Discuss Nuclear Disarmament Problems**

**National Security Guarantees Sought**

*LD1012192492 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in English 0100 GMT 10 Dec 92*

[From the "Midweek" program]

[Text] [Announcer] The future of nuclear weapons based on the territory of Ukraine is a matter of heated national and international debates now. Some political and military figures of Ukraine believe that the country shouldn't get rid of its nuclear potential so easily. The issue needs to be discussed thoroughly.

Dismantling of nuclear warheads is a very expensive process. At the same time highly enriched uranium recovered from nuclear warheads can be used in nuclear power plants. American experts have made calculations on an American program of elimination of nuclear weapons. The U.S. will get 5,000 tonnes of nuclear fuel after dismantling of about 6,000 nuclear warheads. The cost of this fuel is about \$50 billion. Strategic missiles based on the territory of Ukraine carry 1,280 warheads. So Ukraine can economize \$8-10 billion dollars.

Besides getting rid of nuclear weapons Ukraine will need certain guarantees of its national security. An official of Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, says the following in this connection:

The position of the Ukrainian Government is guided by the decisions taken by the Ukrainian Parliament, that is the declaration of independence which stated inter alia that Ukraine is to achieve status of a non-nuclear weapons state in future.

Guided by these decisions of the Ukrainian Parliament the government has signed the Lisbon protocol on 23d May which among others has a provision for Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to adhere to the NPT treaty, that is Nonproliferation Treaty. The government is totally committed and the President of Ukraine is committed also to speedy adhesion [as heard] of Ukraine to this treaty.

We believe that uniqueness of the situation of Ukraine gives us moral right to ask for guarantees of our security. The situation is as follows: Ukraine is the first state ever which is, or in the process of becoming, nonnuclear. As a successor state of the former Soviet Union, and equal successor state, we had at least formal right to be nuclear. But it was the will of the people of Ukraine, as it was expressed by the parliament of Ukraine, to achieve the status of a nonnuclear weapons state. That is to say that we have decided to forego the nuclear option and we would like, and we have the right, to get guarantees of nonuse of force from any nuclear state against Ukraine. That is what we are asking from the United States and Russian Federation, and from other nuclear states.

The final fate of the treaty is, as I have already mentioned, in the hands of the parliament of Ukraine—the position of the government is clear.

The problems that we face and which are of concern to the government and to the parliament are the problems of nuclear safety in the transition period, the problem of financing the huge amounts of expenses involved and also the problem of resources, physical resources in the form of equipment and technical know how needed to have a safe dismantlement process.

We feel that—at least for nuclear warheads—the best solution would, could be found (?within cooperation) with Russian Federation, but it will depend on the position and on the conditions set out by our Russian partners. Such negotiations are due shortly and we hope that their results will be promising.

We also expect that other nuclear states and Western countries in general would give us more help—financial, technical, and other kinds of help—in this dismantlement process. For the time being Ukraine has not yet received a single cent for these purposes and unfortunately we are getting only negative incentives. We are being asked to give assurances, to be, to have speedy progress on the way for dismantlement, but unfortunately we are not being given any help in this huge problem that is very difficult for Ukraine in this particular state of its economy.

[Announcer] Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, an official of Ukraine's Foreign Ministry.

**Kravchuk on Financial Compensation**

*WS1412133392 Kiev KHRESHCHATYK in Ukrainian  
19 Nov 92 p 2*

[Report by unidentified UKRINFORM correspondent: "Ukraine Remains Faithful to Its Nonnuclear Status"]

[Text] Ukraine has no intention of violating its status as a nonnuclear and nonblock country. This was declared by President Kravchuk of Ukraine at a meeting with John Shalikashvili, supreme allied commander of NATO troops in Europe and commander in chief of the U.S. troops in Europe, who is on an official visit in Kiev.

However, the president said, we are also dealing with the situation in the country and the opinion of a part of the legislators and the population. They fear that after Ukraine scraps its nuclear weapons, its defense potential will be considerably undermined, and neighboring states could impose their will. They are also concerned with conflicts breaking out in different regions of the former Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, he noted, we must make a decision that would guarantee our security.

Western countries, too, the Ukrainian president emphasized, should guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons against the states that have abandoned these weapons, and will promote Ukraine's integration into the European structures.

There is another problem. It is connected with the issue of ownership of the strategic weapons located in Ukraine. This is a tremendous asset. We have already moved out of Ukraine more than 1,000 tactical nuclear warheads and have not received a dime. Next, we will dismantle strategic missiles and lose the nuclear fuel, which will then be bought from Russia for a lot of money. This is why we should arrange for compensation with Russia.

General John Shalikashvili expressed understanding of the problems confronting Ukraine and endorsed the further expansion of cooperation in the political and military spheres. He expressed hope that the West will find a way to help Ukraine.

### Russian Diplomats Deny Shifting START-2 Posture

PM1412162392 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
15 Dec 92 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Konstantin Eggert: "Meeting Between A. Kozyrev and L. Eagleburger Does Not Have Expected Result. But the Seventh Congress Does Not Have Anything to Do With This"]

[Text] Talks between Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev and U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation [as published] Treaty [Dogovor ob ogranicenii strategicheskikh vooruzheniy] ended in Stockholm on Sunday.

Judging by agency reports, the expected breakthrough was not achieved. This immediately made observers ask the question: "Has Moscow's position changed under pressure from the national patriots, who have been so active at the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies?"

This theory has not been confirmed so far. In confidential conversations with an *IZVESTIYA* correspondent, Russian diplomats rejected the news of alleged concessions to the national patriots. "The Foreign Ministry has adopted a solid, all-round defensive posture, seeking to prevent any change in the foreign policy course, particularly on the question of arms cuts," one of them said.

It should be remembered that on 7 December State Department spokesman Richard Boucher expressed doubt whether the Stockholm talks would manage to reach a final agreement, referring to a large number of technical details that need to be ironed out. In this connection agencies point to the differences between Moscow and Washington over the future use of launch silos for SS-18 missiles that are to be destroyed under START-2 [SNV-2]. The Russian side is insisting on their conversion to SS-19's, claiming that the complete elimination of the silos would cost too much.

"Our task is to translate the 'framework agreement' concluded by the two countries' presidents in June into the austere language of a treaty," a senior Foreign Ministry aide told your correspondent.

The diplomat, who wished to remain anonymous, expressed the opinion that the Americans are trying to artificially speed up the a solution of questions within the framework of the START-2 treaty. At the same time, he did not rule out the possibility of the finalization of the treaty before the George Bush administration completes its term of office on condition that the groups of experts carry out intensive work.

### Strategic Stability, Nuclear Force Viewed

934P00404 Moscow *ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI* in Russian  
17 Dec 92 p 2

[Article by Petr Lapunov under the rubric "Opinion": "Nuclear Forces—the Nucleus of Security"]

[Text] Russia, having become the successor to the USSR in the area of nuclear arms, has gotten down to work on the establishment of its own Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF). Their main purpose is to guarantee the strategic stability and security of Russia and of the other CIS member states in accordance with the international treaties signed by the Russian Federation.

The final structure of the Russian SNF remains open; however, some rather clear trends have appeared—fewer delivery vehicles, fewer nuclear warheads, and a lower level of readiness.

In accordance with the agreement reached in July of this year between the presidents of the Russian Federation and the United States of America ("framework agreement"), by the year 2003, and possibly even earlier, by the end of the year 2000, the countries will reduce the total number of warheads of each of the parties to a level between 3,000 and 3,500 units, or to a level that will be justified by each of the parties. Russia and the United States are eliminating all intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV'd ICBM's), and will reduce the number of warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) to a level not to exceed 1,700-1,750 warheads.

The agreement that was reached extends the 1991 treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic arms (OSSV), and expresses the additional intentions of the parties. These intentions are supposed to be recorded in the form of a document of a treaty nature, which will have to go through the complex route of signing and ratification in Russia and the United States. It is for this reason that we will make some preliminary estimates in order to eliminate miscalculations and errors that could damage the national security of either of the parties.

At the time of the signing of the OSSV treaty, the USSR and the United States possessed SNF groups (SOA) [strategic offensive arms] that were approximately equal in combat capability, and which reflected principally different approaches of the parties to their construction. At the present time, substantial changes are taking place in the SNF structure under the influence of principal changes in the mutual relations between the United States and Russia. However, as before, strategic deterrence is provided by a nuclear triad consisting of ICBM's, SLBM's, and long-range heavy bombers (HB).

Each component of the triad possesses unique capabilities that are extremely important for national defense and strategic deterrence.

Intercontinental ballistic missiles, for example, possess high speed and accuracy of delivery to target, can be retargeted quickly, and have a guidance system that allows the highest degree of defense and readiness (in comparison with the other components of the triad). In the case of silo basing, and this relates to all missile complexes of the Armed Forces of Russia with the exception of the SS-25 (NATO classification), they represent the most reliable and cheapest operational component of the triad. As is apparent, ICBM's, by virtue of their unique qualities, possess the greatest capability for deterring a potential aggressor. It is true that, in the opinion of individual experts, it is believed that silo-based ICBM's, especially with multiple reentry vehicles, by virtue of their vulnerability to an aggressor's first strike, create the preconditions for their launch immediately on receipt of the first warning signals of an enemy missile attack. In view of this, ICBM's with multiple reentry vehicles respond in the least degree to the requirements for preserving strategic stability in a crisis situation.

Missile submarines are sufficiently survivable and possess high concealability and mobility; however, they have a significantly lower degree of readiness. These SLBM qualities practically exclude missile launches after receipt of the first signals warning of a missile attack, which, in general, contributes to the preservation of strategic stability in the event of a crisis. However, the deterrent capabilities of SLBM's relative to ICBM's are significantly lower. Heavy bombers are not a first-strike weapon by virtue of low concealment and substantial flight time, and they can even be "recalled" after takeoff and return to their bases before cruise missile launch in the event of a change in the situation. Consequently, heavy bombers can be viewed as the most stabilizing component of the triad. They provide the military-political leadership extensive possibilities when making decisions, from a demonstration of force to participation in combat actions for delivering both nuclear and conventional weapons on enemy targets. However, owing to their high vulnerability, they possess the least deterrent capabilities.

Thus, if we want to achieve effective deterrence of potential aggressors, rule out the blackmail of a politically and economically weakened Russia, and ensure guaranteed implementation of combat tasks with strategic nuclear forces, in reducing strategic nuclear forces (SNF) on a treaty basis it is advisable to maintain not only the leading role of RVSN [strategic missile troops] in the triad but also silo-based MIRV'd ICBM's, which to a greater degree meet the requirements of ecological and nuclear security and minimal cost. If political measures for the maintenance of strategic stability are assigned a paramount position, by risking a certain measure of reliability of strategic deterrence, national defense, and defense of our allies, we can allow ourselves

to proceed not only with radical reductions in SNF but also to reorient their structure principally on SLBM's and heavy bomber aviation.

It is structural changes like this that can take place in Russia's SNF at the 2000-2003 year point in the event of implementation of the "framework agreement" at a time when the SOA of the United States practically are not changing. In addition, implementation of the "framework agreement" could also lead to significant additional expenditures. After all, the reductions being established according to the agreement in question will be carried out by means of the destruction of missile launchers and "a reduction in the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles, except for the SS-18 missile." This provision alone gives Russia unequal status with the United States. After all, the question is not about a decrease in the number of warheads on ballistic missiles, which it is proposed to implement on the American Trident-2 and Minuteman-3 missiles, but about the physical destruction of missiles in silo launch facilities. But this, as is known, means the labor of millions of people for more than 30 years and new multibillion expenditures associated with the deployment of single reentry vehicles, which it is recommended to have after the implementation of the "framework agreement."

Of course, reductions in strategic arms are imminent. It is for this reason, from a political standpoint, that the "framework agreement" should undoubtedly be viewed as the next major step to reduced nuclear confrontation. It opens the way for a qualitatively new state of strategic stability in general. However, from a military standpoint concern for the reliability of the defense of Russia and its allies, and also for strategic deterrence, which even in the 21st century apparently will remain problem number one, will unfortunately continue. What is the cause of this? I will dwell only on two main points.

First, the danger of the withdrawal of the United States from the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty of 1972 and the possibility of the deployment of a limited ABM system with space-based and ground-based elements. In such a case the military balance will be characterized by instability, which will render impossible further radical SNF reduction. Consequently, in preparing a document of a treaty nature in which an extremely expensive program is established—implementation of the "framework agreement"—Russia has the right to expect real guarantees on the part of the United States concerning compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty and, moreover, guarantees of departure from a policy of monopolistic creation of a multi-echelon ABM system.

Second, in reaching decisions concerning structural reorganizations and radical reductions in Russia's SNF, a comparative analysis of capabilities in the sphere of long-range precision weapons in a nonnuclear mode, most of all air- and sea-based, is of no small importance. In the process of radical reductions of SNF it will become extremely necessary to take into account the

influence of such weapons on strategic stability and national security, inasmuch as these weapons approach nuclear weapons in their destructive features for resolving a number of tasks. Therefore it is advisable to link the limit levels of strategic nuclear weapons with the resolution of questions on problems of limiting long-range conventional weapons.

Is the United States prepared to recognize our concern and meet us halfway? The answer to this question can be found on the pages of the daily report to Congress by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces for 1992: "We continue to move toward the creation of a global defense system against limited strikes (read, nuclear), which could represent a limited defense of American forces in forward positions."

As is apparent, the question concerns a global system that is capable of defending not only the continental part of the United States but American troops at forward positions: in Europe, in the Near and Middle East, in South Korea, and, apparently, in strategically important areas of the world ocean.

Thus, implementation of the SDI program is assuming an irreversible character: Tens of billions of dollars are being spent, more than a thousand contracts being concluded, and in the next three to five years not less than \$3-4 billion will be appropriated annually. There is uncertainty only over the scales and dates of deployment.

I would not want to forestall events and reach hasty conclusions, including for the American side. Undoubtedly, SNF reductions are necessary. However, it is necessary to compare the scales of the impending reductions, most of all with the security of Russia and its economic capabilities, which, as is well-known, are physically limited.

## SDI, DEFENSE & SPACE ARMS

### Dangers Presented by Deficiencies in Missile Early Warning Systems

PM1012153392 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 3 Dec 92 p 3

[Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel Sergey Pechorov article: "Nuclear Guarantees at a Time of Instability"]

[Text] It is probably obvious to everyone today that the likelihood of a large-scale nuclear war breaking out is extremely small, even if it has not been eliminated. The threat of a carefully planned, surprise first strike by any of the existing nuclear powers is becoming less and less real. But, along with the constructive diplomatic work by the member countries of the "nuclear club" (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) to adapt their nuclear strategies to the new political and poststrategic conditions, a theoretical possibility does exist of an

unsanctioned, unintentional, or, as people still say, "accidental" use of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, provision is made in the strategic forces of the said countries for a wide range of organizational-technical measures to prevent accidental missile launches and also to rule out the possibility of unsanctioned orders to launch being issued. They include, in particular, the rigid centralization of the issuing of launch orders, multilevel systems to verify the authenticity of directives to use nuclear weapons and of signals warning of a missile attack, a high degree of protection against interference on special closed communications channels for the transmission of coded messages, the duplication of verbal and documentary orders, etc.

But, at the same time, according to information from Western specialists in the sphere of nuclear weapons control, it is impossible to rule out entirely unforeseen eventualities. It is considered that the greatest danger on this plane is posed by errors and glitches in missile attack early warning systems [MAEWS]. It is known that MAEWS systems are based on the use of sophisticated radiotechnical and optical complexes and are distinguished by a high degree of automation and by large numbers of high-speed computers. The decision to sound the alarm and launch a nuclear strike is adopted on the basis of this system's signal. On receiving information from remote detection stations located on land, on the ocean, and in space, the electronic computer must instantly assess the situation, work out a command, and transmit it to the strategic offensive forces command post. In the event of a missile attack signal's being issued and confirmed, there will then be an order to place combat strategic facilities in a state of highest readiness to make a nuclear counterstrike.

Unreliability in the functioning of the MAEWS could result in the danger of a nuclear conflict arising against the will of the country's top military-political leadership, since the thought process will be based on false information. The state's leaders analyze the course of the enemy's thinking under conditions of a conflict situation. The most likely thing when formulating a decision would be to assess the enemy's actions according to the very worst scenario. It is at this moment that preparations to repulse aggression begin—which in turn will elicit a corresponding response from the other side. As a result, the escalation of war preparations based on initial false information will snowball.

According to U.S. experts, a potential attack is usually noted several times a day in the United States. When each such incident arises, the NORAD commander is obliged to contact the country's military-political leadership and give an assessment of the danger threatening North America. The situation is exacerbated by thousands of anomalous signals received annually from detection facilities. In the past decade, for example, NORAD annually analyzed approximately 2,600 incomprehensible warning signals. One signal in every 20 needed further analysis because it appeared to harbor a

threat. We too have had examples of false alarms. A few years ago a southern warning radar station detected a missile in flight. The true purpose of its launch was unknown throughout the nine minutes of its flight. In the end it was established that Israel was testing a Jericho-2 ballistic missile with a range of 1,450 km within the zone of responsibility of the Soviet MAEWS. Fortunately the majority of false alarms, whether they are caused by false information, glitches in computer microelectronic circuits, or other malfunctions, are quickly identified. But, according to U.S. experts, alarms which could serve as grounds for declaring a nuclear danger are received twice a year.

Nor should we forget, for example, the fact that the specifications and performance characteristics of the Russian MAEWS have deteriorated somewhat owing to the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar station and the loss of a number of installations as a consequence of the breakup of the USSR. This, taken together, does not help to strengthen the nuclear security system.

The situation could also become very acute as a result of the continuing uncertainty over Ukraine's nuclear-free status. As is known, the nuclear missiles concentrated on Ukrainian territory are still, technically, under Moscow's control. But the haggling over compensation for their withdrawal to Russia, which Kiev has begun and which is accompanied by attempts on the part of certain Ukrainian bodies to "edge their way into the chain of nuclear weapons control," is clearly leading just to an increased likelihood of their use—if not deliberately, then at least accidentally.

And yet the human factor is the main danger with regard to the risk of a launch in error. All links in the chain of control of the nuclear arsenal—ranging from those who adopt crucial decisions to the officers in charge of a launch—are subject to human weaknesses and sentiments. Monotonous work under isolated conditions exacerbates these shortcomings. Political leaders can also find themselves under stress. At the time of the Watergate scandal in 1973, for example, U.S. President R. Nixon, suffering a serious nervous breakdown, was unable to participate in the discussion of important issues. This was allegedly one reason for the inadequate response to the situation that was taking shape and was the reason why the United States placed its nuclear forces on combat alert. True, the U.S. side did subsequently draw conclusions from that situation and took precautions against possible irrational behavior by the President as commander in chief. But there are no similar guarantees in respect of irrational behavior by the leaders of other nuclear countries.

As regards an assessment of the possibility of provocative (or terrorist) strikes being made against installations on Russian territory, it must evidently be made in the context of the process of the proliferation of nuclear missile weapons. Analysis of the views of the leaderships of near-nuclear Third World countries and of their military-strategic aims shows that today they do not reveal substantiated possibilities of provocative (terrorist) strikes against Russian territory.

A distinguishing feature of practically all these states, however, is the fact that decisions to conduct research and development in nuclear weapons, to produce and deploy them, and to introduce safety measures are determined within a narrow circle of people without parliamentary oversight or bureaucratic procedures or on the basis of simplified military thinking. A low level of political responsibility multiplied by internal instability in these states could lead certain leaders to link their personal well-being to the preservation of political power. As a consequence, they will be prepared to perish along with the country rather than lose power. Prolonged confrontation among the majority of these countries could only increase the likelihood of a misunderstanding and an incorrect perception of one another and prompt their ruling regimes to "forestall the enemy;" i.e., to be prepared to take "extreme measures" in respect both of him and of the state which allegedly stands behind him.

No one can give a guarantee today that Russia will not be the target of an attack, particularly as the technical potential of the missiles in the arsenal of the armed forces of certain states which aspire to join the "nuclear club" makes it possible to do this. The problem of nuclear terrorism against our state has not been removed from the agenda either, particularly in the light of the unremitting attempts by a whole series of totalitarian regimes and terrorist organizations to obtain mass destruction weapons.

All that has been said certainly does not mean that measures to remove the threat of accidental or provocative nuclear strikes must be based exclusively on development of the concept of the air defense system. They must be viewed in the broader context of possible ways to avert this threat.

In particular, such traditional measures as further lowering the level of combat readiness of strategic arms, having reduced teams perform tours of duty, and equipping all ballistic missiles with devices to eliminate them on a command from the ground are not without potential. We should evidently tighten up the regime of nonproliferation and control over the nuclear missile programs of all states without exception, make extensive use of tough sanctions, and compel those countries whose "behavior" does not conform with accepted criteria to destroy missile weapons.

## CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

### Council of Baltic States Discusses Russian Withdrawal

93UM00824 St. Petersburg S. PETERBURGSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 18 Sep 92 p 3

[Article by A. Rabkovskiy: "Baltic Summit: Positions Stiffen"]

[Text] *Tallinn-St. Petersburg—Problems of the withdrawal of Russian forces from the territory of the three Baltic countries occupied a central place during the latest session of the Council of Baltic States held Wednesday in Tallinn.*

It is common knowledge that the ministers of defense of Russia and Lithuania agreed upon and signed a new timetable for the Russian Army's withdrawal from this republic in Moscow on 8 September. According to these documents, the last Russian soldier will leave Lithuania no later than 31 August of next year.

At a concluding press conference in Tallinn, chairmen of the supreme councils of Baltic countries A. Ruutel, V. Landsbergis and A. Gorbunovs gave on the whole a positive assessment of progress which had shown up in talks with Moscow. But in commenting on the content of the adopted appeal to the CSCE, all three leaders of the Council of Baltic States emphasized that this is only the beginning of implementation of paragraph 15 of the CSCE Declaration of 10 July 1992.

It is obvious that Russian diplomacy now will have to encounter a stiffer position of Latvia and Estonia in difficult talks on military questions. Arnold Ruutel, for example, designated the following time periods: all Russian military subunits leave Tallinn and all units equipped with offensive arms leave Estonia before the end of the year. In the first half of 1993 questions are resolved with those units which have especially sophisticated technical equipment at their disposal. The final withdrawal of all Russian forces is before 10 July of next year.

Anatoliy Gorbunovs in turn expressed hopes that Russia will not link problems of citizenship of the Russian-language population in Latvia with the presence of its forces there.

At the same time, the following nuance draws attention: in exerting a certain diplomatic pressure on Russia through the CSCE, leaders of the Council of Baltic States are beginning to talk seriously about some kind of human rights violations in the Russian Federation. What do they have in mind here? As is clear from comments of that same Gorbunovs, it is a question, for example, of Letts who live closely together in Siberia and other places, but neither the chairman of the Latvian Supreme Council nor his Lithuanian and Estonian colleagues were able to cite specific examples of actually serious violations of the rights of such national minorities.

It can be surmised, of course, that they have in mind the organization of national schools, creation of religious communes, and publication of their own newspapers for Russians of Baltic origin. There unquestionably are problems here, above all for local Russian authorities, only are they already so aggravated that they require appeals to the CSCE?

The final documents of the Tallinn summit indicate that special diplomatic flexibility and principle will be required of Russia at talks with Baltic countries

### Reportage on Russian-Latvian Troop Withdrawal Negotiations

#### Delegation Heads Hold Press Conference

93UN03544 Riga DIYENA in Russian  
27 Oct 92 pp 1, 8

[Article by Iveta Bojare and Atis Klmovic: "Conflict of Interests in Russian-Latvian Relations: S. Zotov's Assessment of Results of Negotiations Differs from J. Dinevics"]

[Text] Riga, 25 October—At a press conference after the latest round of talks in Moscow, the leaders of the two delegations, S. Zotov and J. Dinevics, said that the successful continuation of the intergovernmental talks between Russia and Latvia on the withdrawal of the army from Latvia will require a meeting of the leaders of the two countries—President B. Yeltsin and Chairman A. Gorbunovs of the Latvian Republic Supreme Council. After the two sides have reached an agreement on certain concepts, J. Dinevics said, the experts will be able to work much more successfully. At this time, said Deputy I. Berzins, a member of the Latvian delegation, there is a clear conflict of Latvian and Russian interests in the talks: No compromises have been reached on matters of fundamental importance. "We cannot even say that we have made any progress, but because any talks are better than open warfare, the talks with Russia obviously have to be continued," I. Berzins said at the press conference on Saturday.

The Russian Supreme Soviet's request for the release of a former officer of the special forces, "Russian citizen S. Parfenov, in view of the insufficient evidence of his guilt," was described by I. Berzins in a reserved tone as illogical: "I find it rather odd that the Russian Supreme Soviet would assume the prerogatives of the Latvian court." It is this court, the deputy said, that should pass sentence on a person accused of a crime.

Dinevics feels that the talks are being held up by Russia's internal problems and the incertitude of its government structures. The final protocol of the talks records the different positions of Latvia and Russia on the dates and terms of withdrawal (Latvia feels that the withdrawal should be completed by the end of next year, but Russia wants to complete the process in 1994). With a view to its own strategic interests, Russia is insisting that three of its military installations remain in Latvia—in Skrunda.

Liepaja, and Ventspils. This is unacceptable to Latvia. In J. Dinevics' words, the only possibility is a separate agreement on the radar in Skrunda. If the last Russian soldier leaves Latvia by the end of the coming year, Latvia could make an exception for Skrunda and extend the period of presence there by representatives of the Russian Army. The two sides have different views on the future disposition of army property and on ways of solving the social problems of servicemen. Russia feels that all of the property at the army's disposal belongs to Russia, but Latvia has expressed the opposite opinion. At the press conference, S. Zotov reported that the Russian Government and President B. Yeltsin would not sign troop withdrawal agreements that would jeopardize the legal status of officers and their right to housing and property rights. The eastern neighbor has proposed terms that are unacceptable to Latvia for the privatization of the living quarters of servicemen, a solution to the citizenship issue that would favor these servicemen, and the possibility of inactivating some military units within the territory of Latvia. Although J. Dinevics agrees that Latvia could help Russia solve the social problems of the military units withdrawn from its territory, he said that the Latvian side would reject all compromises providing for the long-term settlement of Russian servicemen in Latvia. His views on social problems are completely different. In order to assist in their resolution, J. Dinevics, the leader of the Latvian delegation, will make a formal request in Tokyo, I. Berzins reported, to set aside part of the promised aid to the former republics of the USSR for precisely these purposes.

In spite of these differences of opinion between Latvia and Russia, which were recorded in the final protocol, on the day of the talks S. Zotov told a BNS correspondent that he was satisfied with the acceptable agreement that had supposedly been reached at the time of the meeting on the main issues.

According to the BNS report, S. Zotov stated that Latvia had agreed to Russia's use of the radar in Skrunda after the withdrawal of the army, that reserve officers would have a chance to keep their apartments in Latvia and apply for Latvian citizenship, and that all officers wishing to leave would receive compensation. "This is a lie," J. Dinevics said at an NFL [Latvian People's Front] congress after his return from Moscow. The head of the Latvian delegation did not deny that all of these matters had been discussed, but he stated that Latvia had not relented on any point of importance to the Latvian Republic. This was confirmed at today's press conference by I. Berzins, who explained that the BNS report reflected only Russia's point of view. "S. Zotov said exactly what the report says," the head of the Latvian BNS bureau, R. Bikse, said in an attempt to clear up the misunderstanding. The journalist had been unable to learn the views of the Latvian delegation and this is why the report was onesided. "This misunderstanding could benefit those who want the talks to be delayed," said I. Berzins, adding that there was no reason to doubt J. Dinevics' firmness as the head of the delegation.

### Protocol on Talks Published

93UN0417A Riga FS-SM in Russian 13 Nov 92 p 1

[Protocol signed by S. Zotov, head of the Russian Federation delegation, and J. Dinevics, head of the Latvian Republic delegation: "Protocol of the Meeting of State Delegations of the Russian Federation and the Latvian Republic on the Question of the Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR under the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Latvian Republic, 23-24 October 1992, Moscow"]

[Text] 1. In accordance with a previously achieved agreement, negotiations of state delegations of the Russian Federation and of the Latvian Republic took place in Moscow on 23-24 October 1992.

2. On the side of the Latvian Republic the delegation was headed by State Minister J. Dinevics.

On the side of the Russian Federation—S. Zotov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

3. A range of questions concerning the complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation deployed there from the territory of the Latvian Republic, as well as certain problems of economic relations, was discussed.

4. The parties agreed on a number of points in the course of the discussion of the draft agreement on the question of the withdrawal of troops; however, differences on fundamental questions were not eliminated.

5. The Latvian side reaffirmed its position on the need to complete the total withdrawal of the troops in 1993 without any prior conditions.

The Latvian side has in mind the withdrawal of all troops, including the radar station in Skrunda, the dates for the closing down of which can be fixed by a separate agreement.

The Russian side does not exclude the possibility of withdrawing the troops in 1994 if the questions which make up the well-known "package" of Russian proposals of 6 August 1992 are resolved.

6. The Russian side again reaffirmed the prime importance which it gives to the problem of normalizing the legal status of the non-indigenous portion of the population of Latvia, including former members of the armed forces. It bases itself on the fact that the Agreement on the withdrawal of troops ought not to affect the legal personality of these persons, and primarily their property and housing rights.

7. The parties reaffirmed their fundamental positions with respect to rights to real property.

The Latvian side adheres to the position that all real property under the jurisdiction of the armed forces of the Russian Federation located on the territory of the Latvian Republic is the property of the Latvian Republic.

The Russian side considers that the Russian Federation, as the successor of the former USSR, retains the right of

state ownership to the property of the Armed Forces under the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and stationed on the territory of the Latvian Republic.

The parties agreed to seek a solution regarding the military enterprises of the Ministry of Defense, having in mind the ensuring of their normal functioning and the preservation of the employment of the personnel of these enterprises.

8. For the purpose of accelerating and regulating the process of the withdrawal of the troops, the Russian delegation proposed that draft Russian-Latvian agreements prepared by experts of both sides be submitted for the consideration of the governments of the Russian Federation and of the Latvian Republic:

- on the procedure for the crossing of the state border of the Latvian Republic by persons who are members of the Russian Armed Forces;
- on the procedure for the use of territorial waters, ports, and port installations by Russian Armed Forces;
- on railroad shipments of military stores of the Russian Armed Forces through the territory of the Latvian Republic during the period of their withdrawal from the territory of Latvia and the procedure for clearing operations regarding them;
- on the procedure for providing pensions to pensioners from among the members of the armed forces of the former USSR and the members of their families;
- on the procedure for carrying out customs formalities during the period of the withdrawal of the Armed Forces and Border Troops of the former USSR from the territory of the Latvian Republic.

9. The adoption of the "Provisional Statute on the Procedure for Movement of the Armed Forces under the Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation through the Territory of the Latvian Republic and their Crossing of the State Border of the Latvian Republic" was appealed against by the Russian side. This document goes against previously achieved agreements at the level of state delegations to abstain from uncoordinated unilateral actions. The Russian delegation informed the Latvian side that for this reason the command of the Northwestern Group of Forces and the Baltic Fleet cannot accept it for implementation.

The Latvian side bases itself on the fact that until a basic agreement regarding the withdrawal of the troops is concluded the Latvian authorities are compelled to regulate the conditions for the sojourn of Russian troops in the territory of Latvia.

The Latvian side expressed concern about the continuing violations of the sea and air space of the Latvian Republic on the part of the Russian Armed Forces, the conducting of target practice by Russian airplanes and warships in Latvian territory, and the entry of Armed Forces personnel without coordination with the appropriate authorities of the Latvian Republic.

The Russian side raised the question of the cancellation of the duties on fuel imported for the forces of the Baltic Fleet temporarily deployed in Latvia which have been illegally introduced by the Latvian side.

10. The parties defined the range of questions of a fundamental character on which agreement has not been successfully achieved and which require the adoption of political decisions:

- the time periods for the withdrawal of the troops;
- the right of ownership to real property;
- strategic installations;
- the legal personality of part of the former members of the armed forces and the members of their families, including their property and housing rights.

11. The delegations agreed to hold the next round of negotiations tentatively in the middle of November this year.

#### **Latvian Officials, Russian Baltic Commander Meet**

*OW1112185092 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1834 GMT 11 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] At a meeting on Friday [11 December] between top officials of the government and the Defense Ministry of Latvia and Commander of the Russian Federation's Baltic Fleet Valeriy Grishanov discussed the withdrawal of the Russian Army from Latvia, the timetable for the withdrawal of the Fleet, the transfer of facilities and property, and the construction of housing for the Fleet's officers in Russia.

The commander of the Latvian Defense Ministry's Bureau for the control over the withdrawal of the Russian Army Ilgonis Upmalis told Baltfax that no concrete results had been reached during the meeting, because the right to decide property issues belongs only to the commander of the Russian North-Western Group of Forces [NWGF] Evgeny Mayorov.

In turn, Grishanov told Baltfax that the meeting was aimed at establishing good relations with the Latvian Navy. In his opinion, the goal was reached and the meeting was "successful".

**Baltic 'Frustration' at Russian 'Footdragging' on Withdrawal**

93UN0375D Tallinn *THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT*  
in English 30 Oct-5 Nov 92 p 14

[Article by Pilar Wolfsteller: "Russia Gives Troop Figures"]

[Text] In an unexpectedly precise estimate of the difficulty of withdrawing ex-Soviet troops from the Baltic, a Russian delegate told an international conference in Tallinn on October 26-28 that Russia will require housing for 34,211 officers costing over 47 billion roubles.

Mr Simon Lunn, deputy secretary of the North Atlantic Assembly, quoted figures from Boris Bolshakov, deputy chairman of the Russian parliament's committee on defence and security at the end of the three day seminar held in Tallinn. However, after the conference it remained unclear whether the figure was the number of officers only, or if it included dependents as well.

The numbers came in response to questioning by Western countries at the seminar, "Stability in the Baltic Region," the fourth to be held. Russia also asked for aid of any kind to help build the flats.

Vello Saatpalu, Chairman of the Estonian Parliament's Foreign Affairs Committee, expressed frustration at Russia's foot dragging on the issue of the withdrawal of troops from Estonia's territory.

"I understand the problems of Russia very well, but we can't help them. Why should we? It's their problem. In 1940 when they came in they found places to stay in one day. Now it's difficult for us to understand why they can't find homes for their officers and families in their own country," he said.

Jose Lello, a parliamentarian from Portugal and vice president of the North Atlantic Assembly, said that the seminars on the Baltic States are designed to bring all sides together to start a dialogue. "We're not trying to be referees, but it's good to provide a forum."

In addition to discussing the withdrawal of troops from the region, members of the 20 delegations from both NATO and the former Warsaw Pact visited the Tondi barracks of a Russian unit in Tallinn. Moscow denied them a visit to the Paldiski nuclear base on the northern coast.

Ceslovas Stankevicius, vice-president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, linked the fate of Russian soldiers to that of Lithuanians who were deported to Russia during the Soviet regime. "Lithuania sees this as a bilateral matter," he said. "Russia is currently in violation of the rights of many Lithuanian families who were unjustly deported."

If Lithuania will be required to give Russia some compensation for the removal of its soldiers from Lithuanian soil, he added, "then it's not Russia, but rather Lithuania who will need assistance."

**Weekly Reports on Russian Troop Activities in Baltics****5 Nov Report**

93UN0375B Tallinn *THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT*  
in English 30 Oct-5 Nov 92 p 3

[Compiled by Lya Oli: "Troop Watch"]

[Text]

—Russian air force planes continued unauthorised flights in Lithuanian airspace: 15 flights were registered on October 19, twelve on October 20, eleven on October 21, twenty-six on October 23.

—Lithuanian border guards denied entrance to a group of Russian army generals and colonels who tried to cross the border from Latvia to Lithuania at Joniskis; the men, presumably from military unit No 41582, had no entry permits and refused to show their IDs and threatened to "bring the Lithuanians to order" (October 15).

—Lithuanian police detained three Russian army soldiers from military unit No 49689 in Samara, Russia, who stole three TV sets from a freight train at the Radviliskis railway station, central Lithuania (October 20).

—A group of Russian army officers from the coastal defence division in Klaipeda announced on Russian television that they will not leave Lithuania until adequate housing is provided for them in their new postings (October 25).

—Between October 19 and 26, Russian air force planes carried out 23 unsanctioned flights in Latvian airspace.

—A two-day round of Latvian Russian talks on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia ended inconclusively on October 24; contrary to claims by the Russian delegation leader Sergey Zотов, no agreement was reached on the Skrunda ballistic missile early warning radar station which Russia wants to keep after the rest of the troops are withdrawn.

—The Russian navy communications unit No 31181 handed over its premises in Viimsi manor (October 26); local authorities have decided to restore the manor, which used to belong to the prominent Estonian army leader General Laidoner, and turn it into an Estonian War of Independence museum.

—Russian border guards turned over the Kasmu post on Estonia's northern coast (October 26).

—The Estonian delegation proposed setting up a special commission to study the safety of the nuclear reactors at the Russian naval base in Paldiski, northern Estonia, at the meeting of the nuclear safety work group of the Council of the Baltic Sea Countries in Helsinki (October 28).

**19 Nov Report**

93UN0375C Tallinn THE BALTIC INDEPENDENT  
in English 13-19 Nov 92 p 3

[Compiled by Lya Oll: "Troop Watch"]

[Text]

—Russian army Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov said the military withdrawal from the Baltic States should not be pushed because it could have explosive consequences for both Russia and the Baltic States; he also criticised appeals by Baltic governments to NATO and the CSCE on the issue, as well as the holding of referendums on it (November 4).

—Russian air force planes continued unauthorised flights in Lithuanian airspace: eight flights were registered on November 2, four on November 3, twenty-two on November 4, twenty-three on November 5, six on November 7, and eight on November 8; between April 27 and September 27, Lithuanian officials have recorded 1,321 violations of the use of Lithuanian airspace by Russian air force planes, 18 of these endangered civilian flights.

—The 306th Independent Maintenance Battalion (unit 30139) of the Russian army was withdrawn from Siauliai; premises of army unit 20657 were handed over to Lithuanian officials (November 1-6). A total of 151 railway wagons with 78 units of military equipment and 19 transport vehicles were withdrawn from Lithuania during that period.

—A column of 21 Russian army trucks and a bus heading for Riga were turned back at the Latvian-Lithuanian border because they did not have the necessary documentation for entering Latvia (November 2).

—Russian air force planes repeatedly violated Latvian airspace: two unsanctioned flights were reported on November 2, one on November 3, five on November 5, two on November 2, and one on November 9; on November 3 an unspecified number of training flights were reported in the Daugavpils area between 11 am and 6 pm.

—A Russian army train with artillery equipment from army unit 42708 in the Russian town of Serpukhov crossed the Latvian border illegally and was detained by Latvian authorities in Riga (November 8); the equipment was meant for the maintenance unit based in Riga.

—Russian troops from unit 2294 tried to take ten Kalashnikov submachine guns AK-74 to Russia without proper permits and were detained by Estonian border guards (October 27).

**SIPRI Report on CFE Verification Reviewed**

934P0037A Moscow MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I  
MEZHDUNARODNYYE OTNOSHENIYA in Russian  
No 11, Nov 92 (Signed to press 6 Oct 92) pp 152-155

[B. Zhelezov review of book "Verification of the CFE Treaty," by Sergey Kulik and Richard Kokoski, under the headline: "Military Stability in Europe: Verification and Trust"]

[Text] Sergey Kulik and Richard Kokoski, "Verification of the CFE Treaty," SIPRI Research Report, SIPRI, 1991, 129 pages.

The scientific report "Verification of the CFE Treaty" reviewed here is the result of a joint effort at the Stockholm International World Problems Research Institute (SIPRI) by the Russian political scientist Sergey Kulik and the Canadian physicist Richard Kokoski. One of the unique features of this topic, in comparison with other problems of arms control, is that it represents a most intimate interaction of political and technical factors. This is why it is believed that cooperation between specialists of different profiles would make it possible to carry out a complete and comprehensive analysis of the verification regime of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty). The fact that the co-authors of the report are representatives of countries that had belonged for a long time to rival military-political alliances (the Warsaw Pact and NATO) made it possible for this research to avoid, in their assessments of the positions of the sides, any of the distortions characteristic of most works on international policy.

The CFE Treaty was signed in November 1990. A meticulously developed system of verifying enforcement became a distinguishing feature of this document, and to a decisive degree promoted its ratification.

Since the time that the agreement was signed, fundamental changes have occurred in the political and military realities of the European continent. Without any doubt, cessation of decades of confrontation in East-West relations has opened up the road for new, more radical arms reductions. Nonetheless, fulfillment of the limitations of the CFE Treaty remains a necessary "intermediate" stage on the path of further disarmament.

This important document is the result of negotiations spanning almost two decades. Its main goal—maintaining military stability on the European continent on the basis of successive mutual reductions in conventional armed forces and military potentials and their transformation into nonoffensive forces that are still capable of ensuring the security of European states—remains important even today.

In this connection the report's authors note the universal nature of the treaty: "This agreement shows how important it is to impart flexibility to the verification regime—

a merit that provides a possibility for subsequent negotiations to be based on previously developed structures" (p 1). Offering their own evaluations, they examine in detail the most important provisions of the treaty, which makes it possible for even the uninformed reader to understand many of the subtleties of this extremely complex document. In the opinion of the scholars mutually advantageous cooperation of the sides should be the main factor promoting effectiveness of implementation of the verification regime.

Despite all of the significance of inspection measures, reconnaissance satellites remain an important means of control. "Rapid changes in the disposition of armed forces in Europe are causing an increase in the time necessary to place a full-scale offensive into motion, a time now measured in years. Thus the main goal of the mandate of the Vienna talks—to exclude the possibility for creation of a potential for "making a surprise attack and for beginning large-scale offensive operations"—may be achieved with a high degree of certainty with the assistance of just national technical means of verification—NTSK (p 33).

NTSK are basically composed of reconnaissance satellites, which only the USA and Russia have. Establishment of an "open sky" regime is foreseen in the last stage of enactment of the CFE Treaty. Activation of negotiations on this problem made it possible to sign an agreement as early as on 24 March 1992 in Vienna, at the CFE conference, permitting control by means of overflights of the territory of the inspected side. Prior to this moment, the sole means of verification available to every member nation was inspections. The authors emphasize that from the standpoint of public opinion, inspections are the best means of establishing confidence in the certainty of observance of the agreement, and they play the key role in reinforcing trust between states (p 57).

The verification regime of the CFE Treaty foresees four types of inspections, accompanied by prior notification and wide exchange of data. Inclusion of inspections with a short notification time in special zones is a new element in the practice of control, in comparison with previous agreements. From the standpoint of specialists, they can insure effective inspection of military activity (pp 54, 60).

The researchers find it fully justified that after numerous debates in the course of the negotiations, the sides rejected the proposals to keep military objectives under constant surveillance to apply particular identification signs (marks) on armament subject to quantitative limits. This rejection was brought on primarily by warming of the international climate in Europe, which made such procedures unsuitable for both economic and military reasons. Nonetheless, the inspection procedures that have been developed in association with marking equipment in this way could still be utilized successfully in solving the problems of controlling arms in regions undergoing crisis.

Inasmuch as inspections are conducted on a quota basis, regular control over observance of the provisions of the treaty can be ensured on the basis of mutually advantageous cooperation. The report emphasizes that not only exchange of data but also periodic discussions between member nations on purposes and objectives in military policy should play an enormous role (p 21). Two seminars on military doctrine conducted in Vienna (1991-1992) can serve as an example of this.

The CFE Treaty foresees establishment of a Joint Consultative Group that will have as one of their tasks coordination of the intentions of the sides to apply the provisions of the treaty. A Verification and Information Systems Directorate has already been established in NATO for the purposes of cooperation. It accepts, processes and distributes information having a relationship to this document, including with the help of the AWACS aircraft system. The desire of a number of states of Eastern Europe and the CIS to expand interaction with the North Atlantic alliance in matters of military policy can also lead to closer contacts in the area of verification (pp 68-73).

Basing themselves on an analysis of the regimes of monitoring observance of arms limitation agreements signed earlier, the authors conclude that the verification regime of the CFE Treaty requires certain additions. In particular, an international verification organ should be established in order to settle problems associated with specific applications of the agreement's provisions. It could be given the power to influence a party "that has grossly violated the treaty" (p 62). It is not indicated of course in this case what the definition of "gross violation" should be, and specifically what "measures of influence" should be applied against the violator. It seems that establishing such a structure and, all the more so, adopting certain sanctions against a violating country are extremely complex problems requiring cautious solution. Nonetheless, development of a mechanism by which to coordinate decisions directed at ensuring observance of the CFE Treaty is fully possible through the work of the Joint Consultative Group as further progress is made toward cooperation and toward reinforcement of international trust in Europe.

Still, the report is devoted to an analysis of a specific document, and it does contain important conclusions crucial to an understanding of the role and place of verification of compliance with arms control treaties in all aspects of this problem. The scholars devote special attention to the definition of the concept "verification" (p 19). It should be noted that despite the decades of research, political and scientific circles are still not unanimous regarding the definition of this term. Up until the mid-1980s verification was usually perceived only as a procedure of technical control over fulfillment of agreements. This was associated chiefly with the positions of the former USSR and the USA, which in view of a number of objective and subjective factors practically refused to publicly discuss the extent to which their military activity complied with signed documents.

Since the mid-1980s, with the advent of "new thinking" in the process of arms control, the problem of verification of compliance with agreements began to be discussed increasingly more openly at different levels. New elements introduced into the practice of these measures by the INF Treaty and by a number of subsequent agreements regarding reduction and elimination of arms also changed the traditional ideas about the role of verification. It began to be perceived increasingly more widely as a complex process including political, technical, military and legal factors.

Until recent times, the sole objective of verification, in the opinion of both politicians and even most experts, was timely prevention of a threat to security capable of arising as a result of violation of agreements. The paper notes four interrelated goals of verification: detecting violations; deterring the party undergoing verification from its intention to commit such a violation; clarifying uncertainties arising in the course of fulfilling treaty obligations; finally, the main goal—creating confidence not only between partners to the agreement but also in the participating countries that obligations are being met (p 19).

Nonetheless, certain objections are raised when the authors call reinforcement of trust the main goal of verification. In today's conditions of transition in East-West relations from confrontation to cooperation, verification doubtlessly should and can play its role in this process. But this was not always so. In the early 1980s its results were often used to justify actions capable of leading in the future to much graver consequences to stability than the revealed violation itself might have.

The campaign initiated by President R. Reagan's administration in connection with construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar station in the USSR, which went against the ABM Treaty, became a clear example of this sort. This excuse was used to justify, in the eyes of the American community, the plan to deploy an echeloned ABM defense system under development within the framework of SDI. In those days, attempts to create such a system could quite well have completely undermined the entire mechanism of strategic arms control. But by the admission of most authoritative specialists both in the former Union and in the USA, even if the Krasnoyarsk radar station were placed into operation, for practical purposes it would not have created any threat to American security.<sup>1</sup> Therefore it should be added once again that the verification process may have both a positive and a negative influence upon reinforcement of trust. This depends both on the decisions adopted as a result, and on the desire of member nations to settle disputed issues by political methods.

On the other hand the problem of openness ("transparency") is an inherent and increasingly more necessary part of the entire contemporary process of arms control. It includes broad cooperation between states when adopting decisions regarding military development and developing and locating new types of arms. Evolution of

"transparency" resulting from such cooperation will make it possible to significantly reduce the intensity of inspections.<sup>2</sup>

The report distinguishes two basic trends in the approaches to the regimes of verifying compliance with agreements: "adequate verification," which is defined as the ability to detect significant violations presenting a threat to security with sufficient lead time to allow adoption of the corresponding retaliatory measures, and "effective verification," defined today as the possibility of detecting any violation regardless of its military significance (p 20). Recognizing the certain arbitrariness of this division, the authors nonetheless conclude that "verification of the CFE Treaty is more than adequate in certain cases" (p 97).

We cannot agree with such a conclusion. The concept of "adequate verification" was first formulated by President R. Nixon's administration during preparations for the signing of the SALT-1 treaties, and it remained practically unchanged under the administrations of G. Ford and J. Carter.<sup>3</sup> The requirement of "effective verification" of compliance with arms control agreements was first raised by President R. Reagan in the early 1980s, during a time of intensifying confrontation in USSR-USA relations, including in regard to matters of arms control.<sup>4</sup> A precise definition—this verification regime came to be called "effective"—never was formulated. Washington's position at the arms control negotiations permits the conclusion that no fundamental differences exist between "effective" and "adequate" verification. The former simply means raising relatively stiffer requirements on control over compliance with agreements and grading actions in the military area as violations presenting a threat to national security. It should be noted that this form of verification never had and never could have been carried out before as a "legal approach" (as defined by the report's authors).

For practical purposes the United States returned to the principles of "adequate verification" in the course of negotiations to reduce intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. Thus when referring to verification of the CFE Treaty, it would be more proper to say not that it is "more than adequate," but more likely that the regime of verification of a number of the provisions requires greater physical and financial outlays than seem suitable in the present military-political situation (p 20). It should be considered in this case that the military significance of violations may be graded in different ways depending on the geopolitical and strategic positions of the parties to the agreement. A "flexible" verification regime, as was validly emphasized by the scholars, is precisely what provides a possibility to the parties for individually assessing and correspondingly carrying out their activities in this area (p 1).

As with every out-of-the-ordinary paper, the study offered to the reader here will doubtlessly open up possibilities for scientific discussion. Solution of the

problems touched upon in the paper would be of special importance to ensuring Russian and European security.

#### Footnotes

1. See Bann, M., "Foundation for the Future. The ABM Treaty and National Security," The Arms Control Association, 1990, p 76.

2. See Kafka, A., Oznobishchev, S. and Rogov, S., "The Prospects of Transition to Transparency," SSHA: ENI, No 1, 1991, p 18.

3. "The SALT II Treaty. Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 1979, Part 2," Washington D.C., GPO, 1979, p 241.

4. President Ronald Reagan, "Letter of Transmittal to the Congress. ACDA Annual Report," 9 February 1983.

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#### Reportage on Russian Troop Withdrawal from Lithuania

##### 7th Guards Airborne Division Leaves

93UM0176B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 18 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Correspondents Captain 2nd Rank Valeriy Gromak and Captain 3rd Rank Vladimir Maryukha, Kaunas—Ionava—Moscow: "The Assault Troops Are Departing Lithuania—And Right Now It's Important to Maintain Their Combat Capability"]

[Text] It seems that everyone is admitting this: The VDV [Airborne Troops] are the elite of the Russian Army. Many officers in the airborne troops have undergone the strict field academy of Afghanistan. No matter how you currently assess that war, you can't take away the combat experience of the lads who were awarded orders and medals. All of that also pertains to the 7th Guards Airborne Division and to the 242nd VDV Training Center that are deployed at Kaunas and Yonava.

Let's add to that the fact that it is in Lithuania that practically all the models of the latest airborne combat equipment underwent the test of military service. And what a fine training facility and military garrisons there are here! You only need to look at these things one more time in order to admit: when the airborne troops withdraw, we will not soon manage to create such garrisons at their new deployment locations.

As we all know, a schedule for the withdrawal of our troops from Lithuania was signed on 8 September during the Russian-Lithuanian negotiations. The withdrawal must be completed by 31 August 1993. This totally applies to the Airborne Troops. And even the Russian Federation President's 29 October Directive "On Coordinating and Normalizing the Negotiating Process with the Latvian Republic, the Lithuanian Republic, and the

Estonian Republic", where the Cessation of the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states has been proposed until the signing of the appropriate interstate agreements practically does not change the situation for Lithuania. Documents have already been signed with Lithuania and the withdrawal schedule has been approved. And Russia does not intend to unilaterally rescind them. Therefore, the day when the last airborne troop will leave Lithuania is also known. The first rail consist from the 7th Guards, as Airborne Troops Deputy Commander Lieutenant-General Osvaldas Pikauskas reported to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, has already arrived in Naro-Fominsk and a second rail consist is following it. The airborne troops are leaving Lithuania—we need to comply with the withdrawal schedule.

"Nearly 1,200 families reside in our garrison," says Colonel Valeriy Yevtukhovich, chief of the training center for training junior specialists. "Absolutely everyone has been provided with separate apartments. But we have not been permitted to privatize them—the entire garrison will be transferred to the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense. We are leaving everything: apartment buildings, a new school, kindergartens, a Pioneers' Club, a hotel, and a Voyentorg [military exchange] store... And there is also the training facility at which we trained conscripts in 180 specialties for the Airborne Troops."

The training center's firing ranges and moving target gunnery ranges are also silent today. The air field and the parachute jumping area permit us to train up to 10,000 men simultaneously. But right now the center hasn't trained a single specialist—the local authorities are not permitting conscripts into Lithuania. Temporarily assigned center specialists are organizing the training process directly at the combat regiments but naturally in the process the quality of training is decreasing.

Things are a bit better at 7th Division. As Guards Division Commander Colonel Grigoriy Kalabukhov told us, here they are performing parachute jumps and they are conducting training—the combat training plan is 75% fulfilled, despite the withdrawal that has begun. And that is while division manning leaves much to be desired. But there will be practically no compulsory service soldiers or sergeants in the subunits by spring. Nearly 250 rail flat cars will be required to redeploy each regiment, that's 4-5 rail consists which we need to load as soon as possible. Officers, who have quite a few everyday life problems besides service problems, will have to sit behind the controls of tanks and BMD's.

Of course, the material damage is great. But how do you assess the moral damage? Is the least of the problems for the airborne troops the fact that their final date is 31 August 1993 or that the withdrawal periods were caused by past miscalculations? Therefore, obviously the main thing right now—is to find the most acceptable solutions

for the fate of each serviceman in the approved, adequate compensation for Russian expenditures for the equipment left behind.

Judging by the recent statement of Vitautis Landsbergis who is concerned about our decision to cease the troop withdrawal, Lithuania is also seeking these solutions. And this permits us to hope that Russia will be able to withdraw its troops on time. In this regard, the Russian President's directive, as Lieutenant-General Pikauskas stressed in the conversation, has become an extremely necessary moral support for the units being withdrawn and showed that they have not been forgotten and they are needed by the Russians. This delay is needed if only to finally determine where the airborne regiments will be deployed and where to create the new training facility for the airborne troops training center in order to lay even a small foundation for the resolution of the guards' social problems and to provide time to the diplomats for coordinating the status of troops until the end of their withdrawal.

Otherwise just about no one will serve in the officer posts in those same airborne divisions being withdrawn from Lithuania. Units are being withdrawn to sites that have not been prepared and, as has already happened many times, requests for release into the reserve will begin to rain down. This can also occur earlier because, for example, an "assault force" in the form of a commission to inspect physical training was rushed in instead of extremely needed work to rally the troops and moral support and concern about the future of each specific officer. Compulsory service airborne troops have remained here only to perform details and guard duty and therefore a rumor circulated throughout the garrison here: they will immediately release into the reserve officers who have not passed their tests. Certain officers did not wait for that outcome—they immediately wrote their release requests themselves.

And yet the airborne troops who have been sent to an unenviable place due to past miscalculations, as we have become convinced with our own eyes, place Russia's interests ahead of their own. Right now the main thing is to maintain the combat capability of the units being withdrawn. At the regiment of Guards Lieutenant Colonel Aleksandr Kozyukov which we managed to visit, at the military garrison which they must leave, repairs were being conducted that are urgently needed to ensure normal combat training. Even the insignificant numbers of airborne troops that remain are maintaining their assigned territory in ideal order. But they are carrying out their combat training tasks along with these housekeeping chores. The only thing they haven't managed to conduct are battalion tactical exercises due to the restrictions that have been stipulated in the agreement

signed in September between Lithuania and Russia. The rest of the combat training plan has been fulfilled.

"We have to bring everything with us, right down to nails," Deputy Division Commander for Guards Personnel Lieutenant Colonel Sergey Sannikov told us. "Therefore, we need to determine beforehand what, in what manner, and how to withdraw. We also need to be concerned about whether or not it is advisable or possible to withdraw something or if it is worthwhile to leave it behind. For example, we are thinking about transferring to the Russian school in Kaunas the library books of the Garrison Officers' Club that has already been nationalized by the Lithuanians (and that is more than 100,000 volumes). We would also not like to simply leave behind the memorials which, judging by the experience of other republics, will be destroyed..."

They say that each transfer is equal to two fires. The transfer of such masses of people which make up the VDV units in Lithuania is similar, in our view, to a gigantic forest fire. You can't predict or knock down the swoop of the future "flame" of both human passions and awkward political decisions. But the airborne guard must be withdrawn from Lithuania with the fewest possible losses. All of Russia must simply be interested in that. We will not be able to revive the Russian army without this elite. It is still not too late for our diplomats and military to coordinate more acceptable terms for the troop withdrawal, even in that same period of time. Coordinate it with the calculation to not lose Russia's prestige and to provide for the personal interests of the servicemen.

#### Brazauskas Meets NWGF Commander

OW0812201492 Moscow BALTEAX in English  
1913 GMT 8 Dec 92

[From the "9 PM Express-Release"—following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Lithuanian Acting President Algirdas Brazauskas on Tuesday received Colonel General Leonid Mayorov, the commander of the North Western Group of Russian Troops [NWGF], in Vilnius. The two discussed the problems connected with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania.

The meeting was attended by Colonel Stasys Knezys, the Lithuanian government's representative for the withdrawal of the Russian army. Knezys informed Baltifax that the Russian side had raised the question of the possibility of paying servicemen benefit in temporary Lithuanian coupons which the Russian defence ministry had transferred to the army's account.

The Lithuanian side re-iterated the need to stick to the agreed schedule for the withdrawal of troops and transfer military installations and forest areas to Lithuania.

**NWGF Commander Pledges 'No Delay'**

WS1012130092 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN  
in English 1622 GMT 9 Dec 92

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 140]

[Text] 9 December 1992—"There will be no delay in Russian forces' pullout," Chief of the Russian North Western Army [NWGF] L. Mayorov pledged in his interview with journalists in Vilnius yesterday after his meeting with acting President of Lithuania A. Brazauskas at which problems connected with the removal of the Russian troops from Lithuania were discussed. The meeting was also attended by Chief of the 107th Russian division V. Frolov, the Lithuanian Defence Minister A. Butkevicius and the Commissioner of the Lithuanian Government in charge of the affairs connected with the Russian troops' withdrawal S. Knezys.

General L. Mayorov complained that Russian servicemen stationed in Lithuania have no possibility to exchange Russian roubles for local currency, that the Lithuanian governmental bureau surveying the Russian forces pullout is understaffed, that loaded Russian trains sometimes have to wait for departure several days. He also pointed out that following President B. Yeltsin's decree on provisional suspension of the Russian armed forces' withdrawal from the Baltic States solely the transfer of the Kaunas-based regiment of helicopters is temporarily delayed.

On his part, the Lithuanian governmental commissioner on the Russian troops' withdrawal S. Knezys pointed out that the Russian military do not hand over their objects on time or leave without control those objects which they are about to hand over to the Lithuanian authorities.

At the beginning of the year there were 36,000 Russian troops in Lithuania, now there are about 15,000, their remainder in Vilnius consisting of the 466th anti-aircraft missile brigade, a military hospital, a military prosecutor's office and some depots.

Asked about his attitude to the request of the Russian military for permission to sell the flats inhabited by their servicemen's families (about 8500 people), the Lithuanian Defence Minister A. Butkevicius replied that all immovables are the property of Lithuania and the Lithuanian laws are to be observed, however, he added, "taking into consideration international interests, exceptions are not ruled out".

**Russians Hand Over 'Secret' Military Airfield**

93UN0471A Moscow TRUD in Russian 9 Dec 92 p 1

[Article by Gediminas Koncias, reporting from Vilnius: "Lithuania: Departing Troops' Surprise": "Secret Airfield Astounds Experts"]

[Text] You must admit that the former Soviet Army was able to keep a secret. No one in Lithuania even suspected that the military airfield at Zoknai, near the city of

Siauliai, would prove to be perhaps the biggest surprise left behind by the withdrawing Soviet military. Now that the fighter-bomber regiment is completing its redeployment to Russian territory and foreign experts have been allowed to visit the airfield, they have gotten the chance to see a truly unique installation. Its excellent runways, on a par with the best in Europe, are capable of handling the largest airliners. Experts have appraised the value of those runways at \$2.0 billion.

Adjoining them is an extensive military aircraft repair shop, which could easily be modified to repair and service civilian passenger and transport aircraft. Furthermore, the airfield is located only 100 kilometers from the planned Via Baltika Highway, which will link the Scandinavian and Baltic countries with Southern Europe. Nearby is a major rail center, and it is only about 150 kilometers to the warm-water port of Klaipeda. Incidentally, the port of Riga in neighboring Latvia is even closer.

To that it should be added that the international airport in Vilnius is not a promising prospect for development. The first inquiries have already come in from abroad about the possibility of landing at Siauliai.

Will the Lithuanian government be able to reap maximum benefit from this unexpected windfall? Will it be able to convert the airfield into an important transportation complex for the entire Baltic region? Unfortunately thus far there has been more talk about the airfield than real action. And in this era of dirty deals someone has already absconded with copper communications lines and attempted to steal reinforced concrete sections from the runways...

**Lithuanian Aide Says Russians Disregard Schedule**

OW1012114392 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1054 GMT 10 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] The Lithuanian government official in charge of the withdrawal of Russian troops, Stasys Knezys, has told BF [BALTFAX] that his country is ready to pay to the Russian military 20,000 roubles for each square meter of housing they leave behind. As the meetings of official delegations on withdrawal are irregular, Lithuania is ready to sign appropriate agreements with the command of the withdrawing unit without the consent of top-level authorities.

Mr. Knezys also said that the Russian side is not sticking to the withdrawal schedule agreed upon last September according to which all troops should be pulled out by August 31, 1993. Those lagging behind are the coastal guards in Klaipeda and air force units in Siauliai, Panevezys and Kedainiai.

Last Thursday [3 December] the acting President Algirdas Brazauskas received the commander of the North-Western Russian Army group Colonel-General Leonid Mayorov. After the meeting, the general told journalists that Russia will pull out by the agreed deadline, but sometimes the schedule is changed for technical reasons.

According to the Lithuanian press, there are still 15,000 Russian officers and soldiers in Lithuania, while at the beginning of the year the figure was 36,000.

### Remaining Russian Troops Number 19,000

*LD1412191592 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network  
in Lithuanian 1500 GMT 14 Dec 92*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to the National Ministry of Defense, there are currently around 19,000 servicemen of the former Soviet Armed Forces under Russian jurisdiction deployed in Lithuania. Minister Audrius Butkevicius told the ELTA correspondent that by the new year there would be not more than 15,000 servicemen remaining.

The troops are being withdrawn according to the schedule which was signed by the Russian defense and the Lithuanian national defense ministers in September in Moscow. [passage omitted]

### Russian Border Guards Leave Klaipeda

*LD1412182192 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1554 GMT 14 Dec 92*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius December 14 TASS—The last Russian border guard units left the Lithuanian border city of Klaipeda today, according to the Lithuanian Ministry of the Guards.

This was the last step in the official transfer of the entire coastal zone to the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian Republic. The Lithuanian ministry said in a statement, the Russian troops have not been guarding the borders for some time already. "They have been guarding themselves and the installations they were entrusted with," the ministry said.

The Lithuanian border guards today took over headquarters of the Russian border points and other property which were in "a fairly good state".

The Lithuanian ministry also said that the last servicemen of the Russian 107th Motor Rifle Division deployed in the northern settlement in central Vilnius will leave for home on December 20. The bulk of administrative buildings, barracks, military depots and other installations will be transferred to the Lithuanian officials on December 15.

The Lithuanian ministry stressed in the statement that "Lithuania has no substantial claims to the Russian side concerning the fulfillment of the time-table of the withdrawal of former Soviet troops from our territory".

### Remainder To Leave 21 Dec

*OW1512063692 Moscow BALTEAX in English  
1702 GMT 14 Dec 92*

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] Russia's remaining border guards are leaving the Klaipeda Monday [21 December]. Thus the whole border line in the republic's maritime zone comes under the control of the Lithuanian Republic.

According to a report provided by the Lithuanian press service, on December 16 a republic's commission will be accepting the firing range in the southern part of Lithuania which formerly belonged to the 7th airborne division.

The last servicemen from Russia's 107th Motorized Rifle Division who are still staying in the Northern Military Community Vilnius will start leaving the republic December 20.

The transfer of military installations in that area will begin Tuesday and to be completed in several days.

### Problems Seen in CFE Implementation

*934P00294 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 4*

[Article by Anatoliy Kovrigin: "Not in Step With Moscow: Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe Implemented. But Problems Remain"]

[Text] When on 19 November 1990 the chiefs of state and the heads of government of the European countries, the United States, and Canada affixed their signatures to the text of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe [CFE], there were few who could assume that such fundamental changes would occur in the Old World. To be sure, the sprouts of the new approach and the shifts in the deployment of forces in international affairs had already manifested themselves at that time. But such a precipitous outcome of the Conventional Arms Treaty and, all the more so, the collapse of one of the superpowers—the Soviet Union—could hardly have been anticipated by anyone.

Nevertheless, already by that time people in the East as well as in the West were approaching a general understanding of the need to seriously reduce the arsenal of conventional arms, the concentration of which in Europe had reached unprecedented amounts. And the CFE Treaty appeared as a result of a joint search for a way out of this impasse.

And here now two years have elapsed. This is a relatively brief period of time, but extremely important for allowing the process of reducing conventional arms to take on actual traits and outlines. All the countries without exception have made their own contributions to seeing to it that this treaty is transformed from a mere piece of paper to a genuinely operating instrument—one which will facilitate the rescue of Europe from a superabundance of arms. The treaty began to be applied in July of this year; agreement on this had been reached during the course of the summit meeting in Helsinki. At the end of October the depository—The Netherlands—issued the last of the ratification documents, and on 9 November the treaty went into effect officially.

At the Special Conference of the Signatory States to the CFE Treaty, which took place on this occasion in Vienna, it was unanimously noted that this document had survived the test of time. Despite the radical changes in the military and political landscape on the European continent, the treaty had not only not been subjected to any doubts or corrections, but—quite the reverse—it itself has helped to stabilize the situation and furthered the process of restoring health to the general European climate.

As Vyacheslav Kulebyakin, the head of the Russian Delegation in the Joint Consultative Group on the CFE Treaty, remarked in a conversation with me, "in looking back at the first—albeit brief—phase of implementing this treaty, we are fully justified in stating that the treaty has demonstrated its viability. The mechanisms embodied in it were capable of adapting themselves to the new, radically altered conditions in Europe. Naturally, this entire process was not without some pain and trouble. At the initial phase of implementing this treaty we encountered certain specific difficulties caused by the very scope of the changes which had occurred on our continent. Not all of them have been completely overcome. We all need to apply our efforts to make sure that we reduce as soon as possible and then completely eliminate the negative affect of these complexities on the full-scale implementation of the treaty. Certain problems of a practical nature have arisen, which is completely explainable when one takes into account the complex nature of the treaty. In any case, however, the important thing is that the treaty is now operating, and—with each passing day—it is bringing us closer to a situation in Europe whereby security will finally replace the threat of war, trust will replace suspicion, and cooperation and interaction will replace dissension and national egoism.

No less important is the fact that this treaty was formulated at the juncture of two historical periods, and many of its provisions were drawn up, taking into consideration the realities of the military, political, and ideological confrontations of that time. But from the viewpoint of the present day—which is characterized by different political realities—the process of implementing this

treaty will serve as a powerful factor in strengthening trust and mutual understanding between states."

A "fly in the ointment" was introduced into the elevated tone of the speeches at the special conference by the American representative, in whose opinion the approach taken to the problem of monitoring controls by some of the signatories is a source of serious and constant concern. It is not customary to go into details of the problem with regard to such measures, no matter how acute they may be. In point of fact, the differences in the way of looking at things affect—in the considered opinions of people in the Western capitals—elements on the handling of which the following question depends: Will the signatories fully utilize the rights granted to them in the area of verifying the execution of the agreements which have been concluded? Again, as was the case on more than one occasion in the now-condemned former international policy of the USSR, Moscow "is marching in step," whereas the others are not. Moreover, in the lobby at the Vienna talks the representatives of "the others" are spreading their hands in bewilderment over the curious scheme which reflected the general approach to inspection activity. Because, after all, it was precisely the Soviet delegation at that time which submitted it as a reflection of its own understanding of the Western side on the eve of the treaty's signing. But now....

In commenting upon the beginning of the full-scale implementation of this treaty, A. Kozyrev, the minister of foreign affairs, drew attention to this metamorphosis in Russia's parliament. To his way of thinking, besides the difficulties caused by the newness of the matter, inserts and complications have arisen in connection with the attempts by narrow departmental interests to interpret our obligations with regard to the treaty.

We would like to believe that—given such an understanding in the government—the dispute which has suddenly erupted will be settled. This is all the more true in that, from the viewpoint of implementing the treaty, there is a need to correct those of its provisions which directly affect economic aspects. What we are talking about are such changes in the procedures for reducing arms as would allow the sides to carry out their own obligations within the established time frame without attracting additional financial funds. (Of the share apportioned to the former USSR, Russia will have to destroy something on the order of 3,000 tanks, about 8,000 APC's [armored personnel carriers], and almost 2,000 artillery systems).

There is an understanding within the negotiating community that this is not just some kind of "invented" problem for Moscow. And the Western representatives have let it be understood that they are taking into account the objective nature of the difficulties which we have in this field. But—in their turn—they would like to be understood also.

**French Inspectors Confirm No Azerbaijan CFE Violation**

NC1112160692 Baku ASSA-IRADA in English  
1048 GMT 11 Dec 92

[Text] Baku, 11.12.92 (ASSA-IRADA)—Azerbaijan does not violate the agreement on limitation of conventional weapons in Europe [CFE]. This was admitted by another French inspection received by the Ministry for Defence of the republic. Meanwhile, Armenia receives weapons above established by Vienna document norms and uses weapons previously settled outside Armenia in its war against Azerbaijan, for instance, what used to belong to the former CIS regiment in Khankendi [Stepanakert] as ASSA-IRADA's reporter was told in the Ministry for Defence. Moreover, as Georgian Defence Minister Mr. Kitovani said, all the weapons that used to be [for] Georgia are now transmitted to Armenia. Mr. Kitovani also cited a fact when Russian Army's regiment located in Armenian-populated Georgian Akhalkalak city was subjected to attack and the contents of all its military warehouses was taken out to Armenia.

**Russian Border Forces To Withdraw From Baltics by 1 Jan**

OW1512125192 Moscow BALTFAX in English  
1220 GMT 15 Dec 92

[Following item transmitted via KYODO]

[Text] A Russian border forces spokesman told BALTFAX that the withdrawal of Russian border forces from the Baltic states will be completed by January 1, 1993, no changes having been made in the schedule.

He said there are, at present, a total of 1,500 Russian border guards stationed in all three countries, more than half of them in Lithuania. Over 100 motor vehicles, and several airplanes, helicopters and sea vessels will have to be taken back to Russia before the New Year. The agreements stipulate that the Baltic countries are to take over the entire infrastructure of the Russian border guard bases and all border protection facilities.

The Russian border guards will be sent to Kaliningrad, Pskov and St. Petersburg, to be subsequently stationed on the borders with the Baltic states.

The border forces command fears that, with the introduction of stricter border regulations, more smugglers will be caught, since illicit trade with customers in Baltic countries is a lucrative business for Russia's organized

crime. Last month, for example, border guards confiscated goods worth 110 million roubles, as well as 100,000 tons of nickel, 78 tons of copper and 34 tons of fuel.

**Latvian Authorities Allow Transit of Russian Materiel**

WS1112130692 Riga LETA in English  
1359 GMT 10 Dec 92

[Text] Riga, December 10 (LETA)—According to the head of the Russian Army withdrawal monitoring office, Ilgonis Upmalis, on Wednesday [9 December] the Latvian authorities permitted 42 carriages with Russian military equipment (36 tanks and 2 armoured vehicles) to cross the Latvian territory.

The train had left Estonia for the Kaliningrad region but was detained at Valka's station on the Latvian-Russian border and remained there for more than a week because Russia has yet signed the agreement about military transport's transit via Latvian territory.

**New Round of Russian-Estonian Troop Withdrawal Talks Begins**

LD1512100892 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0803 GMT 15 Dec 92

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Albert Maloverian]

[Text] Tallinn December 15 TASS—Russia and Estonia began another round of talks in Tallinn today.

This is the first time the two delegations meet after the parliamentary elections in September which were won by the national radical bloc "Isamaa" (Homeland).

The two-day talks will mainly be devoted to the withdrawal of Russian troops from the republic, the Estonian side said.

**Belarus To Destroy Infantry Combat Vehicles**

LD1612095792 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 0900 GMT 16 Dec 92

[Text] The Belarus Defense Ministry announced the forthcoming elimination of military technology in the area of the town of Borisovo. This will be done on 23 December. Our correspondent in [name indistinct] reports that in accordance with international treaties, mechanized infantry combat vehicles are going to be destroyed. Journalists are expected to be invited for the beginning of this action.

## NUCLEAR TESTING

### Anti-Testing Leader on Struggle to Close Semipalatinsk

934P0043A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Oct 92 p 3

[Article by Olzhas Suleymanov: "Test Ranges of Destiny"]

**[Text] Last night the executive committee of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk antinuclear movement gave its report. This public organization needs no special introduction—its 3 years of activity in opposition to the international military-industrial complex and the specific steps it has taken in this direction are widely known to the world. Nor is it possible to underestimate the role of the organization in the matter of universal nuclear disarmament. Back in October 1989, when the movement was taking its first steps, few believed that the nuclear monster could be shaken even a little by the methods of people's diplomacy and parliamentary resistance in such a short period of history. But here it is October again, a unique mini-jubilee.**

We asked the leader of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement to briefly describe the difficult, very busy years of struggle.

#### Reference Points and Facets of the Problems

October 1989 was a time of peak activity of the country's first antinuclear movement. Of the 18 explosions planned for the year, we stopped 11. The last occurred on 19 October. The last of over 500 in 40 years of testing at the Semipalatinsk test range. For 2 years (up until the August edict of President N. A. Nazarbayev) we held our vigil, organizing popular, parliamentary and international resistance to the plans of the military-industrial complex, which was still mighty then. An open-ended moratorium was begun from that date at the Semipalatinsk test range. And this forced a decrease in activity at other test ranges in the world. But the process itself of universal nuclear disarmament took its first step here, in Kazakhstan.

Closing of the test range was one of the main goals. But we knew right away that until the rest of the test ranges in the world closed, we could not relax. It was for this reason that the movement went international, becoming the core of a global movement—the Global Antinuclear Alliance (GANA), established on our initiative jointly with the international organization "World Doctors Against Nuclear War."

The struggle against the military nuclear complex remains an important part of our program. Part 2 is titled "Rebirth of the Land and Man." One wise person said: "We fought for cleanliness enough—it's time to take up the broom and make a clean sweep." There are many noisy defenders of ecology in the country. But rather than making noise, we act: We are implementing the programs "Clean Water" and "Clean Air."

Scientists of Kazakhstan and St. Petersburg (the North-western Division of Nevada-Semipalatinsk is located in the city on the Neva) developed several types of small drinking water treatment units. These include faucet units for city apartments, and devices for well and hauled water, extremely necessary in rural areas. The devices have already been tested, and they are ready for series production. The Ministry of Industry promised to allocate production space. We are being spurred on by a truth: Citizens of Kazakhstan are drinking poisoned water in many regions.

We are moving ahead rather successfully in the "Clean Air" program. First of all we need to organize production of catalysts for the treatment of gaseous exhausts, since the latter are the principal pollutant of city air.

Where do we get the money? In the first while our assets came from donations by enterprises and private individuals. This source has now been practically exhausted. The money has to be earned. We have several commercial production entities—these are our sponsors. The Nevada-Semipalatinsk joint-stock company is working the most productively, and helping us. It possesses the Polimer Plant, which will produce equipment for drip irrigation needed by the republic's arid zones.

Besides everything else, it received the right to engage in foreign economic activity. Seventy percent of its income goes to the movement. We spend this money on medicines, medical equipment and other projects of the program "Rebirth of the Land and Man."

We are purchasing a baby food plant, and participating in construction of the first children's hematological clinic (for blood diseases) and children's sanatorium in Pavlodar Oblast. Writing of the program "Children of Western Test Ranges" is moving along successfully. It essentially entails marking the boundaries of contaminated places unsuited for residential purposes and animal grazing, and distributing water treatment devices. Our filters, which were developed by specialists of Kazmekhanobr, trap radionuclides as well. We plan to build small enterprises producing children's meat and dairy products, and an infusion solution plant. Four such plants are needed. One of them will appear in the western region.

The state does not have enough hard currency for these purposes. Things being as they are, I have agreed to become chairman of the holding company Inter-Kaspiy in order to direct its activity at developing the western region, and primarily at implementing the "Children of Western Test Ranges" program. This company may become an extremely serious support to the administrations of Atyrau and Mangyshlak oblasts, which are themselves concerned with the state of affairs in the social sphere. The government of the republic is one of the company's founders.

The movement is providing sponsorship to culture and science. Nevada-Semipalatinsk has a lot less money than, let us say, KRAMDS or other rich corporations.

But I haven't ever heard of any of them assuming patronage over a theater or sports club. In September for example, we transferred 3 million rubles to the Writers' Union as a donation, R2 million to the TYuZ [not further identified] and R1 million to a motion picture studio. We support the republic's chess federation and the Daulet wrestling club. At the same time we transferred R10 million to a scientific children's nutrition center. The same amount was sent to the Bobek public charity. It would be nice if our initiative were supported by entrepreneurs and funds. By the way, confirming the tradition of public accounting of public organizations regarding work done in the year would be the right thing to do. Including a report on sponsorship activity. We ourselves are going to make a report on 19 October of each year—on the day of the last explosion at the Semipalatinsk test range.

#### Calendar of Important Dates

Why 19 October, and not 27 August, when the Semipalatinsk test range was closed by an edict of the President of Kazakhstan? To be sure, this was a glorious, emotion-filled day for the hundreds of thousands of the movement's participants. But the 29 August 1991 edict was signed at a time when both Marshal Yazov and military-industrial complex leader Baklanov—the ones who insisted on continuing nuclear tests—were already holding their "Sailor's Vigil." But we had been holding a vigil at the test range back since October 1989!

In October of last year we conducted the international conference "Five Minus One," at which activists of the Global Antinuclear Alliance promised to move up the date of the "Five Minus Five" conference and schedule it for the time when all five test ranges are to be closed.

And now about attention. A few days after the conference B. Yeltsin issued an edict on a year-long moratorium at the Novaya-Zemlya test range. Then France announced a year-long halt in testing on Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific. Three of five test ranges have already fallen silent.

The Lower House of the U.S. Congress voted in favor of a moratorium at the Nevada test range. It had to pass the Senate. Every senator received letters signed by members of the Russian and Kazakhstan Supreme Soviets.

In July 1992 the U.S. Senate voted in favor of the moratorium. The last thing that was needed was the signature of the U.S. president affirming the Congress's decision. Moscow newspapers hastened to announce that Bush refused to sign the moratorium bill. There could be but one explanation: a reluctance to lose the support of the military-industrial complex during the election campaign.

Speaking at a meeting of the United Nations on 6 October, the president of Kazakhstan appealed to the USA to halt the testing in Nevada. On that same day, responding to my letter containing a proposal to lengthen the moratorium at the Novaya-Zemlya test range, the Russian president wrote that this would

depend on whether or not the USA would support the Russian moratorium presently in effect. And neither of them knew that the U.S. president had signed the Nevada moratorium bill back on 2 October 1992!

It seems as if the "conspiracy of silence" is repeating itself. After all, America did not learn of the "Gorbachev" moratorium until half a year later.

We did of course try to see that Yeltsin would become aware of the bill as quickly as possible, and he was made aware of it. By an edict he lengthened the term of the Novaya-Zemlya moratorium until the middle of next year.

If his example is followed by Mitterand (the French moratorium expires at the end of this year), we can be certain that the process of nuclear disarmament will enter its most serious phase. Then a treaty on nonproliferation, and perhaps even prohibition of nuclear weapons, will be signed in 1995. It will be signed by all UN member nations. And an international legal mechanism foreseeing diplomatic, political, economic and other strict sanctions against the treaty's violators will be developed. It seems as if the world will be able to rid itself of nuclear weapons as early as in this century. My confidence in this is growing. And it first appeared in October 1989, when we stopped the explosions at Semipalatinsk.

## CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

#### Mirzayanov, Fedorov Cited on CW Destruction Plan

93WC00094 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 46, 15-22 Nov 92 p 4

[Article: "Expertise: Generals Are Never Sorry"]

[Text] Scandal around the arrest of "MOSCOW NEWS" authors evolves into a major controversy about the environmental situation in the country.

The two scientists whose case is under investigation by the Russian Federation State Security Ministry comment on the chemical disarmament programme tabled for discussion by the Supreme Soviet.

The Comprehensive Programme for the Phased Elimination of Chemical Weapons in the Russian Federation has been approved by the concerned committees of the Supreme Soviet and submitted to the Supreme Soviet Presidium for discussion. But judging from the MN article "A Poisoned Policy" by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fyodorov, the interests of the military-industry complex can prove to be superior to the interests of the proclaimed state policy.

In this connection, MN asked Mirzayanov and Fyodorov to share their view of the chemical disarmament programme currently under discussion.

### Where are the Environmentalists?

Curiously, the programme was developed by the Committee for Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, under the Russian Federation President and headed by the notorious General Anatoly Kuntsevich, one of the masterminds of new chemical weapons. (His efforts in that direction earned him the Lenin Prize and the title of the Hero of Socialist Labour). But today, when we have rejected chemical weapons as a means of warfare, these weapons are no more than a nuisance and a potential source of environmental pollution. However, the Ministry of the Natural Environment (which is supposed to be the chief promoter of the elimination of chemical weapons) seems to be sitting on its hands. The programme fails to specify whether the concrete technologies involved are environmentally-friendly or not. The document mentions only one of the six existing technologies for the elimination of lewisite, and a competition among the technologies is still to be held. There's no mention of the technologies' specifics, including the cost and the danger to the environment involved. In fact, the programme contains no proof that the chosen option is optimal.

### No Heed for Medical Considerations

The programme completely ignores the fact that the production and testing of chemical weapons have ruined both the health of hundreds of thousands of people and vast areas of the natural environment. The top military brass are never sorry. Chemical weapons were produced in Berezniki, Ufa, Chapayevsk, Moscow, Cheboksary, Dzerzhinsk, Volgograd, and Slavgorod (Altai). The environmental situation in Chapayevsk and Dzerzhinsk is critical. But the document doesn't mention it. An honest approach would call for the construction of extra hospitals and an organization for the monitoring of the situation there. A large plant for processing lewisite into arsenic will be built in Kambarak, Udmurtia. But how can the scanty resources earmarked for the protection of local people's health make up for the health hazard involved? Are locals not entitled to be compensated for their earlier ruined health? The same argument is applicable to the residents of the Gorny settlement in the Saratov Region.

### The Most Urgent Concerns Are To Be Found Abroad

It is noteworthy that the Committee has "Conventions" mentioned in its official title, which explains the fact that it regards other matters as top priority. Understandably, it will pay most of its attention to compliance with the Convention, all the more so that it involves a lot of travel abroad. Remember these formerly flourishing committees—the Soviet Women's Committee, the Youth Committee, the Peace Committee, just to name a few? Such organizations were not really concerned with the situation of Soviet women or young people. Nevertheless, their functionaries travelled extensively abroad. The Comprehensive Programme in question, projected to cost 543.7 million dollars envisages spending 494.7

million for inspections, and nothing for the protection of people's health and the environment.

In the USA, the state budget is subject to annual approval by the Congress. In contrast, the Comprehensive Programme envisages that specific plans are to be developed annually—until the projected completion of the elimination of chemical weapons in 2004—and approved by the Committee for Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions. Thus, General Kuntsevich will himself be allotting funds for his own Committee. Since the Committee is under the aegis of the Russian President, neither the parliament nor the government is going to have anything to do with the matter.

### Diversification Instead of Conversion

The programme envisages the building of a national centre for the control and governing of all the works involved. A special building will even be constructed to house the centre's headquarters. We must be aware that a whole new range of structures, including diagnostics centres, is going to emerge. The actual purpose of the centres is unclear from the programme. However, the planned work is not concerned with the situation of the atomic-biological-chemical defence troops.

But these troops have their own bases, complete with barracks and other buildings and installations. The defence industry is vast. If the military is really interested in chemical disarmament, they can, for example, convert one of the defence factories, retrain its workers, and put to new use the already-existing facilities. Indeed, if the army no longer is poised for an atomic-biological-chemical attack, what's the use of all that infrastructure and the personnel?

The impression is that we are dealing not with the conversion of the defence industry, but with its further diversification and the parallel development of peace-oriented production without an actual dismantling of the defence industry.

### Chemical Disarmament Must Have No Secrets

The programme envisages diverse R&D work for cleaning up the old chemical weapons destruction sites, among other things. Thank you very much for openly admitting the existence of such places. Within that framework, huge sums are to be earmarked for the study of the condition of the existing disposal sites for adamite, which has an "arsenic kinship" with lewisite. The study will last for years to come, while the local population will continue to live unaware of the hazard. Huge sums have also been requested for the study of the situation with poisonous substances dumped into the sea.

Work in that direction will call for expeditions to the White Sea and the Pacific to monitor the situation, and design technologies for extracting and disposing of the chemical agents. However, this isn't mentioned in the

programme. The Defence Ministry deems it unnecessary to reveal which chemicals, how much and where, were dumped. This is in contrast to America, where the what and where is revealed first, and the money for the elimination of the hazard is allocated proceeding from that data. In this connection, we would like to underline that the problems involved in chemical disarmament represent a direct concern for the environmental protection agencies, and we must have no secrets where protection of the natural environment is concerned. So withholding such information must be regarded as a crime.

Here's another problem. The Americans decided not to transport their chemical weapons across the country, but rather destroy them at their storage sites. They even passed a law on that. In this country it is different. Phosphor-organic poisons are going to be transported from Shchuchye, Kurgan Region, to Novocherbokarsk, the venue of their production. Why should we imperil not only Shchuchye, but also Novocherbokarsk and all the rest of the towns and cities en route between them? After all, Russian railroads leave much to be desired. A representative of the Committee is going to visit the USA to learn about the safety standards and requirements for railway transportation of chemical poisons. Here you are: the Americans refuse to transport their chemical weapons across the country, and we are going there to ask advice about doing just that.

#### **CW Exposure Article Called Beneficial**

93WC0009B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 46, 15-22 Nov 92 p 4

[Opinion by Natalya Gevorkyan: "Beneficial Treason"]

**[Text] Penkovsky's treason was a huge success for the British and US secret services and a huge flop for their Soviet counterparts. Apart from that, it was a case of good luck for the whole of mankind.**

Now, 30 years after the Caribbean crisis—the peaceful emergence from which was largely contributed to by the data supplied to the West by this Soviet intelligence officer—and 29 years after the execution of Penkovsky for "high treason," it is possible to say it aloud here as well. It was spoken out by our less complex-ridden US colleague, Gerald Sheeter, in the IZVESTIA newspaper, in a tactful way: the case of Penkovsky is a reminder of the need to share information and thus avoid a catastrophe.

Another reminder is the case of the Rosenbergs, who were electrocuted in 1953 for passing US military secrets to the USSR, which thwarted the possibility of an American nuclear diktat vis-a-vis the rest of the world.

I won't guess about the conclusions made in the West, but in this country the case of Penkovsky is not at all regarded as a reminder of the need to share information in order to forestall a catastrophe. Perhaps this is why the Lubyanka is charging Vil Mirzayanov with divulging the secrets in his article exposing the danger of underhanded

dealing in the sphere of chemical weapons. He is seen as another traitor, though with circumstances different from those of Penkovsky and the Rosenbergs. But, then again, his punishment is also going to be milder: 2-7 years in prison.

Penkovsky faced a firing squad in May 1963. I believe that his example is still used to inculcate in Russian spies fear of committing treason. I don't think that the Russian spies are told that the data concerning the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles, corrected by Penkovsky, helped the Americans (and the Soviets, under the American pressure) to walk the tightrope and not slip into a nuclear holocaust. I don't believe that future spies—in this country or elsewhere—are instructed to give thought to this problem: what's to be done if the divulging of secrets ultimately results in the salvation of mankind? What's to be done if the price paid to the spy for his double-crossing is incomparable with the price the world could pay if the spy avoided that act of treason?

The answer is simple: the army, police and state security should be controlled by people who at least refuse to ignore the interests of mankind. Unless we have that, treason like Penkovsky's should be regarded as an act of benevolence. I can imagine the reaction to this "sacrilege" from the top people in secret services around the globe.

To ease the worries of the top brass in Moscow's Yase-nevo and "Aquarium," the Soviet generals hold onto their stereotypes. Otherwise they wouldn't be interrogating Mirzayanov now. Instead, they themselves would have been interrogated by a parliamentary commission and accused of damaging Russia's prestige and the cause of international stability.

Of course, our authors are not going to be electrocuted or shot. But it would really be a pity if the secrets of the military industrial complex were put above considerations of the safety of Russia's citizens. In fact, Fyodorov and Mirzayanov, by their act, already protected the interests of Russians, as best as they could.

#### **Scientist Views CW Expose Article**

93WC0009C Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 46, 15-22 Nov 92 p 4

[Article: "An Independent Opinion: They Didn't Let Out Any Secrets"]

**[Text] Leonard Nikishin of MN asked Prof. Sergey Yufit, Doctor of Chemistry and an acknowledged expert in organic chemistry, to answer the following questions:**

**Q.: Did you read our article "A poisoned policy" in MN issue No. 39, written by Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fyodorov?**

**A.: Yes, I read it closely. I disagree with the central idea of the article and with certain expressions used by the authors.**

**Q.: What is your opinion on the accusation of the authors of letting out certain data concerning the state of chemical technologies, which represent state secrets?**

**A.:** I'm an expert in organic chemistry, and will be sticking to that subject. Speaking about the binary chemical weapon developed, in their words, in this country, the authors use words "lethal," "new" and "more effective" than the American version. But they never mention actual technologies: either the formula or the substances from which it is produced, the tempo of the reaction, the temperature, the catalysts, vehicles, the mode of mixture, or storage requirements. Therefore, no technological secrets have been revealed.

**Q.: What is your assessment of the situation which evolved following the publication of the article?**

**A.:** I'm resolutely against searching "enemies of the people" or "imperialist agents." I agree with MN that the secret of possession of binary weapons by this country was let out by the arrest. I emphasize that the article entitled "A poisoned policy" contains no secrets in the sphere of chemical technology. Of course, it mentions the last stage of "utilization" of the rejected product: dumping it on the territory of the laboratory. Indeed, that fact is worth the attention of law-enforcers. If this fact is untrue, I, if I were in the shoes of the lab's director, V. Petrunin, would sue the authors for libel.

#### Biographic Information on Russian CW Officials

93WC0009D Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English  
No 46, 15-22 Nov 92 p 4

[Article: "MN File: The Men the Military-Industrial Complex Protects"]

[Text] Laureates of the Lenin Prize of the year 1991 (mentioned in a secret list) for development of the new chemical weapon.

**Anatoly Kuntsevich**, 58, Chairman of the Committee for Problems of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions, under the Russian Federation President. He is a Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences (his specialty is physical chemistry), has a military rank of Lt.-Gen., (since 1987), Hero of Socialist Labour (since 1981), laureate of the Italian Peace Prize. He commanded units of chemical defence in the Far-Eastern Military District, the Shikhan chemical warfare testing grounds, and was deputy chief of the chemical defence troops.

**Sergei Golubkov**, 52, First Vice-President of the Roskhimneft Corporation. He worked in the CPSU Central Committee department responsible for the chemical industry, was First Deputy Minister of the Chemical Industry.

**Viktor Petrunin**, 62, Director of the GSNIIOKhT, Doctor of Chemistry, Professor. He graduated from the Moscow Institute of Chemical Technologies where he

also did his post-graduate study and became Candidate of Science. After that, he worked for 25 years as Deputy Director (for science) of the Shikhan-1 chemical warfare testing site.

#### Fedorov Comments Further on CW Allegations

##### Rebuts Kuntsevich Allegations

934P00364 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI  
in Russian No 48, 29 Nov 92 pp 18-19

[Article by Lev Fedorov, doctor of chemical sciences: "Dangerous Games"]

[Text] More than a month has passed since the arrest of Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, doctors of chemical sciences, for the publication of the article "Poisoned Policy" in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. The scandal had not only legal, but mainly international political and ecological reverberations. Today, one of the authors of this article assesses the position of the VPK [military-industrial complex] in this story.

"There is no taboo on scientific research and test work" in the sphere of programs for offensive chemical weapons. This comes from Anatoliy Kuntsevich, a military chemical general (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 11 Nov 1992). And this is not new. However, what is not surprising is that the conversion of the military uniform of the chemical general to a pseudo-civilian tail-coat has not produced any kind of change in his frame of mind (I will mention now that he is the chairman of the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons). What is surprising is our forbearance.

The general modestly recounts in the newspaper the types of chemical weapons that were created with his participation. He is confident that history will learn about this, but it is hardly likely that "it will learn about us." We recall that we already heard something similar at the end of August of last year from an even more important person—the president of the USSR. And we swallowed it in silence. That is the way we are living for the eighth decade: At first we let them sponge on us, and then we remain silent when they promise not to tell us everything.

For some reason the general does not note that chemical weapons have been tested in the United States for some 15 years only in closed hangars, where there is no outside contact with nature and people. But we are doing it more and more in the open air, at times in Shikhan, at times near Nukus, and at times somewhere else. This way it is more convenient and cheaper for the generals. The thought does not even enter their heads that the senseless release of any highly toxic agents into the environment is not simply dangerous, it is criminal. It would seem that the long-term after-effects of the action of VX gas on a human being are still not fully appreciated, most of all in Chuvashia. We should stop, but, as things stand, Anatoliy Kuntsevich proposes a new test for the environment and the people—the newest chemical weapon, a

toxic agent that is rare in its toxic characteristics. If all of this is socialistic humanism, then what is genocide?

The general is of the naive conviction that he is the state, and that any other authority is not important here. But, after all, this is not the case. Here is what can be read in the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation of 8 July 1992 under No. 3244-1: "To recommend to the president of the Russian Federation to submit to the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation drafts of legislative acts of the Russian Federation on a ban, in accordance with the international obligations of the Russian Federation, on the development, production, and storage of stockpiles of chemical, bacteriological (biological), and toxic weapons, and also concerning the responsibility of officials for violations of the aforementioned obligations." So that is it. It turns out that the international obligations of Russia with respect to the DEVELOPMENT of chemical weapons seem to exist and that their legislative formulation is a mere trifle. But not for the general, who for some reason does not work in the government but "under the president."

Our chemical disarmament, which has not started yet, has already taken on a heavy police nuance. Of course, to the direct question of who initiated the criminal prosecution against the authors of the pernicious article, the general, not flinching, answered: "Not us." What is right is right—the letter to the MBR [Ministry of Security of Russia] of 2 October 1992, which gave impetus to the prosecution, was actually signed by V. Petrunkin, a secret laureate of the Lenin Prize for a chemical weapons class (but it was his institute that was criticized in the article—E1.). But this is not the whole truth. In order not to guess very much, let us look into the provisional statute concerning the committee on conventional problems of chemical and biological weapons under the president of Russia, which was confirmed by his edict of 25 May 1992 under No. 523. Thus, the very first obligation of the chairman of the committee—of our eminent general and also of the Lenin laureate of this same class—is a "guarantee in the prescribed order of the security of information that represents a state, official, and commercial secret." As we see, there was someone to give a push for an arrest.

Our Kuntsevich also does not shun the little lie. Here is what his light excursion into history looks like: "On 17 September, THE BALTIMORE SUN newspaper published an article by Mirzayanov and Fedorov. Within three days, it appeared in an expanded variant in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. The hint at the impracticality of the authors is rather transparent. However, a quote from the aforementioned issue of THE BALTIMORE SUN explains everything: "Doctor Mirzayanov and his colleague Lev Fedorov have written an article about a secret nerve gas that should appear in TODAY'S issue of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI." Yes, it happened that way: In Moscow on the morning of 16 September—the day MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI came out—was, as always, a half day earlier than at the other end of the Earth. But the forgetful general should have known that

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI comes out on Wednesdays, although the masthead indicates the following Sunday (this is the way all weeklies of the world are dated—Ed.).

Now, the MBR investigator—a captain—is zealously putting the V. Mirzayanov case together and is rushing to meet the judicial dates. He is scrupulously establishing whether in November 1992, a month before the signing of the convention on chemical disarmament, such a trivial matter as contacts of GSNIIOKhT [State Union Scientific Research Institute of Organic Chemistry and Technology] with Volgograd, GSNIIOKhT contacts with Shikhan, and GSNIIOKhT contacts with Nukus constitute a state secret of Russia, and at the same time he cites the edict of our president, which was handed him in February.

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The very simple conclusion from this "case" is not the tiring questioning and the trial of the authors of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, but something entirely different: If a general who engages in cheap politics gives a dismal interview and is unable to adapt to the simplest situation, why do we need him? Honest to God, it is cheaper for the state to put another person on chemical disarmament, and not of a military cast, if possible. But it is high time for Doctor of Chemical Sciences Mirzayanov to go to Chuvashia—some one, after all, should search for traces of the highly toxic VX gas.

#### Sees Ecological Problems, Military 'Crimes'

PM1012170392 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
3 Dec 92 Morning Edition p 3

[Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Fedorov article: "The Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament"]

[Text] If we asked ourselves why we got involved in preparations for chemical warfare, many awkward details would come to light. For example, chemical weapons could not have acted as a defensive shield like nuclear missiles. Nor were they a deterrent: It was thought that our probable enemy did not know about them.

However, that is theory. The reality stemming from our strategic error of preparing for large-scale chemical warfare is bleak. The weapons have rebounded against their creators, and the military-chemical complex, without having become involved in battles on foreign soil, has ensured that we have a genuine war on our own.

#### A Little History

The serious problems began with mustard gas and lewisite, which are blister agents. The Germans and Americans were cautious about lewisite: On the one hand, the enemy begins to be affected immediately after its use, but on the other hand it is based on arsenic, and it is not clear what to do if the lewisite reaches not the enemy but your own side. Well, our military-chemical

chiefs have left us 7,000 tonnes of lewisite as a keepsake (and have "recycled" [utilizirovali] the rest).

Mustard gas was famous in World War I: Some 12,000 tonnes were used on both sides, affecting a total of 400,000 people. Its "inconvenience" from the military point of view (it can act undetected for up to 24 hours) was compensated for by its ease of production, and mustard gas occupied an honored place in our arsenal.

We manufactured mustard gas and lewisite in Moscow before the war—at the somewhat shady chemical institute which the present State Union Research Institute of Organic Chemical Technology used to be—and buried tonnes of these chemical agents there in 1941. We manufactured mustard gas and lewisite all through the war in Chapayevsk at a chemical fertilizer plant and at the "Kaprolaktam" plant in Dzerzhinsk. For many years after the war production of these chemical agents continued in Dzerzhinsk.

It is thought that people were affected en masse by chemical agents in the Italian port of Bari during World War II—the cause was mustard gas from an American ship with a cargo of chemical bombs that was damaged by German aircraft. Eighty-three people perished then and 534 were seriously injured. I will give a domestic example of which the public is ignorant. For the entire war the plant in Chapayevsk that produced mustard gas and lewisite was filling the graveyards: Young men who were unfit to serve at the front and girls arrived in trainloads, and just as quickly became invalids or died. Once the plant stopped work due to a holdup in bringing in manpower. It is difficult to adduce figures for the losses, but you only have to study the graveyard register to see that they amounted to thousands of people. And the Order of Lenin was awarded 62 times there.

During the war we poured mustard gas and lewisite into munitions (topping it up from kettles!) and sent them to military-chemical bases. After the war on the whole we poured it into tanks and yet again dispatched it to bases. However, when we showed our hand, it turned out that we had nothing to our name—not a single shell, mine, or bomb. The ill-starred 690 tonnes of mustard gas in containers which the military-chemical "peace fighters" are going to destroy at their leisure before the year 2000 are nothing compared with the mustard gas that has disappeared. According to conservative estimates, several tens of thousands of tonnes of it have disappeared (and this is only from the plants at Chapayevsk and Dzerzhinsk). In general, a tour around the military chemical workers' sites of combat and labor glory was unavoidable.

I asked the generals in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI where the mustard gas was. They replied with silence. Then I put the question to Chapayevsk's inhabitants. We made a start: According to a telegram from the chief of chemical troops, it turns out that 1,200 tonnes of mustard gas were buried at a base near Chapayevsk without bothering about the technical side of the matter! What is

more, 50 trains of 50-60 cars, each carrying aerial bombs filled with lewisite, were loaded at this base. We... dumped this in the Arctic Ocean! But, as people say, this was only the beginning. Who can say anything certain about the burial of adamsite, which has been cast into oblivion somewhere in the expanses of Russia? Adamsite is related to lewisite, being based on arsenic...

#### New Chemical Agents

Our generals (like any others) prefer "new" chemical agents that kill people more quickly and effectively than the "old" ones. According to official figures, Russia possesses 323,000 tonnes of these "latest" chemical agents. I am talking about the highly toxic phosphoric chemical nerve agents—sarin, soman, and VX. They were not invented here, but our enthusiasts quickly snapped up the foreign ideas and became keen on all three of them (the Americans did not have sufficient money for soman). The technology for producing them was developed in Moscow at the State Union Research Institute of Organic Chemical Technology and additional work was done at its branches. "Samples" were tested at Shikhan (Saratov Oblast), and this horror weapon of the 20th century was produced at the "Khimprom" plants in Volgograd (sarin and soman) and Novocheboksarsk (VX). Without any fanfare, but with Lenin Prizes and other tangible signs of attention from above.

According to General A. Kuntsevich, "throughout the years right up to 1987, when we ended production of chemical agents, not even the slightest accident or emergency occurred" at chemical weapons plants in Russia. This is not true. To name but one of the things that have happened, there was the huge fire that occurred in shop No. 83 at the Novocheboksarsk "Khimprom" plant in 1974. This major ecological crime's effects have been concealed and have still not been eliminated, but this secret shop produced a military phosphoric agent of the VX type (see SOVETSKAYA CHUVASHIYA, 22 January 1992). The general recently sent a telegram to Cheboksary proposing to investigate the fire. Thanks, but we will now investigate it on our own.

Some 10 years earlier in Volgograd another ecological disaster occurred—effluent from shop No. 34 of the Volgograd "Khimprom" plant, which produced sarin and soman, reached the Volga. According to the recollections of eyewitnesses, the river's surface as far as Astrakhan was white with dead fish. The population never learned the true reasons for the disaster... There have also been "problems" due to chemical agents in the capital. We know about the fire at the State Union Research Institute of Organic Chemical Technology building in 1980 when several hundred grams of highly toxic VX were carried away by wind and water. The city fire fighters joined the battle. Where are those brave young men who were never told about the danger to which they were exposing themselves?

When the military-chemical complex's elite conducted talks on chemical disarmament for decades in Geneva,

the talks were not only about military chemical agents, but about a wide range of means for waging war. That is they were about chemical weapons in general, including psychotropic compounds (incapacitating agents), irritants (in common parlance they are called police gases), and much else. Our military-chemical complex did not wait to find out whether police gases (irritants) would be considered in Geneva to be chemical weapons, it manufactured them. For use not against an enemy, but against our own people! An opportunity to flex their muscles came in spring 1989 in Tbilisi and was used to the full. A year later one Moscow newspaper wrote that apart from riot-control gas [cheremukha], CS gas was also tested there. This is untrue: They tried out a wide range of agents and CS just served as a cover.

Of course, military-chemical circles understand the danger if facts are uncovered about an intention to use or the actual use of irritants. This is why General I. Yevstafyev recently stated that irritants "are not chemical weapons." It would be possible to discuss this if General A. Kuntsevich had not requested money from the Supreme Soviet to carry out research and development into the "recycling of irritants." Translating this into terms we can understand, the request for capital means that there is an excess of police gases in storage. In other words, the role of the chemical industry and applied science in producing chemical agents for fighting the population of Russia continues to be hidden. It is not planned to place irritants in the charge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], although it is the MVD which, if Russian legislation allows the use of police gases in the future, will have to decide how many agents it should have and how much should be destroyed. They are trying to get rid of them quietly.

Incidentally, we still have not been told why till 1990 the word "dioxin," which signifies a group of the strongest artificial poisons, did not appear in official vocabulary as if it was an unprintable expletive. No, they did not ban it, they simply did not use it. To the average Russian this fact means little, but yet another criminal act by the military-chemical complex is concealed behind this—preparation for dioxin warfare. In Moscow the research institute for chemical plant protection agents had a closed department for this, and work was also found for Volsk and Shikhan. There were, of course, accidents and other problems. Matters went no further than development work, but the toxin they developed proved "promising" and was much more toxic than the one known to the world from the Vietnam war and from the explosion in the Italian city of Seveso.

However, we mention dioxin only in passing, and there have been many criminal affairs concerning chemical agents. It is simply that dioxins did not fit into the military framework and, having escaped onto the expanses of Russia, will make their presence felt for many years to come.

### Dead End Road

The idea underpinning the plan of action for chemical disarmament that General A. Kuntsevich has proposed to the Russian Supreme Soviet is, alas, mistaken. Fundamentally mistaken. It does not emanate from the state's most important aim—to resolve the series of questions connected with overcoming the consequences of the many years of preparation for chemical war. Accordingly, the question of responsibility for or the elimination of this strategic mistake's consequences did not arise.

The program only touches on the part of the problem of ridding Russia of chemical weapons that is connected with carrying out international obligations. It could not have been otherwise: The tasks of the Committee for Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian Federation president, as follows from its name, purely concern the [chemical and biological weapons] "convention." No one is proposing to examine retrospectively the actual pollution of cities ruined during the production of chemical weapons: Volgograd and Ufa, Novocheboksarsk and Dzerzhinsk, Chapayevsk and Bereznikov, Volsk and Slavgorod, and others. The generals are talking only about destroying arms, and even so not all arms and not in the right way. The question of the consequences of their many years in charge of chemical weapons does not arise! So until we find out everything about Russia's polluted land (in particular about the Volga basin), it is pointless to raise the question of the ecological side of their activities.

...Anyone who remembers the literature of the 60's will probably not have forgotten N. Smelyakov's "Commercial America." In one conversation the author expressed his bewilderment: How did the United States organize in just one and a half years large-scale production of the military transport ships that transferred the expeditionary corps across the ocean to open the second front? The answer was surprisingly simple: If you want to do anything serious, don't let the generals anywhere near. Now we fairly often look across the ocean in search of formulas and ideas, and it would not be a bad thing if we remembered this piece of advice. It is very relevant.

### Comments on Investigation

PM0812115992 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian  
3 Dec 92 Morning Edition p 1

[Unattributed report on article by Doctor of Chemical Sciences Lev Fedorov "The Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament": "The Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament"]

[Text] Recently the serene flow of official reports on the cessation of chemical weapons production in Russia and on their phased destruction has been disturbed. Apart from the comforting view on the problem which Academician Anatoly Kuntsevich, chairman of the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons, and other officials and representatives

of the military-chemical complex have expressed on more than one occasion in the press (including our newspaper), other opinions have been published, too. The academic chemists Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov have expressed the most pointed views.

The first of them worked at one time as chief of the department to counteract technical espionage at one secret scientific research institute, visited practically all the military-chemical complex's facilities, and gave a written undertaking not to disclose the secrets known to him from his work—secrets which were connected with the production of military toxic chemical agents. These secrets—even the effect on our own people of the chemical agents being produced—constitute major state secrets.

V. Mirzayanov is now under investigation and a criminal case is in progress on his disclosure of these very secrets, these state secrets. His colleague L. Fedorov is acting as a witness in the case. Nevertheless, the scientist has offered a manuscript to *IZVESTIYA* which summarizes his observations over many years of the military chemical complex's secrets. Therefore, the first question to the author is: Is he not afraid of ending up himself in the role of the accused?

"Technically speaking, I was not given access to the secret work although I am in possession of fairly 'explosive' information. What is more, I received an offer from the Supreme Soviet to present my conclusion on the draft of the comprehensive program on the phased destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation. I do not think that under these circumstances the state security service will not try to do me ill. But I am obliged to speak about the myths of chemical disarmament—this is my duty as a scientist and as a citizen of Russia."

What alarms L. Fedorov concerns first and foremost you and me, our children's safety. While there is even the smallest threat from the military-chemical complex, we have an obligation to sound the alarm. After all, to this day we do not know the whole truth about the military-chemical complex's output.

We do not know what's "cooking" in our secret scientific research institutes' and secret plants' flasks. We do not know where the fatal poisons are being stored and how they are being destroyed. We do not know about accidents at chemical plants. And the least attempts to answer these questions may for the "curious" person turn into criminal liability.

One would like to hope that the dozens of generals and thousands of workers of the military-chemical complex are doing everything possible to make us safe (as well as themselves!) from the threat of mass destruction. But it is only religion which relies on faith alone. In real life we need correct and timely information.

Read Lev Fedorov's article "The Myths and Legends of Chemical Disarmament" on page 3.

### Mirzayanov CW Affair Shows Democratization Incomplete

93WC00104 Moscow *MOSCOW NEWS* in English  
No 47, 23-29 Nov 92 p 4

[Article by Academician Georgi Arbatov: "Whom Does Our Military-Industrial Complex Deceive?"]

[Text] MN has continued receiving comments on the development of new chemical weapons.

Much has already been written about Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov, the chemical scientists who have been victimized for their article in MN, but the theme is not yet exhausted. And not merely because it served a reminder of the puzzling and lethally (in the literal sense of this word) dangerous problems of chemical weapons. This has highlighted sore spots in the current stage of the country's development.

One of them is the vulnerability of glasnost and its newly revealed indefensibility. From whatever I read on this case in the Russian and foreign press nothing sheds light on the question: what secrets had the above-mentioned scientists betrayed? If only our authorities do not regard as a state secret the very fact that work is being continued on new types of war gases (the short description of their action in MN is hardly a secret, for it repeats whatever can be found in popular science literature of the West).

Secondly, whatever happened illustrated what many suspected and some even spoke about: after all the monstrous crimes of the past, after the formidable reminder of the persisting threat which was given by last year's putsch, practically no changes have occurred in the state security bodies and law-enforcement bodies. The promised reform of state bodies has not materialized. This is a sad fact causing grave concern. Since August 1991 this major component of the process of society's democratization has not moved anywhere, whereas neither the legislative nor the executive branch has paid the slightest attention to such things. They seem to have been forgotten, although Russians must not do this because of their bitter experience.

And thirdly, it is the military-industrial complex's reluctance or inability to restructure itself and to learn from the lessons and mistakes of the past. And its amazing ability not to respond to changes in politics. The inability of politics to make the MIC rebuild itself and act in keeping with fresh political and economic objectives and realities has been demonstrated.

I would like to dwell on all this in somewhat greater detail.

First and foremost, about the relevance of the problem. In a country where no one can even exactly define what part of the national wealth was used for military spending and where, according to different sources, 40 to 65 per cent of industry worked in defence, it is simply impossible to put the economy more or less in order without demilitarization. No matter what sweeping

plans of reforms may be offered. It is simply beyond our power to maintain such an immense war machine and such a defence industry.

Swift demilitarization is demanded not only by the new economic but also political realities: the end of the Cold War, a radical reduction of the threat from without, and the need for Russia to enter the world community in a dignified manner and become a respectful and trustworthy partner for other countries, which is indispensable for its revival. It is simply impossible to secure all this while keeping the old giant military potential intact and not demilitarizing the economy—especially in conditions where other states are taking this road.

All this calls for radical change. It's a different matter that the changes as such must be well-thought-out and prepared. And there has been time for this—15 months have already elapsed since August 1991. Regrettably, this time has not been usefully used. Where is the new military doctrine, where is a military reform formulated taking account of the latter, where is the general programme of conversion founded on the new realities? Maybe they are still in the depths of corresponding government departments? But then they are not real doctrine, reform and programme because as long as they are drawn up in camera and remain a departmental secret, they cannot become the basis of a real policy calling for understanding, support and even participation by millions upon millions of people.

Now about some more specific aspects of the "case" with the ill-starred publication in MN.

I don't know how and whom by—after the top political leadership passed a decision on eliminating chemical weapons and gave corresponding assurances to the world—the decisions were taken to carry on the development of their new types. Just as the decision to make those who will tell the public about this criminally answerable for divulging state secrets.

Formally, it is true, nothing has been violated—the Convention on Chemical Weapons has still not been signed. But actually, weird and absurd things keep occurring. The country has assumed political commitments to renounce chemical weapons. How then is it possible to continue their improvement and modernization as if nothing has happened? And even in economic terms this is an absurdity. As if the government's one hand doesn't know what the other is doing.

It is not the first time, it is true, that this has happened. Exactly the same happened in this country to conventional weapons (tanks, armoured personnel carriers, missiles, artillery pieces, etc.). Even on the eve of the treaty on their radical reduction, the industry continued turning out en masse the weapons many thousands of which were to be reduced. But here the situation is even more intolerable since what is in question is a medically and ecologically more dangerous type of weapons—we

do not know what to do even with their existing stockpiles which already harm people's health and the environment due to negligence in storage and incompetence in the destruction of toxic agents.

As we all know, disorders in our country are many and varied, and they are now being criticized aloud. Only, not always giving the names of specific culprits.

In the above case, it is true, one name has been given. It is Anatoly Kuntsevich, a general, academician and winner of prizes of various descriptions awarded for the development of toxic agents. As the chairman of a corresponding committee under the President he has also been authorized to develop a programme for the destruction of chemical weapons in Russia.

I see nothing wrong in the fact that the destruction of these weapons will be supervised by the person who developed and produced them—here there is a need for knowledge of the job and a high level of professionalism. But if the same person does both jobs simultaneously—prepares the destruction of chemical weapons and supervises their further improvement—this already gives rise to deep doubts. Maybe it is this "combination of functions" that explains, notably, the serious lapses of his programme for "chemical disarmament" disclosed in the previous issue of MN? Just as the desire to keep everything secret. A sinister meaning is also attached to his statement that Russia will not destroy chemical weapons in the time limits set by the Convention because... there is no money. How is it possible that no money should be found for this if there is enough money for the development of new weapons?

I would like to say a few words specially about the myth being assiduously created by the military-industrial complex to the effect that disarmament and conversion (unlike the arms race, isn't it?) are very costly and we cannot afford them. I don't want to deny at all that the destruction of weapons—conventional, nuclear and chemical alike—calls for considerable inputs. They are inevitable. Yet this is not the cost of disarmament, but the cost of the arm race.

Simply some of us were sufficiently smart, whereas others sufficiently silly, not to take these expenditures into account in the developments of armaments. On the other hand, every unit of armaments, be it a nuclear bomb, tank, gun, shell or submachine gun cartridge, must sooner or later be destroyed (only if there is no war which will "write everything off"). This is not necessarily due to the treaties on disarmament, but simply due to the moral or physical aging of weapons—something gets rusty, something loses reliability or wears out, even metal "fatigues." To say nothing of the fact that technological progress quickly makes obsolete practically everything that was produced yesterday or even today. Therefore we doom ourselves to spending on disarmament at the very moment when we create weapons. And this spending is as indispensable and unavoidable as any other expenditure on society's life support.

It's a different matter that the financial burden of disarmament must under no circumstances be transferred to the army or the defence industry, suggesting that they themselves "make money" on the elimination of weapons and on conversion by selling weapons or other military property. Disarmament must be financed (moreover, on a sufficient scale) from the state budget. The same goes for conversion.

And in this case there is a need to proceed from the assumption that disarmament is still more profitable than the preservation and production of huge quantities of armaments. Not only because there is a need to keep men, whole military subunits, attached to weapons and these weapons must be guarded, saved and repaired—which in itself is very costly. Other costs are even more expensive for society. Today we are witnessing how the weapons stockpiled in incredible quantities are being scattered in every direction. They are either sold by corrupt army personnel or stolen. They are violently taken away in conflict zones, lost due to negligence or left behind during troop relocations. And therefore, sooner or later, these weapons fire. Ever more often one hears about even uranium and plutonium being stolen or disappearing. Is it possible to guarantee the inviolability of chemical weapons as well? Like Chekhov's rifle on the wall, the chemical weapons, mountains of which have been stockpiled, will fire sooner or later.

The situation in the country and the world has changed radically. The activities of the defence industry must be brought to conform with it without further delay. This is vital for the economy. This is vital for policy. This is vital for our own security.

The story with Mirzayanov and Fyodorov must serve as a reminder of this problem's topicality.

#### Development of 'Binary Bomb' Described

PM1512150192 Moscow NOVOYE VREM'YA  
in Russian No. 50, Dec 92 (signed to press  
8 Dec 92) pp 46-48, 49

[Oleg Vishnyakov article: "I Was Making Binary Bombs. This Man Is Talking After Five Years of Silence. He Was Poisoned by Chemical Weapons Made by His Own Hands"]

[Text] Doctors of Chemical Sciences Vil Mirzayanov and Lev Fedorov revealed that, contrary to Soviet leaders' official statements, an extremely powerful toxic substance was created [sozdano] and successfully tested in the late eighties, a substance whose combat potential was much greater than that of all hitherto known types of such weapons. The scientists also gave a detailed interview to our journal.

In the wake of this, Vil Mirzayanov, who had worked for 25 years at the State Union Scientific Research Institute for Organic Chemistry and Technology [GSNIIOKhT] where our chemical weapons were developed [razrabatyvalos] during the war and postwar years, was arrested on

charges of revealing state secrets. Mirzayanov is free at the moment, but his case is still under investigation.

Leaders of Russia's military-chemical complex who, according to Mirzayanov's claim, were involved in the creation of the new substance code-named "Novichok" [Newcomer], have neither confirmed nor denied this report, but have declared in unison that international agreements have not been breached **under any circumstances** because so far nobody has banned the development of chemical weapons as distinct from their production.

The scientists who confirmed the existence of the top secret "Foliant" program for the creation of a new class of toxic nerve gas code-named "Novichok" had only heard of it secondhand and therefore could not be considered reliable sources.

In the course of our journalistic investigation we realized that, in order to confirm the fact that new binary weapons were being developed in the USSR, it was necessary to find someone who had worked directly on "Novichok's" creation.

We succeeded in finding such a person.

He broke his silence after the television program devoted to this scandal. "Ostankino" journalists were allowed inside the GSNIIOKhT to prove to them that chemical weapons were no longer being developed there.

#### The "Generals" Are Still Chemicalizing

For five years now Andrey Zheleznyakov has been spending all his free time at a sculptor friend's studio, carving exotic wooden masks and figures. Andrey is a class-two invalid, having lost his ability to work. He showed us a medical report—the list of ailments is mind-boggling: cirrhosis of the liver, toxic hepatitis, lesion of the trigeminal nerve, epilepsy.

He subsists on a pension of 1,118 rubles plus a supplement for the damage he has suffered. A total of some 2,500 rubles per month. True enough, he receives free medicine and can at any time go for a rest at the St. Petersburg Institute of Hygiene and Occupational Pathology clinic, where leadership personnel from the country's military-chemical complex are treated.

Zheleznyakov's former employers are doing everything to make life easier for him. They demand just one thing in exchange: silence.

When Vil Mirzayanov was arrested at the end of October, former colleagues hinted to Andrey that something similar was lying in store for him as well. Why did he decide to tell me everything? Andrey says that he had thought about doing this for a long time, but the aforementioned ill-starred television program brought matters to a head. During the program, GSNIIOKhT Director V. Petrunin declared that he was prepared to testify before any court: The institute is not engaged in any work at all on binary weapons at present. "I know for

sure that this is a lie," Andrey Zheleznyakov told me. According to him, three of the institute's laboratories are right now experimenting with "Novichok's" latest upgrade (this should be "Novichok-9"—O.V.). The experiments should be completed by the new year.

Zheleznyakov, just like Vil Mirzayanov, is convinced: The generals cannot be trusted with the destruction of chemical weapons. The money received from the Americans for this purpose will definitely be channeled into the development of new and more powerful toxic substances.

### Conspiracy Rules

Andrey Zheleznyakov was born in the family of chemical scientists—his father was deputy people's commissar for the chemical industry in the early forties. Andrey followed in his parents' footsteps: Having completed his Army service in 1964, he joined the GSNIIOKhT as a technician, then graduated from Moscow's Energy Institute.

Having qualified as an engineer, Zheleznyakov remained in "the box." He spent many years working on physical and chemical analysis of synthetic toxic substances. Initially these were soman-type substances, and later on a more up-to-date compound which the Soviet Union described as VX in all international treaties (the extent to which the Soviet variety of VX matched its U.S. counterpart is a different story). As a matter of fact, these designations were never used even in conversations between scientists who, for conspiratorial purposes, used code names like "Product 33" and "Product 35."

"It was well and truly a conveyor belt," Andrey recalled. "Each day we received a product, measured its properties, and sent it further down the chain."

The product was then sent on to Section "B" for biochemistry, where the new compound was tested on rats, dogs, and monkeys.

The office of test engineer, which Zheleznyakov held, was considered one of the most prestigious at the institute. The testers were dealing with end products. As a rule, the other staffers had no idea of what exactly they were developing and producing. Each of them did his own job and did not know what was being done "next door." It was not the done thing to show interest.

Zheleznyakov recalls that the system of secrecy at the institute was fine-tuned down to the tiniest detail, a special pass was required for each laboratory, nothing could be brought in or taken out, there were secret notebooks, special document cases, reliable safes:

"If, for example, you had to go to the toilet, the notebook had to be put in a document case and the document case inside a safe. Everything was locked and sealed. Waste was incinerated. To top it all, 'First Department' [security] staffers rummaged around the garbage every day, looking for secret documents."

### No Matter What Kuntsevich Says...

Presumably by the late seventies Soviet scientists had succeeded in synthesizing a completely new type of toxic nerve gas. Experiments with binary chemical weapons on this basis began at the institute in 1982. Zheleznyakov was involved in these tests from the very beginning. He and another five persons made up a separate group dealing exclusively with the new binary weapon and came directly under Institute Director V. Petrunin.

According to Andrey, there were no more than 20 persons at the institute who knew about the "Novichok" tests, all operations were conducted in the strictest secrecy. It was actually in 1982 that Anatoliy Kuntsevich, one of the chief "chemical generals" (now leader of the Committee for Conventional Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons under the Russian president), officially declared that the USSR had no intention of responding to the creation of binary weapons by the Americans.

Zheleznyakov assembled the test installation which was to become his main job for the next five years. The installation was used to blend two components, with engineers monitoring what was happening at the completion of the process. The main task was to measure the temperature of the end product—the higher the temperature during the blending, the more toxic the substance.

Before the test, the initial temperature was set on a thermostat, ranging from minus 50 to plus 50 degrees, depending on the target against which the weapon was assumed to be used. The installation itself was in turn housed inside a fume cabinet where the highly toxic substances were concentrated and then released in the sky above Moscow through special filters (highly unreliable, according to Andrey).

By no means everyone was striving for success. The laboratory often received substances whose specifications were completely different from what the documentation showed. There were obviously some people keen on wrecking the experiments. Andrey inclines to think that "Novichok," just like other of the institute's secret products, provided an arena for clashes between the personal interests and ambitions of numerous chemical industry chiefs whose main preoccupation was to ensure their own personal success and "sink" their rivals.

### One Hot Morning in May

In the spring of 1987 the laboratory tests of the binary weapons ("Novichok-5" by that time) were approaching completion. Zheleznyakov's group was working twice as hard. The institute's leadership was chasing them—the experiments should be concluded by the end of May so as to enable them to complete an application for the Lenin Prize by August.

The first alarm bells sounded one week before the accident. Following a routine experiment, Zheleznyakov suddenly felt both his eyes going miotic (miosis—

contraction of the pupils—is the first sign of poisoning). Andrey recalls that even then he thought to himself: Something is wrong with the fume cabinet. He did not contact the local medical unit, since this was considered by institute staffers to be almost tantamount to treason: If you end up in the medical unit you would be letting down your chief, who would be held responsible. Incidents of poisoning were thoroughly concealed.

The weather during those days in May was exceptionally hot and dry. The conducting of experiments in such weather was banned under all safety norms in the institute. But the generals forgot all about this in their pursuit of the Lenin Prize....

On that day Zheleznyakov arrived at the laboratory as normal. A degasification had been scheduled—the installation was dismantled after each test and was washed down with a degasifying solution for a whole day. The next day would see the last test, and then he would go on leave. Andrey was seriously thinking of resigning from "the box"—his wife, a painter and modeler by profession, was planning to lease a studio; they had enough money.

Zheleznyakov switched on the fume cabinet (it was switched off overnight)—it seemed to be functioning, he opened the casing, and suddenly felt he had got a "lungful."

"I saw rings before my eyes—red, orange. Bells were ringing inside my head, I choked. Add to this the feeling of fear—as if something was about to happen at any moment," Andrey recalls. "I sat down, and told the guys: I think it has 'got' me. They dragged me out of the room—I was still able to move—and took me to the chief. He looked at me and said: 'Have a cup of tea, everything will be fine.' I drank the tea and immediately threw up.

"They took me to the medical unit, where I was injected with an antidote. I felt a little better. The chief told me: 'Go home and lie down. Come back tomorrow.' They assigned me an escort, and we walked past a few bus stops. We were already passing the church near Illich Square, when suddenly I saw the church lighting up and falling apart. I remember nothing else."

The comrade took Andrey on his back and somehow dragged him to the medical unit. The terrified physicians, instead of giving him first aid, were in too much of a hurry to don protective clothing.

It can be said that Zheleznyakov was lucky. He was sent to the Sklifosovskiy First Aid Institute's Poison Treatment Center, where Doctor Vedernikov saved his life.

#### The "Secret" Patient

Our conversation with Yevgeniy Vedernikov in the almost deserted hospital ward was every now and again interrupted by the clatter of gurney wheels—another patient was being brought in.

That was how Zheleznyakov was brought in five years ago. In addition to the medics, he was also accompanied by several persons in civilian clothes. The first thing the KGB staffers did was to get the first aid physicians to sign a no-publicity pledge. When asked what had happened, they replied that Zheleznyakov had been poisoned by eating some sausage.

According to Vedernikov, Andrey's condition was critical. His heart was hardly beating, the level of choline esterase (a substance which plays an important role in the transmission of nerve impulses) in his blood had dropped to almost zero. Going by these symptoms, the physicians could only guess at the cause of the poisoning. Naturally, nobody believed the "sausage" story.

Zheleznyakov spent 18 days and nights at the intensive care unit, hovering between life and death.

For six weeks Andrey was unable to walk, and lost 35 kg. He was kept in strict isolation—no visitors, no outside contacts, no parcels. Being someone who had accidentally been exposed to the effects of a new toxic substance, Zheleznyakov was of great interest to the country's military-medical science. Each new physician who examined the "secret" patient—whether a therapist, a neuro-pathologist, or a toxicologist—had to sign the KGB's no-publicity pledge. They were all insistently "requested" to forget this particular case.

Zheleznyakov spent a further two months at Leningrad's Institute of Hygiene and Occupational Pathology before returning home. He was moved to Leningrad almost surreptitiously. When bidding him farewell, the "Committee men" yet again instructed him to keep silent.

An investigation was conducted at the institute following the incident with Zheleznyakov. The GSNIIOKhT leadership decided to "pin" everything on the victim—he himself was to blame, they claimed: He had breached safety procedures.

Zheleznyakov was not informed of the investigation's results, but he knows for sure that the degasification norms and the safety procedure rules at the institute were reviewed.

A conciliation commission was set up when Andrey returned from Leningrad. Initially, during a confidential conversation, his colleagues suggested that Andrey should accept all the blame for the accident so as "not to let the friends down." He refused, and another suggestion followed: To share the blame on a fifty-fifty basis with the institute. They failed to persuade him; Andrey firmly stuck to his guns. Finally they conceded, evidently afraid that Zheleznyakov might have a few stories to tell. After all, that was happening in 1987—the year when glasnost flourished.

He was thus left in peace. He was classified as invalid and given a pension; the institute pays the supplement for the damage he has suffered from its own director's

fund. For five years he honestly observed the rules of the game—and kept silent. He no longer intends to do this.

There is one loose end left in this story—the Lenin Prize. We know that the "Novichok" program was frozen following the unfortunate accident. But tests were resumed a year later. Even though it was delayed, the "chemical generals" did receive the Lenin Prize—in the spring of 1991.

We assumed that this coveted prize was actually awarded to the binary weapon based on "Novichok." The generals had dug out the old files, produced yet another batch of the substance, reported to "the top," and received the prize from the hands of Mikhail Gorbachev himself.

But, as NOVOYE VREMENYA's correspondent was told by a former GSNIIOKhT staffer who asked to remain anonymous, at that time—in early 1991—the generals decided to play it safe and based their application for the prize not on "Novichok," which was still being developed, but on the old and tested toxic substance declared by us in the draft Geneva Convention as VX.

If this is really so, our prize winners have not only deceived the Americans but have also, to put it mildly, misled their own country's leadership regarding their successes in the military-chemical sphere.

NOVOYE VREMENYA continues its investigation.

### Feature on Russian Biological Warfare Programs

#### Stated Policy Viewed Skeptically

934P0032A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Dmitriy Frolov under the general heading: "Were Biological Weapons Declared Illegal?"]

[Text] Weapons of mass destruction and morality are mutually exclusive things. But biological weapons have always been so egregiously inhumane that when the Japanese military were caught developing and testing them, for many people this was quite enough justification for dropping atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Since that time no country has dared to admit that it had weapons of this kind in its arsenal. But almost every one of them suspected its enemy of this and was constantly developing means of protection. Protection and that is all—in any case that is what they said. But the Soviet Union was an exception in regard to this. And suddenly last fall it was publicly announced that up until April of this year Russia had its own aggressive biological program, whose development was conducted by the now reformed 15th General Staff Administration. This was announced in connection with the trilateral meeting of representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and Russia (September 1992) devoted to settling mutual

claims in the area of biological and chemical weapons on the threshold of the signing of the convention on the complete ban of these kinds of weapons. After Russia's disclosure of the shutdown of the testing ground on the Aral, the focus of mistrust shifted to St. Petersburg Institute of Super-Pure Biological Substances—information about the fact that it was working on especially dangerous human diseases, including plague, came into the public domain. It seems that the source of the sensational information was the former director of the Valeriy Pasechnik Institute, who had migrated to the West several years ago.

But, according to the Russian side, they never worked with plague there and what they were talking about was the so-called "chicken plague," which was involved only in veterinary medicine. In order to convince the foreign partners of this, they were immediately invited to St. Petersburg. As practically all the sources show, the initiative for terminating the biological offensive program came from President Yeltsin. This was undoubtedly a courageous step, but it is quite obvious that in reality it will be quite difficult. This is shown by the materials published today.

#### Military Biological Warfare Official Interviewed

934P0032B Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Dec 92 p 6

[Interview with General Valentin Yevstigneyev, former chief of 15th General Staff Administration, by Dmitriy Frolov; place and date not given: "We Never Filled Our Models With Live Cultures: The Biological Protection Service Will Engage Only in Protection"]

[Text] I bet that even on the 10th try the reader will not guess whose portrait your correspondent discovered upon crossing the threshold of the general's office. You would have to look at the signature to be sure that you were not mistaken—it really was a picture of Ivan Mikhaylovich Sechenov.

On the other hand, why should there not be a portrait of the eminent physiologist in the office of a general in the medical service—the un-general-like stylish, smiling Valentin Yevstigneyev, who until recently headed one of the most secret administrations of the General Staff—the 15th. Officially, it was working on biological protection but, of course, that was only part of the problems resolved there. It is no longer a secret to anyone, since the president's edict and the public rejection of the aggressive biological program can be interpreted, in this sense, as a reliable confirmation.

The question of production or nonproduction of bacteriological weapons has always been extremely delicate—says Valentin Yevstigneyev. Any specialist knows that it is impossible to produce and test means of protection without working on pathogenic cultures. Not a single vaccine could be created without this.

[Frolov] Tell me, do we have the potential for making weapons capable of carrying a biological payload?

[Yevstigneyev] I do not feel like going into this subject too deeply—the dissemination of such information serves no purpose. I can just assure you that we have a complete list and technical description of such means that are available abroad. At times we have reproduced some of them in order to conduct a military-technical evaluation. Before the convention was signed we studied how we could use our delivery equipment and load it with special loads. We called them mockups for biological agents. No special stocks were created.

[Frolov] Did you really not bring things to completion; did you resist creating these production capacities even though you knew how to do it?

[Yevstigneyev] That is a very delicate question, and I assure you that in industry and also in the other branches of the armed forces they did not know whether one kind of delivery vehicle or another could be used to create special ammunition. Only a very small group of people had this information at the time. In fact a great deal already existed—it could be ordinary ammunition adapted to carry special cultures.

[Frolov] Have any videotapes of these tests been preserved?

[Yevstigneyev] They did a "slow" filming of tests of American ammunition. They observed how the deformation of the ammunition occurred. How it is destroyed and what kind of cloud is formed. It was not clear even from the beginning whether it was dust raised from the ground by the explosion or ammunition—it disperses in one or two minutes. After the convention was signed and we began to prepare for various inspections, the films were destroyed.

I want to emphasize that we never filled our models with live cultures. Why, for example, launch an anthrax pathogen into the atmosphere when it is possible to load the ammunition with a vaccine preparation that is the absolute equivalent of the pathogen but is completely harmless. After all, it was not just soldiers who were affected by this work—there were 150 families of military servicemen on the island.

[Frolov] We rejected the offensive biological program and as a result personnel were reduced by 30 percent and allocations for biological protection by 50 percent. Does this mean that all of these forces and funds were, as they say in the military, put to work right here?

[Yevstigneyev] That would be an incorrect estimation of the situation—that is a cumulative figure which was conditioned, among other things, by the overall reduction of the budget and personnel in the armed forces. The offensive program did not require a large amount of money—after all, it was not an accumulation of arms but a series of research projects.

Incidentally, in general our work did not take as many people as it may seem—there were 12 medical workers in administration and the same number of chemists, and 70 more people who were responsible for the service teams. The Institute of Military Microbiology has 400 people, of whom 120 are scientific associates. There were 6,500 people working in the system as a whole, and now that number has been cut in half.

Actually, it is the personnel problem that concerns our partners. Nobody is making accusations against us about production and accumulation; they are bothered only by the fact that if we want to we can do both. Our partners would like for people who are capable of launching such a mechanism to be excluded from that work.

Herein lies the problem of control as well—control not over the productions and arsenals but over the scientists, the presence or lack of an infrastructure capable of applying the results of their research for military purposes.

[Frolov] Everybody knows about the situation with nuclear weapons, in which such an arsenal has been created that it would be physically impossible to use it all. Tell us frankly, are biological weapons not just as much of a deterrent as the kind of arms somebody intends to use in reality?

[Yevstigneyev] One could undoubtedly name many parameters according to which this weapon is practically no good at all. It keeps poorly and therefore it has no potential. The strategy and tactics for its use are extremely problematic. It is difficult to predict the impact of its application, including on our own personnel. It can be used only at a certain time of the day and in limited climatic zones—sun rays, for example, have a disintegrating effect on the culture. And the main thing is that the moral harm experienced by the side that uses it is immense. It will inevitably entail isolation and maximum escalation of the actions of the enemy, who will consider any means justified.

But the biological weapon also has a number of properties that make it attractive to countries that are not wealthy but have large-scale aggressive aspirations. The expenditure per unit of space is extremely small, and there is no difficulty producing it even in wartime. Ultimately it will be possible to get around the problem of storing it as well. Moreover, modern science makes it possible to modify the pathogen significantly. The present means of protection will be ineffective against it. Genetic engineering opens up possibilities which many will want to try to use for military purposes.

I recall when in the Central Committee I was appointed to the position of administration head (this, of course, was resolved there) I was told: Remember that you are providing for the safety of the nation. I am sure of that now too.

[Frolov] Our partners have expressed concern about the Petersburg Institute for Super-Pure Biological Agents, where, in their opinion, work was conducted with plague

pathogens. The Russians assert that they were working on the creation of a veterinary vaccine against pseudoplague in chickens, which has nothing to do with real plague. How could our partners, who are professionals, be so badly mistaken?

[Yevstigneyev] In 1985 this institute's director, Vladimir Pasechnik, did not return from a business trip abroad. Although his organization did not have direct assignments from the Ministry of Defense, certain work that interested us was being conducted there. In particular, they had received an assignment on transferring the genetic equivalent of the protein myelin into a microorganism. This protein plays the role of insulating the nerve fiber. We were disturbed about significant work in this field abroad, particularly in Great Britain. We were afraid that if the microorganism were modified in that way it could affect the normal program for synthesis of myelin in the organism, which would ultimately lead to flaccid paralysis. We decided to test to see if such a modification were possible. The director at the time knew where this assignment had come from.

[Frolov] Tell us, is Pasechnik still alive?

[Yevstigneyev] He is alive and well and working in Great Britain. We have told the appropriate structures that if he likes living there, let him live wherever he wants to. But the institute's reputation has been tarnished. Moreover, he did know why the institute's new building in Lakhta was being built. In the present one, which is located in the middle of the city, it was simply impossible to conduct certain work. And they did not conduct it, to say nothing of any plague...

[Frolov] Nowadays when people speak about the military they inevitably mention conversion. Teapots made at aircraft plants are bad and expensive. The chemists have found their ecological niche—they are destroying what they used to make. But what about you?

[Yevstigneyev] Our vaccines have long been used in civilian public health. The vaccine against anthrax, strain STI-1, which lies at the basis of all modern preparations, the brucellosis strain, anti-plague vaccines, gammaglobulins... The first industrial batches of antibiotics developed by our civilian colleagues were obtained within these walls. Practically all tests are conducted here and quality standards are developed for practically all medicines against infections. There are not very many places where this can be done. We are frequently assigned the most dangerous work, and we are ready to do it, but... For example, the typhus vaccine—it is produced from a virulent—that is a dangerous—strain. Moreover, its production is dangerously explosive and toxic. We have agreed to do it, but it means creating a pathogenic culture. People immediately say: The military are preparing weapons! In our virology center in Sergiyevyy Posad they had an original idea for preventing the spread of AIDS—we discovered something

interesting while working on one of the viral infections. But I can keep only one or two workers on this project—there is no money.

### St. Petersburg Institute Described

934P0032C Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Fedor Orlov: "It Seems They Found No Plague in St. Petersburg: But It Was Done Very Quietly"]

[Text] Frankly, it is difficult to imagine anything less suitable for the development of biological weapons than the Institute of Super-Pure Biological Agents in St. Petersburg. What Academician Kuntsevich—the same one, the general and chairman of the Committee on Convention Problems of Chemical and Biological Weapons—mysteriously calls "a certain institute," in fact has a sign on the doors and does not display the military guard or the fence with an alarm system which, even if it is a poor one, is an indispensable part of any enterprise that is even vaguely associated with the military-industrial complex.

Inside we did not see a single coded lock. The door to the vivarium was wide open.

But when I recalled the story according to which they were supposed to be working with plague cultures here... I either had to be frightened or to laugh, but I did not feel like doing either one.

My conversation with Yevgeniy Sventitskiy—the institute's director, who told a NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent that he had never worked with a plague culture or any other disease culture—did not clear anything up either.

Yevgeniy Sventitskiy answered simply: "I have no military colleagues." In the director's words, he received all his projects from the Biopreparat Concern, of which the institute is a constituent part. There is not doubt that, as in any other institution, there were and are secret projects here, but there have been considerably fewer of them in recent years—while previously they made up about 20 percent, now they make up about five percent. Yevgeniy Sventitskiy especially emphasized that the curtailment process began even before the scandalous departure abroad of the former director (regarding this, see Yevstigneyev's interview). Now the institute's leadership has ended up in the unenviable position of trying to justify itself, and so the people here are waiting impatiently for the international commission, which, it is thought, can rehabilitate the collective in the eyes of the public and their colleagues. The latter are vitally important since the institute, cut off from budget financing, relies totally on commercial programs.

The international commission, which right at the time of the trilateral conference in Moscow was asked to visit the St. Petersburg scientific research institute to search for

the "criminal," has been dragging its feet so far. The day of its arrival has already been postponed several times. Nonetheless there have been no announcements of its refusal to conduct the inspection.

This slowness can be interpreted in different ways. The more so since there has been no official explanation, and only in the Convention Committee were we told that it seems that the Western participants in the inspection trip are being immunized.

Several of the military colleagues of the biologists, who still exist in nature, think that the people abroad really know that they will not find anything in St. Petersburg. To the natural question of why they do not select another object for their inspection, the NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent received the answer that if they did they would receive a request for an analogous inspection of their own facility, which is a cause for concern to us. In the words of certain representatives of the military department, this is the last thing our Western partners want.

One way or another, it is quite obvious that the biological weapon project will not be hidden in the history of the Institute for Super-Pure Biological Agents.

On the other hand, this subject shows fairly clearly the difficulties encountered by those who really want to learn the truth about biological weapons projects.

The system of indirect orders adopted in the military-industrial complex (in this case, through the Biopreparat Concern) is a reliable guarantee of this. Incidentally, it is an extremely telling fact that while even children are no longer frightened by this Biopreparat, the scientists associated with it dare to assert that they did not suspect that there were any special relations between the concern and the military department.

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When this article was being prepared for printing, news came from St. Petersburg that the international commission had arrived there.

But it preferred not to report on the practical results of its activity.

#### Presidential Edict on Biological Weapons Questioned

934P0032D Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 2 Dec 92 p 6

[Article by Judicial Service Lieutenant Colonel Oleg Belyavskiy: "The Biological Program Was Shut Down, But... Are We Not Getting Ahead of Ourselves?"]

[Text] The edict of the president of Russia of 11 April 1992 prohibited the development and implementation on the territory of the Russian Federation of biological programs conducted in violation of the Biological Convention, and a number of practical steps were taken to

eliminate any ambiguity in this area: All aggressive research programs of the former USSR were curtailed; in spite of a certain amount of harm to the protection programs, the only test laboratory, on Vozrezhdeniye Island in the Aral Sea, was closed down; at all military biological facilities they dismantled experimental technological lines for preparing biological formulas, and the entire physical plant and laboratories are being reconstructed for producing protective preparations and products for the national economy; the released scientific and technical personnel potential has been redirected for solving crucial problems of providing the country with modern biological preparations for exclusively peaceful national economic purposes; the number of personnel participating in military biological programs has been reduced by half. The allocations for military biological research have been reduced by 30 percent, and the administration of the Ministry of Defense in charge of the offensive biological program has been abolished.

The list of measures taken by the Russian side does in fact seem impressive. It would be reasonable to assume that the Americans and British obtained such desirable admissions and concessions from Russia in no other way than by making corresponding commitments themselves. Or perhaps they have nothing left to eliminate, reduce, retool, or reprofile? And perhaps no biological research has been done in the armed forces of the United States and Great Britain since the signing of the 1927 Convention.

Let me present these figures.

In the armed forces of the United States, there are actually three departments within the Defense Department: Army, Navy, and Air Force—one for each branch of the armed forces. Each of these departments has a command (in the Armed Forces of Russia these would be the main or central administration) for medical research and development and a number of subordinate structures which are responsible for making annual adjustments to programs for antibacteriological defense.

Let us consider these structures from the example of the U.S. Department of the Army, which is responsible for overall leadership of the program.

The command for research and development of the U.S. Army (USAMRDSC) has jurisdiction over: the Administration for Development of Medicines, the Administration for Medical Supply for the Army, the Aeromedical Scientific Research Laboratory, the Medical Scientific Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (head institution—O.B.), the Letterman Scientific Research Institute, the Laboratory for Biomedical Research and Development, the Biological Laboratory for Aerosol Testing, and the Walter Reed Scientific Research Institute (which has branches in Malaysia, Kenya, Brazil, Thailand, and the FRG). There are, naturally, the Medical Intelligence Center and the Information Center. But that is still not

all. Within the aforementioned program certain functions are assigned to another command of the Department of the Army—material and technical supply, which, among others, has jurisdiction over the Administration of Laboratories and the Administration for Testing and Evaluation.

The structure of the latter is included in the Dugway Proving Ground—the U.S. Army's largest military-technical center, located on a gigantic desert plateau in the state of Utah.

I will not go through the entire structure of military-biological institutions of other departments of the U.S. Armed Forces—that would take up too much space. Suffice it to say that, for example, the Department of the Navy has its own network of foreign military-biological testing centers and field laboratories—in the Philippines, Indonesia, Egypt, Peru, and Kenya.

Scientific and engineering personnel for the aforementioned institutions are trained by dozens of universities and also the Military Medical Academy in a Washington suburb—Bethesda.

In 1986 the American Congress allotted more than \$40 million for maintaining the Walter Reed research facility and \$12 million for the Letterman research facility, and the total allotted annually by the Pentagon for research within the biological research program reached \$100 million by the end of the eighties—100 times more than what is spent on conducting defense biological research in our country.

Perhaps this money was spent for purely peaceful purposes, as the Convention requires?

Let us try to answer this question by quoting just a few excerpts from articles in the American press.

In August 1987 the weekly **BUSINESS WEEK** ran an article entitled "Is the Pentagon Preparing for the Introduction of Biotechnological Warfare?" whose author asserted that "...under the Reagan administration the Pentagon program for biological weapons development is growing more rapidly than the bacteria cultures developing in the incubator..." According to this magazine's information, the Pentagon's allocations for research in the area of bacteriological weapons grew from \$15 million in 1981 to \$90 million in 1986. In that same year of 1986 another \$5 million was released for the construction of a new testing facility at the Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. The Pentagon programs, the journal writes, use the latest methods of biotechnological science, above all genetic engineering, which make it possible "without significant expenditures to manufacture large quantities of antibodies, toxins, and other substances capable of making biological weapons more effective."

According to the American magazine **THE PROGRESSIVE**, the funds allotted for increasing the arsenals for

bacteriological warfare compose the "most rapidly growing and dangerous expenditure item of the U.S. military budget."

In 1989 residents of Amherst, where the University of Massachusetts is located, demanded special hearings to clarify the nature of the research being conducted in the aforementioned university with money from the U.S. Defense Department. The public in Amherst were in favor of declaring the city a "zone free of any work for creating biological weapons."

Even taking into account the fact that American journalists, like ours, like to lay it on thick—especially in those areas where the majority of us are dilettantes—the nature of the research being conducted in the bosom of the military-biological structures of the United States cannot but evoke concern. Thus, according to information at the disposal of the Armed Forces of Russia, the United States has retained practically all of the infrastructure of the facilities at which biological weapons were developed.

The Armed Forces of Great Britain also have a developed network of biological scientific research institutions.

It is now out of fashion to make any comparisons of military potentials—especially when speaking about the United States and its NATO allies. It is thought that the danger for Russia of armed conflicts with these countries is negligible. In the current stage of the development of the geopolitical situation, one can agree with such assertions. But one can hardly fail to attach significance to the numerous signs of the existence of a military-biological potential among our southern neighbors... As for the United States, things are a lot calmer on the borders there.

But nonetheless the United States is trying—and apparently succeeding—to solve problems of reinforcing the Biological Convention at the expense of the security of other countries. It is no accident that the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia—the leader of our delegation to the meeting of experts of Russia, the United States, and Great Britain—Grigoriy Berdennikov, stated outright in his speech that the lack of an adequate reaction from the United States to the large-scale complex of measures taken by Russia evoked in him "a feeling of dissatisfaction." Moreover, the Americans, guided by the well-known rule of strike while the iron is hot, are urging the Government of Russia to proceed further along the path indicated by our partners across the ocean.

Of course, it would be stupid not to take advantage of the situation that has developed on the territory of the former USSR to put an end to such a concept as "parity" once and for all. The more so in this area where this parity actually did exist.

The Convention and the international documents adopted to develop it could well remain on paper unless in the near future we find approaches to solving the problem of a mechanism for international monitoring of the fulfillment of the Convention by its participants. In this connection the Russian side has expressed the need

for a clear distinction between activity that is allowed and prohibited under the Convention, particularly so that the objects that are banned and their volumes will be clarified and concretized. At the same time we announced our readiness to try the appropriate procedures for monitoring biological facilities.

Unfortunately, neither in Geneva nor at the meeting in Moscow did we manage to reach complete agreement on these proposals. And that is no accident: The Americans are prepared to monitor and cut whatever and wherever you wish—as long as it does not affect the American defense potential and the territory of the United States itself. Our politicians have a different approach. As always, history will judge...

### Legislation on Pathogen Export Control

#### Presidential Directive

PM0712133592 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI  
in Russian 5 Dec 92 p 3

[Russian Federation president's directive No. 711-rp dated 17 November 1992]

[Text] Directive of the Russian Federation president

On the introduction of Controls on the Export From the Russian Federation of Pathogens, Their Genetic Variations, and Fragments of Genetic Material, Which Could Be Used in the Creation of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons

1. The list submitted by the Russian president of pathogens, their genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material which could be used to create bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons which are exported under licence (the list is appended) is approved.

2. The Russian Federation Government shall approve the Statute on the procedure for controlling the export from the Russian Federation of pathogens, their genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material which could be used in the creation of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons.

[signed] B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation.

President's Directive no. 711, dated 17 November 1992.

List of Pathogens, Their Genetic Variations, and Fragments of Genetic Material Which May Be Used in the Creation of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Exported Under Licence Approved by Directive of the President of the Russian Federation no. 711 dated 17 November 1992

Number of position	Name	Foreign economic activity commodity code number
1.	Viruses, their genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material	
1.1	Strains of pathogen of dengue fever serotype I-IV	300290500
1.2	Japanese encephalitis pathogen	300290500
1.3	Pathogen of primaveral-estival mite encephalitis	300290500
1.4	Pathogen of St. Louis encephalitis	300290500
1.5	Pathogen of Eastern American Equine Encephalomyelitis	300290500
1.6	Pathogen of Venezuelan Equine Encephalomyelitis	300290500
1.7	Pathogen of Western American Equine Encephalomyelitis	300290500
1.8	Rift Valley Fever Pathogen	300290500
1.9	Smallpox pathogen	300290500
1.10	Yellow Fever Pathogen	300290500
1.11	Hemorrhagic Fever Pathogen	
1.11.1	Hemorrhagic Fever with Renal Syndrome	300290500
1.11.2	Congo-Crimea Hemorrhagic Fever	300290500
1.11.3	Omsk Hemorrhagic Fever	300290500
1.11.4	Hemorrhagic Lassa Fever	300290500
1.11.5	Hemorrhagic Ebola [as transliterated] Fever	300290500
1.11.6	Marburg [as transliterated] Fever	300290500
1.11.7	Argentine Hemorrhagic Fever (Junin)	300290500
1.11.8	Bolivian Hemorrhagic Fever (Machupo)	300290500
1.11.9	Chikungun [as transliterated] Fever	300290500
1.12	Pathogen of lymphocytic chomomeningitis	300290500
1.13	Monkey Pox Pathogen	300290500

Number of position	Name	Foreign economic activity commodity code number
1.14	White Pox Pathogen	300290500
1.15	Pathogen of Kyasanurskaya [as transliterated] Forest Disease	300290500
1.16	Rabies pathogen	300290500
1.17	Pathogen of Scottish Encephalomyelitis	300290500
1.18	Pathogen of Murray Valley Encephalitis	300290500
1.19	Pathogen of Rosio [as transliterated] Encephalitis	300290500
1.20	Oropush [as transliterated] Pathogen	300290500
1.21	Povassan [as transliterated] Pathogen	300290500
2.	Rickettsia, genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material	
2.1	Q Fever Pathogen	300290500
2.2	Trench Fever Pathogen	300290500
3.	Bacteria, genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material	
3.1	Anthrax Pathogen	300290500
3.2	Brucellosis Pathogen	300290500
3.2.1	Brucella melitensis	300290500
3.2.2	Brucella suis	300290500
3.2.3	Brucella abortus	300290500
3.3	Cholera Pathogen	300290500
3.4	Pathogen of dysentery (Shigella)	300290500
3.5	Pathogen of glanders	300290500
3.6	Pathogen of pulmonary melioidosis	300290500
3.7	Plague pathogen	300290500
3.8	Pathogen of tularemia	300290500
3.9	Pathogen of typhus abdominalis	300290500
3.10	Ornithosis pathogen	300290500
3.11	Botulism pathogen	300290500
3.12	Gas Gangrene pathogen	300290500
3.13	Tetanus pathogen	300290500
3.14	Pathogen of legionnaire's disease	300290500
4.	Genetically altered microorganisms producing the following toxins (1)	300290500
4.1	Toxin botulinus	
4.2	Gas Gangrene Toxin	
4.3	Toxins of Staphylococcus aureus	
4.4	Ricin	
4.5	Saksitoksin [as transliterated]	
4.6	Dysentery toxin	
4.7	Konotoksin [as transliterated]	
4.8	Tetrodotoxin [as transliterated]	
4.9	Verotoksin [as transliterated]	
4.10	Abrin	
4.11	Cholera toxin	
4.12	Tetanus toxin	
4.13	Tnkhotsenovyye [as transliterated] mycotoxins (Note 1) The list does not constitute a basis for the control of the toxins themselves	

**Statute on Procedure**

PM0812102392 Moscow ROSSIYSKIE VESTI  
in Russian 5 Dec 92 p 3

[“Statute on the Procedure for Controlling the Export from the Russian Federation of Pathogens, Their Genetic Variations, and Fragments of Genetic Material Which Could be Used in the Creation of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons,” approved by Russian Federation Government Decree No. 892, dated 20 November 1992]

[Text] 1. This Statute envisages a set of measures to control the export of pathogens, their genetic variations, and fragments of genetic material which could be used in the creation of bacteriological (biological) and toxic weapons (hereafter called pathogens)

2. The procedure for controlling the export from the Russian Federation of pathogens envisages

the preparation and submission of a ruling on the possibility of the export of pathogens included in the List of Pathogens, Their Genetic Variations, and Fragments of Genetic Material Which May Be Used In the Creation of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons Exported Under License Approved by the President of the Russian Federation (hereinafter known as the List);

the licensing and declaration of pathogens for export.

3. When concluding contracts (agreements, treaties) for the export (transfer, exchange) of pathogens included in the List, subjects of economic activity on the territory of the Russian Federation or in places (points) under the jurisdiction or control of the Russian Federation, regardless of the form of ownership, must insist that the importer of these pathogens not use them for the purpose of creating bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, re-export them or transfer them to anyone else without written permission from the exporter, which must be coordinated with the Russian Federation Commission for Export Control under the Government of the Russian Federation. Permission for re-export may be obtained on fulfillment of the conditions stipulated in this paragraph.

Guarantee commitments must be specially registered by the importer at the importing country's state agency regulating foreign economic activity in each specific deal involving the supply of each item of export included in the List

4. The export from the Russian Federation of pathogens included in the List or their re-export is not allowed in the case of a state which violates the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972 and the Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare dated 17 June 1925.

5. The licensing of the export of pathogens included in the List is mandatory for all subjects of economic activity on the territory of the Russian Federation irrespective of the form of ownership and must apply to all types of foreign economic activity, including direct production and scientific and technical ties and commodity exchange operations in accordance with the present Statute.

The export of pathogens included in the List is allowed only under a license valid for that occasion alone [razovaya litsenziya] issued by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations

A license may be issued if the Commission for Export Control of the Russian Federation under the Government of the Russian Federation rules that the export of pathogens is possible. Where necessary the ruling is to be coordinated with the State Committee for Health and Hygiene Supervision.

To obtain a ruling, an application for the issue of a license completed in accordance with the requirements of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations must be sent to the Export Control Department of the Russian Federation's Export Control Commission under the Government of the Russian Federation. Copies of the contract and the document stipulating the importer's guarantee that the export item will not be used for the development and production of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons must be appended to the application

A ruling must be issued no later than 20 days after the aforementioned department's receipt of the documents in question. The ruling shall be sent by that department to the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and a copy shall be sent to the applicant

The Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations shall send the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics Export Control Department (in the agreed form) a report on the licenses issued on the basis of such rulings.

6. When pathogens included on the List are transferred outside the Russian Federation they must be declared in the prescribed manner

The exporter shall provide the Russian Federation State Customs Control organs with a customs declaration and a copy of the license, which shall serve to allow the export item to be taken outside the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation State Customs Committee shall send the Russian Federation Ministry of Economics Export Control Department (in the agreed form) a report on the [customs] declarations that have been made for the export of pathogens for which licenses and the rulings envisaged by paragraph five of this Statute have been issued

7. The pathogens included in the List may not be allowed to be exported from the territory of the Russian Federation without presentation of a customs declaration and a copy of the license, or if the declaration procedure is violated.

## ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES

### Russia-China Border Troop Reduction Agreement Said Imminent

LD1512143992 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0800 GMT 15 Dec 92

[Text] Russia and China are on the verge of concluding an agreement on troop reductions on the border. This was declared by Igor Rogachev, Russia's ambassador in China, on the eve of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Beijing, which will start this week, though Rogachev did not clarify by how much troops on the border will be reduced. According to Western estimates, the number of troops of the former Soviet Union along the whole length of the border with China was 600,000 people in the mid-1980s. The number of Chinese troops on the border was one million.

## REPUBLIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

### Operational Problems in Strategic Arms Deployed in Ukraine

#### Electronic, Other Items in Short Supply

934P0031A Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian 12 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "A Sword in the Sheath Is Still a Sword"]

[Text] Man is the most dreadful thing on earth.

Think about this. The beast of prey takes only as much as he needs. A pack of wolves will not kill more reindeer than it can eat. Man is willing to destroy (and has destroyed) such things for himself in the millions. And everything that surrounds him—life on the planet. He is capable of splitting the globe. Not in half, but into small pieces.

Has nature really created a gravedigger for itself in the person of Homo sapiens? Or is it still stronger and can, having grown angry, destroy it (us) in a worldwide flood? Noah will appear, build an ark, and history will go around a second circle. Maybe this will be the third or fourth?

Such thoughts came to me at a depth of many meters, where I found myself with missile launcher crew members. Diabolical thoughts. Perhaps because we were located not far from hell... But it is paradise compared to the hell that even one launcher can create.

At the launcher consoles are people. It is not for the sake of passion that I will say: We must bow to them for the fact that they are protecting us. The missile launcher crew members of the strategic forces.

#### Weapons with the Philosophy of Absurdity

To serve 36 years in the Rocket Forces is not a field to cross. That is why the general's head is gray.

Others look at people with the stripes on their trousers merely as owners of black "Volgas" and two-story cottages. But here to talk with the person, look into his eyes, and finally understand...that same Lieutenant-General Valeriy Alekseyevich Mikhtyuk. To learn that he began serving back under Marshal Zhukov with his iron discipline. That together with ranks and positions, concerns and complexities increased in geometric progression. That the person who is responsible for millions of lives is paid less than the driver of the streetcar rumbling by outside his window.

"Nuclear weapons have their own philosophy," says Valeriy Alekseyevich [Mikhtyuk]. "Everything that man has thought up for warfare—spear, assault rifle, tank—he has used. The atomic bomb was created nearly 50 years ago. But not once has it been used in a combat situation. (Hiroshima and Nagasaki are a completely different case.) Here it turns out, on the one hand, the most destructive weapons in history are ready for a strike at any minute, and, on the other, everything is being done to see that this does not happen."

The people who serve in the Strategic Rocket Forces are more deeply aware of the illogicalness of such a situation than others.

I am lucky: I am the first journalist in the more than 30-year history of this strategic formation to be in its command post. This is the electronic brain connected to many hundreds of installations by thousands of cable-capillaries and radio and space communications. There are two direct telephones here—to the President of Ukraine and the minister of defense. A redundant system or, put simply, insurance precludes nonfulfillment of the assigned mission.

The combat shift at the command post is Lieutenant F. Mansurov, Major K. Stadnik, and Senior Lieutenant V. Bychkov. A Tatar, a Ukrainian, and a Russian. People of different nationalities, but of one love—for the cause which they serve. Take note of the name: combat shift. It is not an alert shift, but a combat shift. This generally trivial detail underscores the nature of the duty. In point of fact, everything here operates in the combat mode. It simply cannot be any other way.

The chief of the command post, Colonel I. Stepanov, tells about things which, unfortunately, I cannot reveal to the reader: they are classified. To me, knowing equipment on the level of a fountain pen, all this seems incomprehensible. The strength of the intellect and labor invested in the Rocket Forces forces one to look at our

people differently. We consider them (ourselves) uncultured and lagging decades behind Europe. But at the command post I began thinking differently. We, the hungry and poor, are richer than other in mind and capabilities. Yes, this is a paradox: poorer, but...richer.

Stepanov's older brother, Viktor Dmitrievich, serves here. He is also a colonel. They are the sons of a Russian and a Karelian. The older Stepanov brother has two children who were born in Ukraine. He has been honorably serving in Ukraine for many years now. But the tasks which Viktor Dmitrievich and his subordinates perform go far beyond the framework of our power and even the entire former Soviet Union.

They are on duty for 3-4 days at the command post (like in all the Rocket Forces). I repeat, from the side this looks showy: huge illuminated displays, super-equipment, the telephone to the President... But the people, hidden from the sun in the thick, reinforced concrete shell, breathing pumped in air instead of the pine-fresh air, all perceive this differently.

The missile launch crew members are on duty an average of 100 days a year, sometimes more. They themselves joke, there is no system better in the world than the "3-4" system. Between the times they go on combat duty, they have equipment classes and take certification tests. And, of course, there is the work with people. All this comprises the yearly cycle that is polished by decades.

We go from the command post to a more businesslike place—to the "guardroom." Here, too, everything is not simple. Two soldiers (compulsory service personnel) are located here for several days under an electronic lock, the key to which, you yourself understand, you will not find on the road. All the vital systems are self-contained and redundant. They prepare the food here themselves. In the event of unforeseen circumstances, the guard shift is able to stand duty for quite a few days. It is supplied, beginning with a needle and ending with a large-caliber machinegun.

The guards are under constant monitoring. Even when you open the metal shutter, a signal panel activates in the command post. In short, everything has been thought out, including for athletics. A trainer has been set up here, and there are weights.

It is probably most difficult for the combat crew of the launcher to stand duty. They are the ones, as I said before, who are closer to hell. The responsibility weighs more heavily on them than the many meters of armor above their heads. These two people (as part of the entire combat crew) perform strategic missions. During the Great Patriotic War, such missions were assigned to fronts.

Lieutenant Colonel O. Nazarov is assistant to the regimental commander for working with personnel; Senior Lieutenant O. Melnikov is a launch section engineer. They have been here at the console for six hours. Nearby are the unit colors: this is the procedure in the Rocket Forces. By the way, political workers were always part of the combat crews in the Strategic Rocket Forces. To put

it bluntly, there are combat officers and not "storytellers" with a pointer at the geographical map. Last year, when the political workers were removed from the establishment following the well-known events, they still continued to stand combat duty.

What are the two Olegs thinking about during these minutes? To make it look good, one could say that they were thinking about their lofty purpose and the enormous responsibility. But what are they really thinking? They are thinking about the basics of life, which today are a luxury for them. That same apartment (we will talk about the housing problem separately).

I will venture to assume what an American officer standing duty at a launcher is thinking. Where to go with his wife and children on his days off—to the country villa or Disneyland. And in what kind of a car: a Ford or a recently purchased Chrysler. What he is not thinking about is how to store up potatoes for his family for the winter. But our brother has to...

So, what does he have for his most difficult labor?

### Destitute Millionaires

If the former party apparatchiks labored under the same conditions as the missile launcher crew members, they would have created privileges for themselves on par with an oil-rich Arab prince. Here everything is indeed difficult, although not a single one of the 20 officers whom I met complained about the difficulties. Maybe it was partly because they are proud people. Moreover, they are people with a special mentality and high intelligence. Such people do not cry on someone's shoulder.

To talk about how much the missile launcher crew members receive means to cut to the quick. But, I must say, such a paltry wage for such an enormous responsibility! One can take comfort in the fact that they do not receive any more in other troops. But does this really make it easier? A comparison with civilians also does not favor the missile launcher crew members. I already spoke of the streetcar driver. There are people who come out with 3,000-4,000 rubles [R] a month. But they, using contemporary language, hang around and earn a kopeck or two on the side.

I was told that a warrant officer recently discharged from the unit set himself up in a commercial structure and is buying a home for R2 million. It is not hard to figure out that he has enough for other things, too. Today he suggests to his former co-workers to leave the service and come to work for him.

People hear about such cases and are depressed. They feel destitute. Another paradox: the misslemen who are entrusted with millions of rubles worth of equipment, billions at today's prices, exist in such poverty. (It would be bombastic to use the word "live" in this context.) In one of the stores in Vinnitsa, a double-bed costs R120,000. You will not earn enough for it in a year. The only thing left to do is throw your overcoat on the floor and sleep on it.

True, the missilemen do have some benefits. For every six days of combat duty, they get one day added to their leave. But with a stipulation: they cannot run it up to more than 15 in a year. That is, if you are on duty for 120 days (that comes to 20 days of added leave), you will receive only 15.

In addition, each missileman is paid a monetary bonus for each duty. It would seem to be good. But what actually turns out? For these 3-4 days, they deduct so-called share from the bonus. As a result, the total amount of the bonus is less than what is charged for food. The next paradox: the more you are on duty (read, the more they squeeze out of you), the less you earn. Here is a specific example. Major K. Stadnik, with whom we became acquainted at the strategic formation's command post, last time received R652 for duty, and they deducted R730 from it. For some the difference is even greater.

I should add that the wives of many officers and warrant officers are deprived of the opportunity to work. And there is nothing on which they can economize, except to bring hindrances to work. Or during the duty divide the ration in two and thus scrape up about 300 kopecks. You see, the missile launcher crew members are directed to eat at the flight norm—in view of their special workload. Even at the previous norms, the energy content of the daily ration was over 4,600 calories.

If only it were just the financial difficulties that weighed heavily on the missile launcher crew members. The housing problem is even a more serious burden.

"In our formation, the problem is especially critical for every other serviceman, says Major-General R. Karimov. "As far as the officers are concerned, 56 percent of those without apartments immediately stand combat duty."

Here I recalled Lieutenant Colonel O. Nazarov. When I showed an interest in where he was now living, Oleg Aleksandrovich answered: "Nowhere..." "How can that be?" "Really, can you call this housing?" explained the officer. "An acquaintance went on leave for a month and a half and left the keys." "Well," I continued the conversation, where will you live then?" "So far I haven't picked out anything. Strictly speaking, there is nothing to choose from."

And this is for an experienced officer who has devoted so many years to the service and savored all the "delights" of garrison life, including on Kamchatka. (Oleg Aleksandrovich spent about four years there.)

Where do those without apartments live?

"The lucky ones who have rented a place to live under a contract," continued Rustam Bakiyevich [Karimov]. "number less than 50. But then, those who get a place through private traders number nearly 250. About 200 are cooped up in dormitories and hotels. And they charge them more money there, too."

Lieutenant A. Bezkravnyy graduated from school this year. He did not expect conveniences, but he also did not plan on spending R4,000 a month for a dormitory. It is

good that his co-workers have found Andrey [Bezkravnyy] a place that fits his wage. Even then it is expensive, especially if you consider that the prices at the officers' mess are exorbitant.

Here are some typical facts in Colonel V. Stepanov's unit. Major S. Rybakov and his wife and two children are suffering in a one-room apartment; Captain V. Korolyuk and his family and many, many others are in the same conditions.

But housing is still being built. This year there are plans to turn over a 120-apartment building. Another building—with 100 apartments—is to be turned over early next year, and two 72-apartment buildings are to be turned over in the fall. This alone will not solve the housing problem. But, it will lessen its acuteness.

The problem is made more complicated by the fact that some of the officers leaving to serve in other countries of the Commonwealth are making all sorts of exchanges. For example, an officer who left the missile formation traded places with a civilian in Russia. The person who will arrive to fill the vacant position has no roof over his head. Thus, the line of people without apartments is increasing. True, the commander of the Carpathian Military District last fall banned the exchange (and also the privatization and granting of apartments) without consent of the district quarters and utilities directorate. But will this save the situation?

Problems of a personal nature are piling up on duty problems. Read about them in one of the coming issues

#### Operational, Social Lacks in Nuclear Forces

934P0031B Kiev NARODNA ARMIYA in Russian  
13 Nov 92 p 2

[Article by Lt Col Sergey Nagoryanskiy, NARODNA ARMIYA correspondent: "A Sword in the Sheath Is Still a Sword"]

[Text] (Conclusion. See 12 November issue for beginning.)

"We exchange sugar for units for the launcher computers," the missilemen might as well make such announcements in the Russian and Belarusian newspapers. It is in these countries that the main equipment suppliers and repair enterprises are located. And some of our Ukrainian plants are not pampering us very much.

"Neither Russia nor Ukraine has supplied us with anything since the beginning of the year," says Colonel N Tavrov. "There are a particularly large number of delivery deficiencies from Russia."

Let us note that these involve not only electronics but also goods that are top-priority. For example, paints and lubricants. "For certain positions," Nikolay Illich [Tavrov] continues, "there have been no deliveries for about two years."

In normal conditions, this is somehow tolerable. But not now, when serious inspection and maintenance work has begun. This kind of work is done once in three years. Today it is being dragged out over a period of time. It is not just due to delivery deficiencies, but also because organizational issues have not been resolved. Back in April, the formation was sent an inspection and maintenance schedule for 1993 from Moscow. Later a similar one came from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. It specified that two units were to conduct inspection and maintenance, and two were to be removed from combat duty.

"We appealed to higher levels," Colonel N. Tavrov shares the sore subject. "We found mutual understanding. There has been some movement on deliveries of equipment and materials. But this is not enough. I will emphasize: in the Rocket Forces the job must be done flawlessly."

What is preventing this?

Above all, it is the lack of an effective legal base among the powers of the CIS for mutual deliveries. They tried to establish one back at the beginning of the year. They prepared the appropriate agreement. I will give you the complete title—"On Principles of Supplying the Armed Forces of the Commonwealth Member-States with Armament, Equipment, and Supplies and Organizing Production Activities of Repair Enterprises and Scientific Research and Experimental Design Work." The agreement was considered at the February summit meeting in Minsk. However, in contrast to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk, the leaders of three other powers, including Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, did not sign the document.

An agreement on strategic forces also came about at Minsk. This time they signed for Russia. Finally, they came to an agreement in the summer at Dagomys. Much remains only on paper, but you cannot use it to patch up holes or feed people. And it will not make the car move, it needs gasoline.

"In September-October we did not receive a single liter of gasoline," Lieutenant Colonel G. Pleshko says. "We have many dozens of vehicles that have to make trips daily."

Grigory Ivanovich [Pleshko] is also bothered by other concerns. There are refrigerators and electric heaters in the launcher "guardrooms" whose operating life expire back under Brezhnev... Who will replace them? When? Especially at today's crazy prices. For guard detail personnel—considering all the complexities of standing duty—a special ration was devised long ago. Today we are running out of the stocks of this special ration in the formation. There is also much concern about clothing and related gear.

"At one time we received rations from Russia," says Grigory Ivanovich [Pleshko]. "Today the deliveries have stopped. Our only hope is Ukraine."

With regard to storing up vegetables and potatoes for winter, here the missilemen are thoroughly stocked up.

Their problems are the same as ours, with the same gasoline and clothing and related gear. But we may also suffer badly and renounce something. It should not be like this in the Strategic Rocket Forces. Their problems with fuel and lubricants and other difficulties—due to the exceptionally critical duty—are increased by a factor of two or three. That is why the missilemen should enjoy priority, and at the state level.

Many have said to me that in previous years, when there was a special need, aircraft were rushed to the manufacturer almost for nuts. Those were the rules. Firm rules. But now... Of course, you can complain about the time costs, but this should not at all be an excuse for the situation that has developed.

Another sore spot is the manning of missile units with personnel. As far as officers, warrant officers, and junior specialists are concerned, much has been thought out. Things are far more complicated with compulsory-service personnel.

"In the fall of last year and the spring of this year, we ended up with less than the best trained young people," says Major-General R. Karimov, "even though we sent officers ahead of time to the military commissariats to select the most suitable draftees. But when we came directly for them, many of whom we had taken were not there... I understand that there are special selection requirements for the Border Troops, the National Guard, and the Black Sea Fleet, but not to the detriment of the Rocket Forces, which by the way guard and protect not only the people of Ukraine but also those border guards, guardsmen and the entire Army and Navy..."

These are the facts. Just according to the results of the latest draft, the number of young men not suitable for service in the Strategic Rocket Forces went over half of the total number of young replacements. We very soon had to discharge or send some of them to the military commissariats. And the lads from unfortunate families were brought to militia offices. You see, most of the soldiers and sergeants stand combat duty at installations of special state importance!

"Here the parents also 'help,'" complains Rustam Bakievich [Karimov]. "Some arrive and simply take their sons away with them, like from a kindergarten. And all these lads are citizens of Ukraine. Here you cannot justify the actions by previous references to the fact that they are serving in an 'imperial' army."

Whom do the Strategic Rocket Forces serve?

### Servants of Two Gods

This, of course, should not be. One must serve one's master. And the missilemen are well aware of this. But circumstances (the breakup of the Soviet Union and the unified armed forces and the appearance of the independent states) took shape in such a way that you cannot solve the problems of subordination at one time, especially since they are more political than military.

When I visited the office of Colonel A. Selyunin, he had about 10 telegrams on his desk: from the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and its Socio-psychological Directorate, from the Carpathian Military District, from Marshal Ye. Shaposhnikov, from Army General P. Grachev, from another Moscow commander... Often the directives being given mutually preclude one another.

"The missilemen are steadfast people," says Anatoliy Semenovich [Selyunin]. "But even they have a limit, including for patience. Moreover, it must not be tested in people who have spent their entire service in the combat mode. And it is also impermissible to demand that they take the oath and do so as quickly as possible. Most of the people have determined their own position, unlike the politicians..."

"In the spring, all sorts of public organizations attacked us," says Colonel V. Stepanov. "They almost as an ultimatum demanded that we pledge allegiance to the people of Ukraine. But we are military people and obey orders. And so far there has not been any order to take an oath... True, the presidents of Ukraine and Russia agreed at Dagomys that the servicemen of the two powers called upon to serve in the Joint Armed Forces will pledge allegiance to the state of which they are citizens. But, first of all, the time periods have not been specified by this agreement. Second, what does it mean to divide people in conditions of the Strategic Rocket Forces today?"

According to the results of a sociological survey, more than 50 percent of the officers are willing to pledge allegiance to the people of Ukraine. 15 percent wish to be transferred to Russia, and the rest are still thinking. If, as they argue here, there are even 5 percent who wish to be sent to Russia, this would have a devastating effect on combat readiness. The missilemen have no extra people. There are simply no people to put on combat duty in place of those leaving. If we resort to such a decision, the workload on those left will increase markedly. This is intolerable in conditions of the Strategic Rocket Forces.

"We have been waiting a long time for a clear political decision on the strategic forces," says Lieutenant-General V. Mikhyuk, commander of the large strategic formation. "And the issue of the oath is one of the main ones. But it must not be dramatized. Moreover, they should not demand some kind of percentage from us. Rephrasing a well-known expression, you cannot measure politics with arithmetic. At the same time, and this is the main thing, the missilemen are handling their missions. I will emphasize that they are combat missions. And the training process as a whole is proceeding normally. For example, the formation of Major-General R. Karimov was rated 'good' according to the results of an inspection. Given all the difficulties, we continue to guard reliably that which has been entrusted to us. And as commander, I am grateful to my subordinates for this."

There is another circumstance that is weighing on people. This is their future. In Lisbon, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed a treaty according to which our country

will become nuclearfree by the end of 1997. This generally suits those officers who have completed 20 years of service. They will receive a full pension. But what about the young lieutenants who do not see any light at the end of the tunnel? We still must give the new people their due: the vast majority of them are serving conscientiously.

From time to time, politicians "surprises" also tug at the missilemen. In the deputy halls and in the offices with artistic parquet, ideas sometimes emerge which absolutely do not take realities into account. It is simply hard to believe some of the statements. Suffice it to recall the much talked about statement by President Boris Yeltsin that all strategic missiles in the former Soviet Union had been retargeted... Then there is the recent example where the minister of defense of the Russian Federation, Army General P. Grachev, stated that today the missiles located on the territory of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have been removed from combat duty and withdrawn into the reserve...

Imagine the reaction to such a statement by the people standing combat duty. Is it permissible to play hide-and-seek with them?

Sometimes the "experts" throw up ideas which look attractive to the simpletons and help an author gain a trump card for the next political game. Not too long ago, the idea was expressed that Ukraine is capable of putting satellites into space using the missiles located on its territory. When I asked the missilemen about this, they looked at me as if I was not all there...

That is politics. Life itself is weighing on the missilemen. Although many of them are sitting under ground, they see more and largely understand better than you and I. When they stand combat duty, people are not only working. Some are holding hunger strikes in the center of the capital, others are building "forosy" [transliterated], others are speculating in women's underwear in Poland, and still others are selling state secrets. And others...

The recent discussion of the military doctrine in the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine has prompted the missilemen to start thinking. The polarity of the opinions and proposals expressed, as it appeared to me from conversations with officers, alarmed them somewhat. Why? Because, in their opinion, not all deputies have a clear enough understanding of what is meant by "nuclearfree status" and "neutral power," and not all of them fully understand what nuclear weapons are and how they can be used. Such a lack of understanding has come about partly because the people's deputies, with rare exception, have never visited the missile launcher crew men. But, the military men themselves back last year were knocking on the doors of parliament. And not without some success. When the Supreme Soviet was discussing the draft Law on Social and Legal Protection of Servicemen and Their Family Members, Major-General Yu. Yushchenko, Colonel V. Karaslay, and Lieutenant Colonel V. Aleshchenko traveled from the large strategic formation of the Strategic Rocket Forces to Kiev. They tried to persuade deputies and argued. As a result, a significant

aspect was added to Article 3 of the law—on the status of servicemen of the Strategic Deterrence Forces.

Now about mutual understanding. I will dare to make a proposal. Shouldn't the deputies, members of the government, and other interested structures meet with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the missilemen? Perhaps it is a joint discussion of the entire spectrum of strategic problems that would make it possible to crystallize the state's military doctrine. As we know, the finishing touches are being put on it. For its part, NARODNA ARMIYA could organize such a discussion.

#### Can a Nuclear Warhead Be Stolen?

Either this question or another tormented two lads, and they decided to try to get to a launcher. First of all, the system of barriers would not let them in. Second, the guard detail personnel. But the lads did not know about this and went, as they say, to the point.

I am not describing in detail. I will say only that the actions of the guards prevented the people from dying. You see, a high-voltage current runs through one of the obstacles. One almost touched it, and... That is when Junior Sergeant O. Zherebnny and Privates V. Kazartsev and V. Garenko distinguished themselves.

Similar situations have occurred more than once this year. They all, so to speak, are minor in nature. But they force us to begin thinking again about nuclear safety.

This issue is of special importance for the missilemen (and for the whole world, for that matter). Now it is possible to accomplish much that is not so complicated: it took years to work out mechanisms of servicing, preventive maintenance, scheduled routine work, and the like. What will we have to do in the future? Take the missiles out of the silos, dismantle them, and transport the nuclear warheads and containers with highly toxic fuel to the appropriate points. In short, the risk of an unsanctioned actions, as the missilemen say, increases under such circumstances.

There is experience in such dismantling in the former Soviet Union. But even taking it into account, the complexity of all the work will not decrease. We must train people for this, and do so not on a state basis and not merely a military basis. We must do so in order to eliminate those difficulties which have been covered in a small part in these two articles.

**We should put some of the apologies for politicians on a missile and launch them somewhere far away! But if we could, we could get rid of countless problems along with them. Another problem is the transfer of military installations of the missile units being reduced. In the small town of Lipniki and at Zhitomirshchina, such an installation was transferred long ago to local authorities. Today**

it looks like a place following a nuclear strike. It was ransacked... Will the same thing happen with the rest of the property being vacated and valued by a recent commission of the Ministry of Defense at more than R1 billion? It is criminal to waste this given our poverty.

**But not everything is so gloomy and hopeless, even in housing. The command authorities of the large strategic formation, with the help of "Ukrinvestkonversiya" [Ukrainian Conversion Investment], which allocated R42,557,000 to the missilemen, have resolved the issue of building several dozen apartments. We can make other breakthroughs, but they do not give bureaucratic shackles...**

**Missiles in parades have always caused us pride. They are menacing weapons. Even outside of war they are menacing: a sword in the sheath is still a sword. After visiting units of the Strategic Rocket Forces, one is filled with even more pride for these people. They are people of a backbreaking heroic profession.**

**There is someone we can count on...**

#### U.S. Senators Visit Kazakhstan, Discuss Nuclear Arms Elimination

934P0030A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 24 Nov 92 p 3

[Article by Vladimir Desyatov: "An Offer Of Intergovernmental Competition: American Senators Nunn and Lugar Visited Alma-Ata"]

[Text] American Senators Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a Democrat from Georgia, and Richard Lugar, a Republican from Indiana, visited Alma-Ata on 21 November as part of their trip to the CIS nuclear states.

They held meetings with President Nazarbayev and Minister of Foreign Affairs T. Suleymenov, participated in a parliamentary discussion, and met with political leaders and journalists.

As you know, Senators Nunn and Lugar have authored a draft bill allocating \$800 million for the dismantling and elimination of nuclear missiles and silos on the territories of the CIS states. This dollar allocation amount is directly tied by the American side to the rate of disarmament in each individual state. It has been emphasized that the state which leads in nuclear disarmament will get the biggest slice of the American dollar pie.

The senators' current trip strongly resembles an attempt to expand, within the CIS framework, an intergovernmental competition for the leadership position in the nuclear disarmament race. It is hard to say how successful they will be in this task: Owners of nuclear weapons tend to compete for last place in the arms race

rather than aim to become the leader. Besides, experts think that Nunn and Lugar's bill gives the American inspectors and experts practically unlimited powers.

In the course of his talks with the senators, Nazarbayev made it clear that in the nearest future he would sign an international agreement on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and that it will be ratified by the parliament. The president also spoke of problems which arose during the training of Kazakh specialists in the area of nuclear armaments and possibilities for Kazakhstani-American cooperation in this respect. As for Kazakhstan's participation in the Nunn-Lugar competition, it remains an open issue. It seems that Nazarbayev was not satisfied with the senators' indefinite answers concerning the terms, time limits, and size of sums that can be given to Kazakhstan.

From Alma-Ata the American guests flew to Bishkek, after which they will go to Kiev, Minsk, and Moscow.

**Ukrainian Group Calls for Retention of Nuclear Weapons**

*LD1312191592 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 13 Dec 92*

[Text] The Crimean Committee of the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA] has demanded a halt to the propaganda for the neutral status of Ukraine and for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from its territory. This was stated at a sitting of the Committee dedicated to problems around the Black Sea Fleet. The Crimean Committee of the UNA considers the stand of the Ukraine Defense Ministry leadership and the Naval Forces of Ukraine to be the cause of the critically dangerous situation in the Fleet. The document approved by the Committee states that the government structures of our state are "unable to assume control of the Black Sea Fleet."

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